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Abstract
In December 1999 during the Helsinki European Council summit Greece 
consented to the Turkish candidacy for EU membership in what has been greeted 
as a remarkable shift in Greek policy towards Turkey. The argument of this 
thesis is that the so-called “Helsinki strategy” constituted the culmination of 
Greek Prime Minister Simitis’ attempts to pursue what he referred to as the 
“communitisation” of Greco-Turkish relations. Simitis believed that Greece 
should allow Turkey to develop its relations with the EU within a framework of 
EU rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece. According to the former Prime 
Minister, if  Greece could establish such rules at the EU level, the EU would 
assume responsibility for ensuring Turkey’s compliance. The argument 
emphasises the causal significance of domestic sources of foreign policy and 
leadership style in particular. “Communitisation” was an internal, pre-conceived 
task, to the completion of which Simitis remained unequivocally committed 
throughout the period under investigation even in the face of severe constraints 
and evidence that challenged the necessity of the task. The argument was tested 
against three alternative explanations that incorporated all the explanatory 
variables discussed in the literature, including shifts in Greece’s relative power 
position, the increasing economic costs of Greek policy, an external shock that 
demonstrated policy failure and the establishment of relevant EU foreign policy 
practices. Empirical testing of the four alternative explanations was based on 
process-tracing their observable implications for three dimensions of the policy 
making process: the definition of the policy problem the Helsinki strategy was 
intended to address, the alternative courses of action Greek foreign policy makers 
considered and finally the manner in which they were assessed. The theoretical 
framework constructed to resolve this empirical puzzle can be fruitfully applied 
to the study of several EU member-states’ foreign policies, thus advancing the 
theoretically informed empirical study of foreign policy.
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7Chapter 1: Introduction
The puzzle and the research question
Relations with Turkey have occupied the top of the Greek foreign policy agenda 
during the better part of the past four decades. Between 1973 and 1975 bilateral 
problems between Greece and Turkey emerged, while the Cyprus question, 
which had been a source of tension between the two countries since the 1950s, 
entered a new phase after Turkey’s military intervention in 19741. In the mid- 
1970s, Greece started to see Turkey as an international aggressor that constituted 
a threat to the territorial integrity of the Greek state. Addressing the Turkish 
threat became an issue of the utmost importance. The Greek government decided 
to apply for membership of the European Communities in the hope that Turkey 
would think twice before pursuing an aggressive policy towards a member-state 
of the Communities and that Greek membership would force Turkey to make 
concessions on Greco-Turkish relations in order to develop its own relations with 
the Communities2. Once its accession was achieved, Greece assumed an 
uncompromising stance. According to the newly elected socialist government, 
since Greece was a status quo country and Turkey a revisionist one, Greece only 
stood to lose from bilateral negotiations with Turkey over territorial issues. 
Consequently, the government decided to terminate the negotiations its 
predecessor was conducting and stated that the latter would not resume, unless 
Turkey abandoned its claims on Greek territory, recognised that the only pending 
issue was the delimitation of the continental shelf in the Aegean and removed its 
troops from Cyprus3. This policy had implications for Greece’s stance on 
relations between Turkey and the European Community/European Union (EU).
1 For these disputes see A. Heraclides, “Negotiating the Aegean Dispute: In Quest of Acceptable 
Principles and Points of Convergence”, Turkish Review o f Balkan Studies, 12, 2007, pp. 101-3; 
Y. Valinakis, Introduction to Greek Foreign Policy 1949-1988 (in Greek), Thesaloniki, 
Paratiritis, 1989, pp. 120-128, 205-210 and T. Veremis, The History o f Greco-Turkish Relations 
1453-2003 (in Greek), Athens, Sideris, 2003, pp. 142-156
2 Valinakis, op. cit. pp. 244-5. This idea remains popular to the present day; see T. A.
Couloumbis -  S. Dalis, “Greek Foreign Policy since 1974: From Dissent to Consensus” in D. G. 
Dimitrakopoulos -  A. G. Passas (eds), Greece in the European Union, London, Routledge, 2004, 
pp. 82, 84
3 For the PASOK (Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement) governments’ policy towards Turkey see V. 
Coufoudakis, “Greco-Turkish Relations and the Greek Socialists: Ideology, Nationalism and 
Pragmatism”, Journal o f Modem Greek Studies, 1: 2, 1983. For the negotiations the ND (New 
Democracy) governments conducted between 1975 and 1981 see Heraclides, op. cit. pp. 105-16
8When democratic rule was restored in Turkey and the Turkish government 
attempted to reactivate its Association Agreement with the Community, Greece 
insisted that progress in relations between Turkey and the Community should be 
prevented until Turkey had met the above conditions. This policy of 
conditionality was also adopted by the conservatives when they were returned to 
power and became standard practice for Greek policy towards Turkey4.
In December 1999, at the Helsinki European Council summit, however, Greece 
consented to the most significant development in EU-Turkey relations since the 
1963 Association Agreement: the EU upgraded Turkey to candidate country 
status. One might have thought that Turkey had met the conditions that Greece 
had imposed or at least some of them. Turkey, however, had met none. The 
Greek government allowed progress in EU-Turkey relations due to a complete 
reversal of national policy. Academic commentary has greeted the so-called 
“Helsinki strategy” as a “monumental decision”5 that constituted a “momentous 
shift”6 in Greek policy towards Turkey, thus inviting the question:
Why did the Greek government consent to the Turkish candidacy?
This shift becomes even more striking, when one takes into consideration the fact 
that Greco-Turkish relations are considered a “national issue” in Greece. In a 
volume where contributors were asked to discuss EU member-states’ special 
interests and relationships, the editors concluded that the latter are organised in 
“rings of specialness” that form concentric circles7. At the core of these rings of 
specialness lie what the editors referred to as the “domains prives” of EU 
member-states’ foreign policies, that is to say issues that national governments 
are determined to keep separate or private from the EU context. Greek policy 
towards Turkey was identified as one such domain prive. Indeed, as Turkey
4 For the ND government’s policy towards Turkey see S. Rizas, From Crisis to Detente: 
Constantinos Mitsotakis and the Policy of Greco-Turkish Rapprochement (in Greek), Athens, 
Papazisis, 2003
5 J. Ker-Lindsay, “The Policies of Greece and Cyprus towards Turkey’s EU Accession”, Turkish 
Studies, 8: 1, 2007, p. 73
6 G. Pagoulatos, “Greece, the European Union and the 2003 Presidency”, Groupement d ’ Etudes 
et de Recherches Notre Europe, Research and European Issues No 21,2002, p. 16
7 I. Manners -  R. Whitman, “Conclusions” in I. Manners -  R. G. Whitman (eds), The Foreign 
Policies o f European Union Member States, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2000, pp. 
266-7
9replaced the Soviet Union as the main threat to Greek security in 1974 (and 
officially in 1984), Greco-Turkish relations reached the top of the Greek foreign 
policy agenda and touched upon vital national interests, with regard to which 
autonomy ought to be maintained. Furthermore, as the socialist governments of 
the 1980s assumed an uncompromising stance on Greco-Turkish relations, it 
gradually became exceedingly difficult to move towards a more moderate stance 
or make decisions that involved loss of autonomy.
As has been pointed out, one implication of the classification of Greco-Turkish 
relations as a “national issue” is that “it is impossible...to advocate a policy 
different from the one that is accepted as national policy without a significant 
electoral cost or the fear of being criticised as a traitor”8. Indeed, the difficulties 
Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou faced in his attempts to improve 
Greco-Turkish relations in 1988 are instructive in this respect9 and in the 
aftermath of the 1996 Imia/Kardak crisis, which literally coincided with the 
formation of a new Greek government, the latter had to formulate a policy 
towards Turkey amidst the main opposition party leader’s claims that it had 
committed “acts of treason”10 during the crisis. Given that the charismatic 
Papandreou had not managed to commit the public to rapprochement in the late 
1980s, his successor -  Prime Minister Costas Simitis -  succeeding where 
Papandreou had failed was highly unlikely, since, while Papandreou exerted 
undisputable control over his party, Simitis’ leadership was constantly being 
undermined by intra-party opposition. The Prime Minister had to reckon with 
dissenters (both Members of Parliament and Members of the Cabinet), who more 
often than not were found amongst those who had unsuccessfully claimed the 
party’s leadership after Papandreou’s resignation, identified themselves with 
Papandreou’s policies and claimed that Simitis’ policies were distorting 
PASOK’s so-called “patriotic character”11. One analyst went so far as to argue
8 D. Kavakas, “Greece” in I. Manners -  R. G. Whitman (eds), The Foreign Policies o f European 
Union Member States, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2000, p. 150
9 R. Clogg, “Greek-Turkish Relations in the Post-1974 Period” in D. Constas (ed), The Greek- 
Turkish Conflict in the 1990s: Domestic and External Influences, London, Macmillan, 1990; V. 
Coufoudakis, “PASOK on Greco-Turkish Relations and Cyprus, 1981-1989: Ideology, 
Pragmatism, Deadlock” in T. C. Kariotis (ed), The Greek Socialist Experiment: Papandreou’s 
Greece 1981-1989, New York, Pella, 1992, pp. 174-5
10 K. Mardas, Preambles to War (in Greek), Athens, To Pontiki, 2005, p. 380
11 On intra-party opposition see E. Athanassopoulou, “Blessing in Disguise? The Imia Crisis and 
Turkish-Greek Relations”, Mediterranean Politics, 2: 3, 1997, esp. pp. 79, 98; K. Featherstone,
10
that Simitis’ opponents appeared to consider him “a potential ‘retreatist’... 
regardless of his record” because they were uncertain about his true intentions12.
The fact that Greco-Turkish relations are perceived as a national issue also 
induces the involvement of non-governmental actors with intense preferences, 
such as the Church and the media13. As has been pointed out, the Greek Orthodox 
Church maintains a significant level of influence both on the political system and 
on society14. This influence was exceptionally felt during the tenure of 
Archbishop Christodoulos. Shortly after his election, Christodoulos announced 
that he was going to be making “interventions” on national issues and the 
government appeared to acknowledge the Archbishop’s “special role”15. The 
Archbishop’s interventions and the government’s policy, however, were pointing 
in opposite directions. While the government was reconsidering its policy 
towards Turkey, Christodoulos was arguing that Greece’s “so-called allies” were 
attempting its “shrinking” in the name of a “so-called peaceful coexistence”16.
Similarly, the media did not promote moderation either. As has been pointed out, 
the number of television networks is disproportionate to the size of the 
unregulated market and it has therefore driven the search for competitiveness to 
extremes, which in turn has produced a distinct type of coverage of national 
issues17. Especially since the Imia/Kardak crisis, coverage of national issues has
“Introduction: ‘Modernisation’ and Structural Constraints of Greek Politics”, West European 
Politics, 28: 2, 2005, p. 226; A. Kazamias, “The Quest for Modernisation in Greek Foreign 
Policy and Its Limitations”, Mediterranean Politics, 2: 2, 1997, pp. 81, 85-7; T. Veremis -  T. 
Couloumbis, Greek Foreign Policy: Dilemmas o f a New Era (in Greek), Athens, ELIAMEP -  
Sideris, 1997, p. 55
12 Kazamias, op. cit. p. 81
13 On the Church and the media as factors that constrained the government’s capacity to pursue 
reform see A. Agnantopoulos, “The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy: A Conceptual 
Framework and an Empirical Application in Greek-Turkish Relations”, Paper prepared for the 2nd 
LSE PhD Symposium on Modem Greece: “Current Social Science Research on Greece”, LSE, 10 
June 2005
14 Featherstone, op. cit. p. 224; D. Halikiopoulou, “The Changing Dynamics of Religion and 
National Identity: Greece and the Republic of Ireland in a Comparative Perspective, Journal o f 
Religion in Europe, 1, 2008; Kavakas, op. cit. p. 152; G. Mavrogordatos, “Orthodoxy and 
Nationalism in the Greek Case”, West European Politics, 26: 1, 2003
15 M. Vasilakis, The Wrath o f God (in Greek), Athens, Gnoseis, 2006, pp. 42-4
16 Ibid. pp. 307-8; these statements were the follow-up to statements made shortly after the crisis, 
according to which “the real dilemma was and still is: peace or freedom”; see also “Greece’s 
Nationalist Archbishop”, Economist, 349: 8098, 12/12/98
17 D. Mitropoulos, “Foreign Policy and Greek Media: Subordination, Emancipation and Apathy” 
in P. I. Tsakonas (ed), Contemporary Greek Foreign Policy (in Greek), Athens, Sideris, 2003
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assumed what has been referred to as an “ultra-nationalist” character. One 
analyst went as far as to argue that between 1996 and 1999 the media attempted 
to substitute for state authorities and became “an autonomous player in the 
foreign policy making process”18.
The ability of these non-governmental actors to constrain the capacity of foreign 
policy makers to pursue reform is linked with public opinion. Since Greco- 
Turkish relations constitute a national issue, Greek policy towards Turkey has a 
uniform effect on the public/nation and different policy options do not entail 
different costs and benefits for different social/interest groups. One analyst went 
as far as to argue that “public opinion also becomes a foreign policy maker”19. In 
contrast to what has been suggested in the literature, there is no evidence that the 
1999 earthquakes and the feelings of solidarity amongst the Greeks and the Turks 
that they caused allowed the government to consent to Turkey’s candidacy20. 
Eurobarometer surveys show that even though Greek people were amongst the 
most supportive of enlargement, that support did not extend to Turkey. All the 
earthquakes managed was to increase support from thirteen (13%) to twenty- 
three percent (23%) of those surveyed, while sixty-nine percent (69%) remained 
opposed to the prospect of Turkey becoming a part of the EU21. The link between 
public opinion and domestic actors opposing reform was clearly manifested 
shortly before the Helsinki summit. During the last meeting of the Cabinet before 
the summit, certain Cabinet members opposed the strategy the Prime Minister 
seemed determined to pursue. As the next election was drawing near and opinion 
polls showed skepticism towards Turkey increasing amongst the public, several 
Cabinet members preferred to postpone the decision22. In fact, it was reported in 
the press that several Cabinet and party members suggested that a Greek veto 
would create favourable circumstances for the ruling party to call for and win an 
early election23. In this sense, the decision to consent to the Turkish candidacy
18 Ibid. pp. 292-3
19 Kavakas, op. cit. pp. 151-2
20 A. Heraclides, “The Greek-Turkish Conflict: Towards Resolution and Reconciliation” in M. 
Aydin -  K. Ifantis (eds), Turkish-Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in the Aegean, London, 
Routledge, 2004, p. 76
21 European Commission, Eurobarometer: Public Opinion in the European Union, Report Number 
51, 1999 and European Commission, Eurobarometer: Public Opinion in the European Union, 
Report Number 52,2000
22 N. Marakis, “Two and a Half Lines for Helsinki”, To Vima, 21 November 1999
23 G. Lakopoulos, “Electoral Surprise”, To Vima, 28 November 1999
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has been described as a “major gamble” 24 in view of the forthcoming election 
because the government had to convince the public that consenting to upgrading 
Turkey to candidate country status “without a prior show of goodwill from 
Ankara did not represent a loss to Greek national interests”25.
Finally, it should be noted that foreign policy change took place in the absence of 
epistemic communities that could have acted as agents of reform. As has recently 
been argued: “The dramatic shift in Greece’s foreign policy toward Turkey, 
which reached its climax at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, 
evolved in the virtual absence of any prior in-depth discussion in Greek 
academia! It could even be argued that Greece’s new strategy toward Turkey... 
was exclusively the result of decisions taken by politicians. It is truly remarkable 
that not only was this major shift in Greek foreign policy not ‘prepared’ by the 
Greek IR community, but it still has not even been studied through the 
application of the relevant IR theoretical tools”26.
The far-reaching implications of the decision that Greece secured attribute the 
quality of a “substantively important”27 case of foreign policy change to the shift 
in Greek policy. Once the Greek government ceased to object to the Turkish 
candidacy, the road was cleared for the initiation of a process that could lead to 
Turkish accession. The large and inefficient agricultural sector, large regional 
inequalities, the size and demographic dynamics of the population, the multi- 
regional geopolitical roles, the predominantly Muslim character and the 
geographical position of Turkey have already began to challenge the policies and 
politics of the EU, the EU as a polity and the very concept of “Europe” and of 
being “European”. Unexpected change in Greek foreign policy has been an 
integral part of developments affecting all EU citizens.
24 Ker-Lindsay, op. cit. p. 73; see also K. Ifantis, “Greece’s Turkish Dilemmas: There and Back 
Again.. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 5:3, 2005, p. 382
25 J. Ker-Lindsay, “Greek-Turkish Rapprochement: The Impact of Disaster Diplomacy?”, 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 14: 1, 2000, p. 226
26 P. Tsakonas, “Theory and Practice in Greek Foreign Policy”, Southeast European and Black 
Sea Studies, 5: 3, 2005, pp. 429-30
27 For the term see J. Mahoney -  G. Goertz, “A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative 
and Qualitative Research”, Political Analysis, 14: 3,2006, pp. 242-3
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The state of the art
While change in Greek policy towards Turkey was quite unexpected, numerous 
ideas that attempt to explain it have been put forward ex post facto. More often 
than not, these analyses are rather descriptive and not particularly parsimonious, 
as they usually identify long lists of developments that may have affected Greek 
policy. Several studies discuss the “Europeanisation” of Greek foreign policy28 
and the evolution of Greek policy towards Turkey has been identified as “the 
clearest manifestation of the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy”29. Indeed, 
it is widely held that foreign policy is the most successful -  if not the only -  area 
of Europeanisation in Greece30. While initially, “there was no sign of 
Europeanisation in Greek foreign policy but, rather, ample evidence to the 
contrary”31, with foreign policy being “the area of public policy over which 
Greece (had) fought most hard to preserve autonomy of action, in disregard to 
the consensus requirements of EPC”32, the second half of the 1990s saw “the 
biggest surge of Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy”33.
These studies constitute part of a remarkable growth of the literature on 
“Europeanisation” witnessed in the field of European Studies since 199934. The 
emphasis on Europeanisation reflects a research interest in the possible causal 
significance of the EU in processes of domestic change. Academic consensus,
28 S. Economides, “The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy”, West European Politics, 28: 2, 
2005; P. Ioakimidis, “Contradictions between Policy and Performance” in K. Featherstone -  K. 
Ifantis (eds), Greece in a Changing Europe: Between European Integration and Balkan 
Disintegration, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1996; P. Ioakimidis, “The 
Europeanisation of Greece’ s Foreign Policy: Progress and Problems” in A. Mitsos -  E. 
Mossialos (eds), Contemporary Greece and Europe, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2000; Kavakas, op cit; 
C. Tsardanidis -  S. Stavridis, “The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy: A Critical 
Appraisal”, European Integration, 27: 2, 2005
29 Economides, op. cit. p. 482; Stavridis and Tsardanidis acknowledged this as an interesting 
question, which “(could) not be considered in more detail”; see Tsardanidis -  Stavridis, op. cit. p. 
228
30 S. Stavridis, “Assessing the Views of Academics in Greece on the Europeanisation of Greek 
Foreign Policy: A Critical Appraisal and a Research Agenda Proposal”, The Hellenic 
Observatory - LSE Discussion Papers, No. 11, 2003, p. 7
31 Tsardanidis - Stavridis, op. cit. p. 226
32 Ioakimidis, “Contradictions between...”, op. cit. p. 37
33 Economides, op. cit. p. 478
34 K. Featherstone, “Introduction: In the Name of Europe” in K. Featherstone -  C. M. Radaelli 
(eds), The Politics o f Europeanisation, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 5. For the real 
world developments that resulted in increased interest in the concept of Europeanisation see S. J. 
Bulmer -  C. M. Radaelli, “The Europeanisation of National Policy?”, Queen’s Papers on 
Europeanisation, No. 1,2004, pp. 1-3
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however, has not yet been reached regarding the precise meaning of the concept. 
As numerous meanings have been attributed to Europeanisation and most 
definitions of the concept have been used exclusively by the scholars that 
introduced them, the concept’s usefulness for empirical research has come into 
question35. Furthermore, while it has been shown that the EU effect has been 
greater on public policies than on national polities or domestic politics36, it has 
also been argued that this effect varies across policy areas depending on the 
latter’s nature and the relevant institutional set-up at the EU level. In the case of 
foreign policy, in particular, it has been suggested that the “unique nature” of the 
policy area and intergovernmental decision-making at the EU level render 
Europeanisation less likely or its effects weaker and, in any case, harder to 
trace37.
Studies on the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy have failed to address 
these issues. Economides’ study -  which explicitly identified change in Greek 
policy towards Turkey as the outcome of Europeanisation -  does not engage the 
debate on the precise meaning of the concept or the debate on the applicability of 
the concept to the study of foreign policy38. A “minimalist” definition is adopted, 
according to which Europeanisation refers to “the impact of EU membership on a 
member-state”39. Based on this definition, the concept is used rather loosely. 
Europeanisation -  in the case of Greek foreign policy -  has assumed the form of 
“Westernisation”, “modernisation”, “normalisation, rehabilitation”, 
“denationalisation” and “multilateralisation”40. Some of these outcomes are 
practically indistinguishable (denationalization -  multilateralisation), others are
35 T. A. Borzel -  T. Risse, “Conceptualising the Domestic Impact of Europe” in K. Featherstone -  
C. M. Radaelli (eds), The Politics o f Europeanisation, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 
59; J. P. Olsen, “The Many Faces of Europeanisation”, Journal o f Common Market Studies, 40: 
5, 2002, p. 921; S. Stavridis, “The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy: A Literature 
Review”, The Hellenic Observatory - LSE Discussion Papers, No. 10, 2003, p. 4
36 C. M. Radaelli, “Europeanisation: Solution or Problem? ”, European Integration OnLine 
Papers, Vol. 8 No. 16,2004, p. 14
37 C. Major, “Europeanisation and Foreign and Security Policy: Undermining or Rescuing the 
Nation-State?”, Politics, 25: 3, 2005, p. 182; K. E. Smith, ‘The EU in the World: Future Research 
Agendas’, European Foreign Policy Unit Working Paper, 2008/1, 2008, p. 17
38 This appears to be a common problem in the literature on Europeanisation. As has been 
pointed out, the latter has hitherto exhibited limited awareness of the significance of concept 
formation and its implications for measurement; see T. Exadactylos -  C. M. Radaelli, “Research 
Design in European Studies: The Case of Europeanisation”, Journal o f Common Market Studies, 
47: 3,2009, esp. p. 521
39 Economides, op. cit. p. 471
40 Ibid. pp. 472-3
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explicitly considered as being synonymous (Westernisation -  modernisation) and 
others (normalisation, rehabilitation) appear to be idiosyncratic and of relevance 
mainly - if not exclusively - to the Greek case.
This is characteristic of the literature on Europeanisation. Since the latter is 
understood as a concept that refers to the domestic impact of the EU, empirical 
research is often organised as a search for such an impact without defining the 
outcomes of Europeanisation with a sufficient degree of precision. As has been 
pointed out, due to the early stage of research on Europeanisation, researchers 
have shown preference for an analytical grid “broad enough as to accommodate a 
wide range of empirical observations that may have something to do with 
Europeanisation”.41 Our inability to specify this range, however, hinders our 
efforts to identify the puzzles relevant to Europeanisation. In other words, we are 
not certain what the empirical observations that would make us suspect that 
Europeanisation has occurred are. Indeed, it is not unusual for researchers to 
select a state’s accession to the EU or the establishment of cooperation in the 
field of foreign policy as a starting point and subsequently to try and find some 
sort of EU impact. It is often the case that either no change can be observed42 or 
that every observable change is ex post facto conceptualised as a form that 
Europeanisation assumed43. If Europeanisation is a process, but we are not 
exactly sure what the outcomes of the process are, we are facing the exact same 
problem Haas identified approximately four decades ago: a dependent variable 
problem44. At that time, it was unawareness of the possible outcomes of the 
integration process that hindered theorising, nowadays, it is a similar 
unawareness of the possible outcomes of the process of Europeanisation that 
poses a challenge for researchers.
41 C. M. Radaelli, “The Europeanisation of Public Policy” in K. Featherstone -  C. M. Radaelli 
(eds), The Politics o f Europeanisation, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 32
42 B. Tonra, The Europeanisation o f National Foreign Policy: Dutch, Danish and Irish Foreign 
Policy in the European Union, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2001
43 Economides, op cit
44 E. B. Haas, “The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of 
Pretheorizing” in L. N. Lindberg -  Scheingold S. A. (eds), Regional Integration: Theory and 
Research, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1971, p. 18
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The numerous outcomes discussed above are considered forms of the 
“projection” of national interests onto the European foreign policy agenda45. 
According to Economides, when Europeanisation assumes this particular form, 
member-states “project” their national interests onto the EU’s agenda, as EU 
membership may offer the means to achieve national foreign policy goals more 
effectively, in which case the EU serves as a “vehicle” for national foreign 
policy46. While it has indeed been suggested that EU membership has made new 
“assets” or “tools” available to Greek foreign policy makers47, the literature has 
failed to specify which of the foreign policy instruments available at the EU level 
are relevant despite the fact that the analysis of EU foreign policy has made 
substantial progress in this respect48. Specification and precision are fundamental 
properties of good causal arguments49 and “EU membership” as an explanatory 
variable is not sufficiently precise. More significantly, as has been pointed out 
within the context of the debate on the precise meaning of Europeanisation, 
identifying “projection” or “uploading” as a form or constituent element of 
Europeanisation implies a direction of causality (from the domestic to the EU 
level) that “properly equates” Europeanisation with (an aspect of) the concept of 
integration and brings its usefulness into question because the use of two 
different concepts for the same phenomenon contradicts “elementary logic”50.
45 Economides, op. cit. pp. 472-3
46 Ibid. p. 472. See also J. I. Torreblanca, “Ideas, Preferences and Institutions: Explaining the 
Europeanisation of Spanish Foreign Policy”, Arena Working Papers, WP 01/26, 2001; R. Wong, 
“The Europeanisation of Foreign Policy” in C. Hill -  M. Smith (eds), International Relations and 
the European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 137, 150; R. Wong, The 
Europeanisation o f French Foreign Policy: France and the EU in East Asia, Basingstoke, 
Palgrave, 2006, pp. 8-9 and the sections that discuss the EU as a constriction/opportunity in the 
contributions to I. Manners -  R. G. Whitman (eds), The Foreign Policies o f European Union 
Member States, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2000
47 Couloumbis -  Dalis, op. cit. p. 81; K. Ifantis, “Whither Turkey? Greece’s Aegean Options” in 
C. Arvanitopoulos (ed), Turkey’s Accession to the European Union: An Unusual Candidacy, 
Athens, Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy -  Centre for European Studies -  
Springer, 2009, p. 122
48 See K. E. Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World, Cambridge, Polity, 
2003, pp. 52-68
49 J. Gerring, “Causation: A Unified Framework for the Social Sciences”, Journal o f Theoretical 
Politics, 17: 2,2005, pp. 170, 172
50 For such critiques see K. Dyson -  K. H. Goetz, “Living with Europe: Power, Constraint and 
Contestation” in K. Dyson -  K. H. Goetz (eds), Germany, Europe and the Politics o f Constraint, 
Oxford, Published for the British Academy by Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 13-15, 20; 
Featherstone, “Introduction: In the Name...”, op. cit. p. 10 and Radaelli, “The Europeanisation 
of...”, op. cit. p. 34
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Economides’ analysis of change in Greek policy towards Turkey reinforces this 
critique in the sense that the “projection” of Greek foreign policy goals onto the 
EU’s agenda is not considered to have been the outcome of an EU-generated 
process, but that of Prime Minister Simitis’ “intentions”. Drawing on Ioakimidis’ 
idiosyncratic distinction between “responsive” and “intended” Europeanisation -  
Economides identifies Europeanisation with “modernisation”51. According to 
Ioakimidis, while responsive Europeanisation is “spontaneous” and involves “no 
or little conscious effort” by political actors, intended Europeanisation entails “a 
strong intention and thus a purposefully framed scheme” to pursue policy change 
and it is synonymous with modernisation52. The analysis is to a large extent 
normative and the use of certain terms (modernisation, Europeanisation) both as 
analytical categories and as political mottos has resulted in considerable 
confusion. As Stavridis concluded, after interviewing Greek academics, most of 
them are biased in favour of Europeanisation: they consider it to be a “positive 
development”53. This is a result of viewing “Europe” as a panacea. In effect, 
Europeanisation is perceived as a goal that needs to be achieved. This 
understanding of Europeanisation has prevented a clear distinction between 
Europeanisation and other processes, such as modernisation, which are also 
considered to be positive developments, and a clear distinction between the 
process of Europeanisation, its causes and its outcomes.
While Economides concedes that the term “modernisation” is seldom applied to 
foreign policy54, he argues that Prime Minister Simitis’ programme of 
modernisation had “its complementary policy externally” and that his “intention 
was to embark on a parallel process of re-Europeanising Greek foreign policy 
while pursuing a modernising domestic reform programme”55. The argument 
fails to distinguish between the causal significance of the EU and that of the 
former Prime Minister’s “intentions”. Economides says more about what needed
51 Economides, op. cit. p. 475-7
52 P. Ioakimidis, “The Europeanisation of Greece: An Overall Assessment”, South European 
Society and Politics, 5: 2, 2000, pp. 74-5. Ioakimidis, however, considers modernisation to be a 
prerequisite for Europeanisation. He seems to be caught in some sort of circular thinking, where 
modernisation is considered to be a prerequisite for Europeanisation, a type of which stands for 
modernisation; see Ioakimidis, “Contradictions between...”, op. cit. p. 48
53 Stavridis, “Assessing the Views...”, op. cit. p. 7
54 Economides, op. cit. p. 475
55 Ibid. p. 481, emphasis added
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to be done in order that “Europeanisation” could be achieved than about why it 
was pursued. Change in Greek policy towards Turkey is attributed to a key 
foreign policy maker’s “intentions” without empirical evidence of his 
considerations that resulted in the formulation of this strategy or a theoretically 
informed explanation of why his “intentions” were causally significant for policy 
change. In the field of economic policy the objective of Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) entry constituted the link between Simitis’ modernisation 
programme and European integration and reform assumed the quality of a 
process of “catching-up” with “Europe”56. It remains unclear, however, whether 
this programme included a similar commitment to foreign policy reform, what 
that commitment entailed and what the relation between modernisation and 
European integration in the case of foreign policy was. Unless one can show that 
EU foreign policy norms and practices influenced the former Prime Minister’s 
“intentions” regarding Greek policy towards Turkey, one cannot establish the 
causal significance of the EU, in which case the use of the term 
“Europeanisation” would appear unjustified. The study of foreign policy is 
characterised by a multitude of explanatory factors spread over different levels of 
analysis57 and distinguishing the causal significance of the EU from that of other 
factors constitutes one of the key tasks that research on Europeanisation entails58.
The literature has indeed emphasised Costas Simitis’ election as Prime Minister 
in 1996 as a critical development59. The former Greek Prime Minister, it is 
argued, “symbolises ‘European normality’ as opposed to ‘Greek idiosyncrasy’”60. 
As a representative of the “modernisers” -  as opposed to “ethno-centrists” -  he 
believed that the improvement of Greco-Turkish relations was possible61. Since 
“the ideological acceptance of the objectives of European integration” is
56 K. Featherstone, “Greece and EMU: Between External Empowerment and Domestic 
Vulnerability”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 41: 5, 2003, op. cit. p. 924
57 V. M. Hudson, “Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of 
International Relations”, Foreign Policy Analysis, 1:1,2005, p. 2
58 Radaelli, “Europeanisation: Solution...”, op. cit. esp. p. 8
59 Economides, op. cit. pp. 477-8; Ioakimidis, “The Europeanisation of Greece’ s Foreign 
Policy...”, op. cit. pp. 368-9; Kavakas, op. cit. p. 155; Stavridis, “The Europeanisation...”, op. 
cit. p. 12
60 D. Keridis, “Foreign Policy and Political Culture: Greek Policy towards Turkey Today” in H. 
K. Yallouridis -  P. I. Tsakonas (eds), Greece and Turkey since the End of the Cold War (in 
Greek), Athens, Sideris, 1999, p. 95
61 Ibid. pp. 95-7
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considered “a vital precondition for the Europeanisation process to take hold”62, 
the formation of a new government under Simitis, who “had always been 
identified with PASOK’s pro-European and reformist wing”63, is believed to 
have contributed to the “Europeanisation” of Greek foreign policy. This line of 
reasoning allows little room for the causal significance of the EU. Change in 
Greek policy towards Turkey appears to have been the result of the efforts of a 
policy maker with a considerable level of commitment to foreign policy reform 
and sufficiently well placed within the foreign policy making process to pursue 
it. This seems to justify concerns regarding the usefulness of the concept of 
Europeanisation. It remains unclear what the added value of conceptualising 
change in Greek policy as the outcome of a process of Europeanisation is. It 
would appear that a more traditional foreign policy analysis approach focused on 
the policy makers and their personal characteristics would have sufficed to 
explain policy change64. The literature on foreign policy leadership styles in 
particular has identified responsiveness to the policy context as a key variable65. 
In this sense, it is essential to establish how responsive to contextual variables 
Simitis was and whether he was driven by a commitment to a specific type of 
policy reform that he intended to pursue.
According to a different argument, change in Greek policy towards Turkey was 
neither the outcome of a process of Europeanisation, nor that of the former Prime 
Minister’s attempts to pursue his own vision for reform, but a reconfiguration of 
the combination of internal and external balancing66. Greco-Turkish relations
62 Ioakimidis, “Contradictions between...”, op. cit. p. 36; See also K. Kouveliotis, “ 
'Europeanisation' and Greece: The Impact of European Integration on the Diplomatic and 
Strategic Domains of Greece”, Paper prepared for the 2nd LSE PhD Symposium on Modem 
Greece: “Current Social Science Research on Greece”, LSE, 10 June 2005, p. 4
63 Pagoulatos, op. cit. p. 10; The faction of the party that supported Simitis -  including those who 
were going to assume responsibility for foreign policy making -  was also pro-European; see 
Featherstone, “Introduction: ‘Modernisation’...”, op. cit. p. 227
64 For this approach as a part of Foreign Policy Analysis see V. M. Hudson -  C. S. Vore, “Foreign 
Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow”, Mershon International Studies Review, 39: 2, 
1995
65 For foreign policy leadership styles see M. G. Hermann et al., “Who Leads Matters: The 
Effects of Powerful Individuals”, International Studies Review, 3: 2,2001
66 While the use of inverted commas suggests unusual usage o f the term, Ifantis has referred to 
the Helsinki strategy as a “highly sophisticated ‘external balancing’ strategy”; see Ifantis, 
“Greece’s Turkish Dilemmas...”, op. cit. p. 382. Tsakonas interchangeably refers to the Helsinki 
strategy as a balancing strategy and a socialisation -  in the sense of structural realist international 
relations theory -  strategy; see P. I. Tsakonas, “Socialising the Adversary: The Greek Strategy of 
Balancing against Turkey and Greco-Turkish Relations” in P. I. Tsakonas (ed), Contemporary 
Greek Foreign Policy (in Greek), Athens, Sideris, 2003, esp. p. 70 and P. Tsakonas, “Problems of
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remained conflictual during the early post-Cold War era and Turkey was still 
considered the main threat to Greek security. The conflictual nature of Greco- 
Turkish relations was reflected in the arms race between the two countries. In the 
aftermath of the 1996 Imia/Kardak crisis in particular, Turkey announced a new 
armaments programme and a few months later so did the Greek government. 
Greece had to balance against Turkey in order to restore the balance of power in 
the Aegean.
At the same time, however, Greece had accepted the need to meet the Maastricht 
criteria and accede to EMU67. One might add that the general shape of the 
economy was accentuating the problem. Indeed, at the start of the 1990s, Greece 
was experiencing “deep economic failure”68. The stabilisation programme 
pursued by the Mitsotakis government failed. The revised programme presented 
by the Papandreou government produced only modest results. When the 
hospitalised Papandreou resigned, Simitis was elected Prime Minister and placed 
even greater emphasis on macroeconomic stabilisation, much like he had done as 
Finance Minister approximately a decade earlier, thus consolidating PASOK’s 
new economic policies. EMU entry in particular was turned into a “central 
national goal”69 and “shorthand” for the Prime Minister’s programme of 
“modernisation”70. Economic policy failure and the Maastricht criteria were 
pointing in the same direction. It should also be noted that Greek policy makers
and Prospects for Greece’s ‘Socialisation Strategy’ vis-a-vis Turkey” in F. Aksu (ed), 
Proceedings o f the International Conference on Turkish-Greek Relations: Issues, Solutions, 
Prospects, 9 March 2006, Istanbul, Istanbul, OBIV, 2007. Waltz has indeed argued that 
“socialisation” occurs in the international system; see K. N. Waltz, Theory o f International 
Politics, New York, Random House, 1979, pp. 74-7, 127-9. As Checkel has pointed out, 
however, the phenomenon Waltz refers to as socialisation is in fact little more than a process of 
emulation of the behaviour of successful states in the system and it is therefore inconsistent with 
standard definitions of socialisation as a process of social interaction that results in the 
internalisation of behavioural norms; see J. T. Checkel, “International Institutions and 
Socialisation in Europe: Introduction and Framework”, International Organisation, 59: 4, 2005,
p. 806
67 Tsakonas, “Socialising...”, op. cit. p. 65; See also K. Botsiou, “Greco-Turkish Relations 1974- 
2000: Historical Review” in P. Kazakos et al., Greece and Turkey’s European Future (in Greek), 
Athens, Sideris, 2001, pp. 197-8; M. Muftuler-Bac -  L. M. McLaren, “Enlargement Preferences 
and Policy-Making in the European Union: Impacts on Turkey”, Journal o f European 
Integration, 25: 1, 2003, p. 23
68 Featherstone, “Greece and EMU...”, op. cit. p. 925
69 G. Moschonas, “The Path of Modernisation: PASOK and European Integration”, Journal o f 
Southern Europe and the Balkans, 3:1, 2001, p. 14
70 S. Vemey, “The End of Socialist Hegemony: Europe and the Greek Parliamentary Election of 
7th March 2004”, SEI Working Paper, No.SO/EPERN Working Paper, No. 15, 2004, p. 22
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decided that macroeconomic policy as opposed to structural reform should bear 
the burden of stabilisation71. Consequently, the immediate response to the crisis 
(increasing defence expenditure in order to build up Greece’s military 
capabilities) was not sustainable in the long run. Greece had to pursue external 
balancing in order to be able to secure both foreign and economic policy goals.
When the Helsinki strategy is conceptualised as an “external balancing strategy”, 
the term is used rather loosely. External balancing refers to alliance formation 
and in its broadest sense the term “alliance” refers to formal or informal security 
cooperation regardless of degree72. The Helsinki decision, however, included no 
such provisions. No obligation for EU member-states to coordinate their policies 
on security issues related to Turkey stems from the agreement that the Greek 
government secured in Helsinki. In this sense, it has been argued that, unless an 
EU common defence policy is established, EU level arrangements do not 
constitute sufficient guarantees of Greek security73. Consequently, the economic 
cost of internal balancing is acceptable compared with the cost of defeat in case 
of a Greco-Turkish war74.
Furthermore, change in Greek policy took place within the post-Cold War 
international context. While Tsakonas’ fairly elaborate statement of the argument 
explicitly draws on neo-realist international politics theory and its implications 
for states’ foreign policies, it does not discuss the implications of the altered 
structural context within which policy change was decided. Tsakonas has 
acknowledged the significance of the role of the US in Greco-Turkish relations
71 P. Kazakos, Between the State and the Market: Economy and Economic Policy in Post-War 
Greece 1944-2000 (in Greek), Athens, Patakis, 2001, pp. 437,449-50,481, 511-2
72 M. N. Barnett -  J. S. Levy, “Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of 
Egypt, 1962-73”, International Organization, 45: 3, 1991, p. 370
73 T. P. Dokos -  N. A. Protonotarios, Turkey’s Military Power: Challenge to Greek Security (in 
Greek), Athens, Tourikis, 1997, p. 209; T. Dokos, “Balancing Against the Turkish Threat: The 
Military Dimension” in C. K. Yallouridis -  P. I. Tsakonas (eds), Greece and Turkey after the End 
of the Cold War (in Greek), Athens, Sideris, 1999, p. 208; T. P. Dokos, “Greek National Security 
Policy: The Linkage Between Defence and Foreign Policy” in P. I. Tsakonas (ed), Contemporary 
Greek Foreign Policy: An Overall Approach, Athens (in Greek), Sideris, 2003, p. 250
74 Dokos -  Protonotarios, op. cit. p. 190; It should also be noted that econometric models have 
shown that the economic benefits of reducing defence expenditure would only be “very small” 
for Greece, but “rather substantial” for Turkey and they would therefore leave Greece worse-off 
in terms of its relative power position vis-a-vis Turkey; see J. Brauer, “Greece and Turkey: A 
Comprehensive, Critical Review of the Defence Economics Literature” in C. Kollias -  G. 
Gunluk-Senesen (eds), Greece and Turkey in the 21st Century: Conflict or Cooperation A 
Political Economy Perspective, New York, Nova Science, 2003, pp. 214-8, 221
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during both the Cold War and the post-Cold War era75. Furthermore, it has been 
argued that Greek and American interests with regard to relations with Turkey 
diverge76. It is surprising in this sense that the implications of the dominant 
position of the US for power relations between Greece and Turkey are discussed 
only in passing77. On the other hand, it has been argued that, with regard to 
Greco-Turkish relations in particular, “no other country experienced (the end of 
the Cold War) less intensely than Greece”78. As a recent literature review 
concluded, whether change in Greek policy towards Turkey was the result of the 
end of the Cold War is a question that remains open79.
Paradoxically enough, even though Tsakonas has conceptualised the Helsinki 
strategy as an external balancing strategy, he has argued that it was different 
from earlier Greek initiatives that also sought to engage the EU in “Greece’s 
balancing policy” against Turkey80. According to Tsakonas, Greek attempts to 
transform the EU into a “security provider” proved to be ill fated. As was 
mentioned above, Greek policy makers believed that accession to the 
Communities would suffice to guarantee Greek security and force Turkey to 
make concessions on Greco-Turkish relations in order to develop its own 
relations with the Communities further. In this sense, the Imia/Kardak crisis 
confirmed the EU’s inability to provide security81. Indeed, the formation of a new 
government in 1996 coincided with a severe foreign policy crisis that brought 
Greece and Turkey to the brink of war. In the aftermath of the crisis Turkey was 
claiming sovereignty over numerous islets in the Aegean, which Greece 
considers its own territory, and it announced a costly armaments programme 
prompting Greece to respond with an armaments programme of its own. Even
75 Tsakonas, “Socialising...”, op. cit. pp. 55-6; P. Tsakonas -  A. Toumikiotis, “Greece’s Elusive 
Quest for Security Providers: The ‘Expectations-Reality Gap’”, Security Dialogue, 34: 3, 2003, 
pp. 307-8
76 H. Papasotiriou, “Relations between Greece and the United States” in Tsakonas P. I. (ed), 
Contemporary Greek Foreign Policy (in Greek), Athens, Sideris, 2003, pp. 605-7; Z. Onis, 
“Luxembourg, Helsinki and Beyond: Towards an Interpretation of Recent Turkey-EU Relations”, 
Government and Opposition, 35: 4, 2000, pp. 474-5
77 Tsakonas, “Socialising...”, op. cit. p. 68
78 K. Ifantis, “Greece and the USA after the Cold War” in K. Featherstone -  K. Ifantis (eds), 
Greece in a Changing Europe: Between European Integration and Balkan Disintegration?, 
Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1996, p. 153
79 Stavridis, “The Europeanisation...”, op. cit. p. 22
80 Tsakonas -  Toumikotis, op cit
81 Ibid. pp. 307-8
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though the literature has identified external shocks that demonstrate policy 
failure as one of the most powerful factors that drive foreign policy change82, a 
theoretically informed assessment of the implications of the 1996 crisis for 
change in Greek policy towards Turkey is still lacking.
The arguments in the literature that have attempted to explain change in Greek 
policy towards Turkey raise a series of questions that render the latter even more 
puzzling: Was change in Greek policy towards Turkey the outcome of a process 
of Europeanisation? If so, why was Greek policy Europeanised? Did the end of 
the Cold War necessitate change in Greek policy? What were the implications of 
US policy for Greek policy towards Turkey? Did the economic situation the 
government was facing have implications for its policy towards Turkey? Did the 
Prime Minister’s modernisation programme include foreign policy reform? If so, 
how committed was Simitis to foreign policy reform? What were the 
implications of the 1996 Imia/Kardak crisis for Greek policy towards Turkey? 
Did these factors interact in producing foreign policy change? How is it possible 
to determine the relative causal significance of each of these factors? While the 
mere number of potential explanatory variables renders the case truly puzzling, a 
framework that incorporates all relevant explanatory variables, specifies the 
interactions between them and exploits their full explanatory potential to provide 
a convincing conclusion on these questions is still lacking. Similarly, a 
completed empirical study is also lacking and, more significantly, studies that list 
numerous variables that may have influenced Greek policy towards Turkey have 
failed to indicate what the observable implications that would allow researchers 
to confirm and/or refute their causal significance are83.
82 J. T. S. Keeler, “Opening the Window for Reform: Mandates, Crises and Extraordinary Policy 
Making”, Comparative Political Studies, 25: 4, 1993, pp. 440-1; J. Gustavsson, “How Should We 
Study Foreign Policy Change”, Cooperation and Conflict, 34: 1, 1999, pp. 85-7; C. F. Hermann, 
“Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy”, International 
Studies Quarterly, 34: 1, 1990, p. 12
83 As Stavridis has pointed out, the analysis of change in Greek foreign policy as the outcome of 
Europeanisation and, therefore, the rather small part of the literature on Europeanisation that 
discusses foreign policy, would benefit from the study of a particular empirical case; see 
Stavridis, “Assessing the Views...”, op. cit. p. 32
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The argument
The argument of this thesis is that the Greek government’s decision to consent to 
the Turkish candidacy constituted the culmination o f Prime Minister Simitis’ 
attempts to pursue what he referred to as the “communication” o f Greco- 
Turkish relations. According to this notion, Greece should allow Turkey to 
develop its relations with the EU further even if Turkey had not complied with 
Greek demands provided that rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece were 
established at the EU level. The logic underlying communitisation was fairly 
straightforward. I f  Greece could have rules fo r  Turkey’s behaviour towards it 
established at the EU level, the EU itself would see to it that its own rules were 
observed. The argument draws on foreign policy analysis and the literature on 
foreign policy leadership styles in particular and emphasises the causal 
significance of a domestic source of foreign policy change. Simitis ’ leadership 
style was characterised by an orientation towards a preconceived, internally 
defined task — the communitisation o f Greco-Turkish relations -  to the 
completion o f which he remained unequivocally committed even in the face o f  
severe constraints and evidence that challenged the task’s necessity.
The argument was tested against three alternative explanations of change in 
Greek policy towards Turkey that incorporated all the relevant explanatory 
variables discussed above. Two of the alternative explanations conceptualise the 
Helsinki strategy as the outcome of Europeanisation, that is to say a process of 
incorporation of EU enlargement conditionality into Greek policy towards 
Turkey. According to the Europeanisation thesis84, Greek foreign policy makers 
chose to incorporate enlargement conditionality into their policy towards Turkey 
because they calculated that it was utility maximising. While the argument of this 
thesis suggests that the purpose of the Helsinki strategy was to establish rules 
that would make the EU responsible fo r  ensuring Turkey’s compliance with 
Greek demands, this explanation suggests that its purpose was to offer Turkey a 
greater incentive to comply with Greek demands. In contrast, the socialisation
84 It should be noted that even though “the Europeanisation thesis” and “the socialisation thesis” 
are used as shorthand for these two explanations, both explanations conceptualise the Helsinki 
strategy as the outcome of Europeanisation.
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thesis suggests that Greek foreign policy makers incorporated enlargement 
conditionality into their policy towards Turkey because they became convinced 
that it was the appropriate course of action for an EU member-state given the 
situation. The final explanation conceptualises the Helsinki strategy as an 
external balancing strategy. According to the balancing thesis, Greek foreign 
policy makers formulated the Helsinki strategy in order to improve their relative 
power position vis-a-vis Turkey without compromising the objective of entering 
EMU.
While all four explanations predict the same outcome, they predict very different 
pathways to the formulation of the Helsinki strategy. It was possible to 
empirically distinguish between the four explanations by process tracing their 
observable implications for three dimensions of the policy making process: the 
definition of the policy problem the Helsinki strategy was intended to address, 
the alternative courses of action Greek foreign policy makers considered and the 
manner in which the latter were assessed. The evidence drawn from process 
tracing showed that Simitis ’ unequivocal commitment to the communitisation o f  
Greco-Turkish relations constitutes the only convincing explanation o f all three 
dimensions o f the formulation o f the Helsinki strategy.
Simitis had indeed selected communitisation as the optimal policy for Greece 
prior to his election as Prime Minister and he remained unequivocally committed 
to it during his Premiership. Despite the fact that the beginning of his 
Premiership literally coincided with the Imia/Kardak crisis, which constituted a 
traumatic shock that the literature suggests is often a most powerful factor that 
drives foreign policy change, Simitis had identified the failure of Greek policy 
towards Turkey to achieve its objectives prior to the crisis and the latter was 
interpreted as evidence that confirmed his beliefs. Simitis sought to reduce what 
he saw as an excessive responsiveness of Greek policy towards Turkey to 
external factors. Communitisation was intended to replace the practice of vetoing 
progress in EU-Turkey relations until Turkey complied with Greek demands and 
Greece was to pursue communitisation steadfastly.
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Simitis’ preference for communitisation began to affect Greek policy towards 
Turkey immediately after his election. Indeed, in retrospect, the Helsinki strategy 
does not appear entirely surprising. The shift in Greek policy towards Turkey had 
begun much earlier. Greece had already allowed EU-Turkey relations to progress 
in July 1996 despite the fact that Turkey had not complied with the conditions 
that Greece had set. Greece took this course of action on four separate occasions 
(15 July 1996, 29 April 1997, 1997 Luxembourg European Council, 1999 
Helsinki European Council) during the period under investigation. The 
explanation that emphasises the causal significance o f Simitis ’ leadership style is 
the only one that is consistent with all four decisions.
The evidence showed that the formulation o f the Helsinki strategy was not the 
outcome o f Europeanisation. Greek foreign policy makers did not identify the 
discrepancy between Greek policy towards Turkey and EU enlargement 
conditionality and they did not consider the latter an alternative course of action 
that might be more appropriate or more effective. In fact, Simitis had argued the 
necessity of communitisation prior to the establishment o f enlargement 
conditionality at the EU level and therefore the latter could not have affected his 
calculations. Similarly, the evidence showed that the Helsinki strategy was not 
formulated as an external balancing strategy. Greek foreign policy makers did 
not consider the Helsinki strategy an alternative to defence expenditure and 
therefore the Helsinki strategy was not intended to address a “guns-or-butter” 
dilemma.
Simitis’ internal belief that Greece should pursue the communitisation of Greco- 
Turkish relations determined the definition of the policy problem, the alternative 
courses of action considered and the manner in which they were assessed. The 
fact that Greco-Turkish relations remained problematic was the result not only of 
Turkey’s consistently revisionist policy, but also of Greece’s lack of an effective 
policy. According to Simitis, Greece had to make a choice between continuing to 
prevent progress in EU-Turkey relations and allowing EU-Turkey relations to 
progress within a framework that would include EU rules for Turkey’s behaviour 
towards Greece. While the first option had been pursued and it had failed to 
achieve its objectives, Simitis’ preferred policy would attribute the role o f
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guarantor o f  Turkey’s compliance with Greek demands to the EU, as the latter 
would see to it that its rules were observed.
The plan of the thesis
Chapter two will present the theoretical framework for this thesis and fully 
elaborate the four explanations mentioned above. While the argument of this 
thesis draws on foreign policy analysis and the literature on foreign policy 
leadership styles in particular and emphasises the causal significance of a 
domestic source of foreign policy change (the Prime Minister’s leadership style), 
the three alternative explanations incorporate the external variables discussed 
above. Prior to elaborating on the explanations that conceptualise the Helsinki 
strategy as the outcome of Europeanisation, chapter two will address concerns 
regarding the usefulness of Europeanisation, present a useful definition of the 
concept and establish its applicability to the study of foreign policy. It will be 
shown that of the several “faces” of the concept discussed in the literature, only 
one raises questions that are both new and researchable: Europeanisation as a 
process of incorporation of EU norms, practices and procedures into the domestic 
level. Furthermore, Europeanisation can be applied to foreign policy provided 
that explanations of the phenomenon take its voluntary nature into account. It 
will be shown that the Helsinki strategy can be conceptualised as the outcome of 
a process of incorporation of EU enlargement conditionality into Greek policy 
towards Turkey. Greek foreign policy makers chose to incorporate enlargement 
conditionality into their policy towards Turkey either because they calculated 
that it was utility maximising in the face of policy failure demonstrated by the 
1996 Imia/Kardak crisis or because they became convinced that it was the 
appropriate thing to do for an EU member-state given the situation. The final 
explanation draws on neo-realist international politics theory for baseline 
predictions for state behaviour and conceptualises the Helsinki strategy as an 
external balancing strategy, which was formulated in an attempt to secure both 
foreign (countering the Turkish threat) and economic (meeting EMU entry 
criteria) policy goals. This particular formulation of the balancing thesis 
incorporates the implications of both Turkish policy towards Greece and post-
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Cold War US policy on Greco-Turkish relations and EU-Turkey relations for 
Greece’s relative power position vis-a-vis Turkey.
Chapter three will show that it is possible to empirically distinguish between 
these four explanations by process tracing their observable implications for three 
dimensions of the foreign policy making process: the definition of the policy 
problem the Helsinki strategy was intended to address, the alternative courses of 
action Greek foreign policy makers considered and, finally, the manner in which 
the latter were assessed.
Chapter four will present a detailed historical narrative of Greek policy towards 
Turkey between January 1996 and December 1999. The period from January to 
September 1996 was marked by considerable uncertainty initially due to the fact 
that Simitis was Prime Minister, but not the leader of PASOK and subsequently 
due to the fact that Simitis lacked a mandate from the electorate. Despite the fact 
that he was severely constrained, Simitis began to pursue his vision for reform 
immediately and in July 1996 the first EU decision that communitised Greco- 
Turkish relations was secured. The period between October 1996 and December 
1997 was marked by the initiative of the Dutch Presidency, which led to an 
unprecedented involvement of the EU in Greco-Turkish relations, and the 
Luxembourg European Council summit, where Greece achieved the 
communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations at the highest political level for the 
first time. The period between January 1998 and June 1999 was marked by 
mounting pressure on Greece from Turkey, EU member-states and the US, while 
Greece remained adamant that the decision made in Luxembourg should not be 
revised. Finally, the remainder of the period under investigation began with the 
formulation of the Helsinki strategy in June 1999 in an attempt to pursue the 
further communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations and culminated in the 
Helsinki summit negotiations in December 1999.
Chapter five will establish how Greek foreign policy makers defined the policy 
problem the Helsinki strategy was intended to address. It will be shown that 
Prime Minister Simitis had identified policy failure prior to the Imia/Kardak 
crisis and that he had argued the need for a different policy towards Turkey -
29
which he referred to as “communitisation” -  prior to the establishment of 
enlargement conditionality at the EU level. The crisis merely reinforced his 
belief in the necessity of communitisation. His commitment to the latter 
remained unequivocal during the period under investigation as he intended to 
reduce the responsiveness of Greek policy to external factors. In contrast to what 
the socialisation thesis predicts, Greek foreign policy makers did not begin to 
identify Turkish violations of substantive EU foreign policy norms for the first 
time during the period under investigation. In contrast to what the balancing 
thesis predicts, a guns-or-butter dilemma was not the problem the Helsinki 
strategy was intended to address.
Chapter six will establish the alternative courses of action Greek foreign policy 
makers considered. It will be shown that Prime Minister Simitis’ preference for 
communitisation determined these alternatives. In contrast to what the balancing 
thesis predicts, Greek foreign policy makers did not consider the Helsinki 
strategy an alternative to defence expenditure that would allow Greece to build 
up its military capabilities. In contrast to what both explanations that 
conceptualise change in Greek policy towards Turkey as the outcome of 
Europeanisation predict, Greek foreign policy makers did not identify 
enlargement conditionality as an established EU practice that could serve as an 
alternative to the policy previously pursued. On the contrary, Simitis, who 
personally pursued the implementation of communitisation immediately after his 
election, repeatedly stressed the need for the formulation of an EU policy on the 
matter. Greek foreign policy makers distinguished between the practice of 
vetoing progress in EU-Turkey relations until Turkey complied with Greek 
demands and the practice of allowing EU-Turkey relations to develop prior to 
Turkey’s compliance with Greek demands in exchange for EU rules for Turkey’s 
behaviour towards Greece as Simitis’ notion of communitisation prescribed. 
Greece took this course of action on four separate occasions (15 July 1996, 29 
April 1997, 1997 Luxembourg European Council, 1999 Helsinki European 
Council) during the period under investigation, even at a time when reducing 
defence expenditure was considered unthinkable and even when the EU 
decisions that Greece secured were not consistent with enlargement 
conditionality. The argument of this thesis is the only explanation that is
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consistent with all four decisions. It will be shown that Simitis continued to insist 
on the necessity of communitisation even after the latter had failed to produce the 
desired results. In the aftermath of the Luxembourg decision, where EU rules for 
Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece were established at the level of the European 
Council for the first time, Simitis was most unwilling to consider consenting to 
the Turkish candidacy without additional EU rules for Turkey’s behaviour 
towards Greece, despite the fact that the communitisation achieved in 
Luxembourg had not produced the desired results.
Chapter seven will establish how Greek foreign policy makers assessed the 
alternative courses of action they considered. It will be shown that Prime 
Minister Simitis’ preference for communitisation determined this assessment. In 
contrast to what the socialisation thesis predicts, Greek foreign policy makers 
were particularly concerned about the costs and benefits of the alternatives they 
considered. There is no evidence that Greek foreign policy makers became 
convinced of the inappropriateness of the policy previously pursued. On the 
contrary, they systematically argued that it was their EU partners and the 
European Commission that had on certain occasions behaved inappropriately. In 
contrast to what the balancing thesis predicts, the benefits of the Helsinki 
strategy that Greek foreign policy makers calculated were not economic. The 
economic cost of policy towards Turkey was only one of the reasons why Greek 
foreign policy makers wished to resolve Greco-Turkish problems, not the reason 
why the Helsinki strategy was selected to resolve them. It was believed that 
EMU entry had been secured prior to the formulation of the Helsinki strategy and 
the latter would not affect defence expenditure already planned. While there is 
evidence that the Helsinki strategy was believed to offer Turkey an incentive to 
comply with Greek demands, this particular calculation was of secondary 
significance. Greece had made explicit that the status quo was preferable to an 
agreement that would grant Turkey candidate country status without establishing 
additional rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece even though such an 
agreement would offer Turkey greater incentive to comply with Greek demands. 
Furthermore, this calculation was not the outcome of an assessment of the 
discrepancy between Greek and EU policy and, thus, it cannot be attributed to 
the EU. The main benefit of the Helsinki strategy was the role of guarantor of the
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resolution of Greco-Turkish problems that was assigned to the EU as Simitis’ 
notion of communitisation prescribed and it was meant to be part of the EU’s 
broader international role. Indeed, the four EU decisions that Greece secured (15 
July 1996, 29 April 1997, Luxembourg decision, Helsinki decision) during the 
period under investigation progressively increased the EU’s involvement in 
Greco-Turkish relations.
Chapters five to seven will compare the four pathways to the Helsinki strategy 
predicted by the four alternative explanations with what actually happened 
during the period under investigation. The concluding chapter will reconstruct 
the argument, show that post-1999 developments are consistent with the 
argument and discuss its implications for the analysis of both Greek foreign 
policy and aspects of other EU member-states’ foreign policies which the 
literature has identified as crucial.
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Chapter 2: Leadership, Europeanisation and Balancing
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to fully elaborate the implications of the various 
explanatory variables mentioned in the previous chapter for Greek policy 
towards Turkey and specify the interactions between them in order to formulate 
theoretically informed alternative explanations of the Helsinki strategy. In 
contrast to the long lists of relevant developments discussed in the literature, four 
parsimonious explanations are formulated here, each of which only incorporates 
variables (sources of foreign policy change) that constitute individually 
necessary and jointly sufficient causes for the outcome under investigation 
(change in Greek policy towards Turkey); such combinations of 
necessary/sufficient causes are typical of the understanding of causality in 
qualitative research85.
The first explanation draws on foreign policy analysis and the literature on 
leadership styles in particular and conceptualises the Helsinki strategy as the 
culmination of Prime Minister Simitis’ attempts to pursue what he referred to as 
the “communitisation” of Greco-Turkish relations. This notion constituted an 
internal, pre-conceived idea, according to which Greece should allow Turkey to 
develop its relations with the EU within a framework of EU rules for Turkey’s 
behaviour towards Greece. If Greece could have such rules established at the EU 
level, the EU itself would become responsible for ensuring that its rules were 
observed. Change in Greek policy towards Turkey was not a response to 
contextual variables, but followed from the unequivocal commitment of a task- 
orientated key policy maker to an internal, pre-conceived idea, which he had 
difficulty changing even in the face of disconfirming information and formidable 
constraints.
The next two explanations conceptualise the Helsinki strategy as the outcome of 
a process of Europeanisation. It will be argued that of the several “faces” of the 
concept discussed in the literature, only one is useful for empirical research on
85 Mahoney -  Goertz, op. cit. p. 232
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foreign policy change: Europeanisation as a process of incorporation of EU 
norms, practices and procedures into the domestic level. In this sense, the 
Helsinki strategy can be conceptualised as the outcome of the incorporation of 
EU enlargement conditionality into Greek policy towards Turkey. It will be 
shown that Europeanisation can indeed be applied to foreign policy provided that 
the voluntary nature of the process is taken into consideration. According to the 
Europeanisation thesis, Greek foreign policy makers interpreted the Imia/Kardak 
crisis as an external shock that demonstrated policy failure and decided to 
incorporate EU enlargement conditionality into their policy towards Turkey 
because they calculated that it would offer Turkey a greater incentive to comply 
with Greek demands. In contrast, according to the socialisation thesis, Greek 
foreign policy makers came to share a new definition of the situation with their 
EU partners and became convinced that their policy towards Turkey was 
inappropriate for an EU member-state given the common definition of the 
situation.
Finally, the balancing thesis conceptualises the Helsinki strategy as an external 
balancing strategy against Turkey. Drawing on neo-realist international politics 
theory for baseline predictions for state behaviour, it is argued that Greece’s 
relative power position vis-a-vis Turkey was weakened as a result of what was 
perceived as Turkey’s increasingly aggressive policy towards Greece and US 
support for Turkey’s aspiration to develop its relations with the EU further. 
Consequently, balancing against Turkey was considered necessary. At the same 
time, however, Greece was pursuing EMU entry. As resources were scarce, 
Greek foreign policy makers formulated the Helsinki strategy in an attempt to 
reconfigure the combination of internal and external balancing in favour of the 
latter.
The unequivocally committed leader
While the literature has acknowledged the formation of a new government in 
1996 under the leadership of Costas Simitis as a critical development, its effects 
on Greek policy towards Turkey have not been specified in a theoretically
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informed manner. In contrast to developments that have implications for 
Greece’s relative power position vis-a-vis Turkey and serve as the basis for a 
structural explanation of change in Greek policy, Simitis’ election as Prime 
Minister has implications for domestic sources of foreign policy change86. The 
emphasis on the foreign policy making process within the state and especially on 
policy makers and their particular characteristics, motivations and intentions has 
been a central element of foreign policy analysis since the 1950s87. While 
international relations scholarship has often “neglected” the study of foreign 
policy change88, it has been suggested that the latter might be the result of “the 
determined efforts of an authoritative policy maker, frequently the head of 
government, who imposes his own vision of the basic redirection necessary in 
foreign policy”89.
More recently, policy makers’ responsiveness to the policy context has been 
identified as the key variable that determines the scope of the causal significance 
of policy makers’ personal attitudes and beliefs. The latter is inversely 
proportionate to his responsiveness to the policy context. The less responsive to 
context a policy maker is, the more goal-driven she will be90. Such policy makers 
are driven by internal, pre-conceived ideas, a cause, a problem to be solved or an 
ideology91. They enter the decision making process with a fixed set of priorities, 
which they have difficulty changing. In such cases, it is more important to know 
about policy makers’ attitudes and beliefs than about the policy context. 
Different characteristics of policy makers combine to produce different 
leadership styles in this respect. Responsiveness to policy context can be 
assessed on the basis of the following characteristics: a) reactions to constraints,
86 This distinction between structural/systemic and domestic-political explanations of variation in 
foreign policy is based on whether they incorporate unit-level attributes of states, such as political 
institutions, economic structures, culture or leadership, which are not related to a state’s relative 
power position in the system; for an alternative distinction based on a more inclusive definition of 
structural/systemic explanations and a more narrow definition of domestic-political explanations 
see J. D. Fearon, “Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy and Theories of International Relations”, 
Annual Review o f Political Science, 1, 1998
87 Hudson -  Vore, op. cit.
88 J. A. Rosati -  M. W. Sampson III -  J. D. Hagan, “The Study of Change in Foreign Policy” in J. 
A. Rosati -  J. D. Hagan -  M. W. Sampson HI (eds), Foreign Policy Restructuring: How 
Governments Respond to Global Change, Columbia, University of South Caroline Press, 1994
89 Hermann, “Changing Course...”, op. cit. p. 11
90 For goal-driven leaders see Hermann et al., op cit
91 Ibid. p. 86; J. G. Stoessinger, Crusaders and Pragmatists: Movers o f Modem American 
Foreign Policy, New York, Norton, 1985, p. xiii
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as non-responsive leaders will challenge the constraints imposed on them by the 
policy context and they will act decisively in an attempt to achieve a resolution 
of the policy problem that is consistent with their attitudes and beliefs and b) 
openness to information, as non-responsive leaders who enter the decision 
making process with a well-formulated vision for reform will seek information 
that reinforces their beliefs and overlook disconfirming evidence92.
Leaders who challenge constraints and are closed to information are the most 
committed and unresponsive93. The motivations of such leaders vary: they may 
be focused on relationships, in which case their style would be “evangelistic”, or 
they may be focused on the resolution of a problem, in which case their style 
would be “expansionist”94. The term expansionist may be somewhat misleading. 
It does not necessarily refer to territorial expansion, but to the expansion of 
power and influence, the ability to control a particular domain of affairs. 
Regardless of whether they seek to resolve a problem or convert others to their 
cause, such leaders will be the least sensitive to the policy context.
The style of leadership will matter most when certain conditions hold. First, there 
must be an individual with the necessary authority in the political system and 
second, the individual must exercise his authority95. That will be the case when 
the leader is interested in getting involved in foreign affairs in general or in a 
specific foreign policy issue and when the foreign policy problem is critical or 
involves high-level diplomacy, when the leader remains involved after she has 
set the general direction of the policy and when those who participate in the 
decision-making process are not granted the right to veto decisions96.
92 For these characteristics see Hermann et al., op. cit. pp. 89-94 and M. G. Hermann, “Assessing 
Leadership Style: Trait Analysis” in J. M. Post (ed), The Psychological Assessment o f Political 
Leaders: With Profiles o f Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan 
Press, 2003, pp. 187-197
93 Herman et al., op. cit. p. 96
94 Such leaders are often referred to as “crusaders”; see ibid. p. 98; J. Kaarbo, “Prime Minister 
Leadership Styles in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: A Framework for Research”, Political 
Psychology, 18: 3, 1997, p. 565. While the term might be considered unfortunate, its meaning is 
neither inherently positive, nor inherently negative.
95 While more often than not the literature discusses US Presidents, the framework has also been 
applied to Prime Ministers; see Kaarbo, op cit and J. Kaarbo -  M. G. Hermann, “Leadership 
Styles of Prime Ministers: How Differences Affect the Foreign Policy Making Process”, 
Leadership Quarterly, 9: 3, 1998
96 For these conditions see M. G. Hermann -  C. F. Hermann, “Who Makes Foreign Policy 
Decisions and How: An Empirical Inquiry”, International Studies Quarterly, 33: 4, 1989, pp.
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The above conditions indicate that the emphasis on Simitis’ beliefs is pertinent. 
The centrality of the Prime Minister in the Greek political system, especially 
since the constitutional reform of 1986, is well established. Furthermore, Greco- 
Turkish relations were indeed a crucial foreign policy issue that involved high- 
level diplomacy. As was mentioned above, Greco-Turkish relations have 
occupied the top of the Greek foreign policy agenda for the better part of the past 
forty years. The beginning of Simitis’ Premiership coincided with the 
Imia/Kardak crisis, which brought Greece and Turkey to the brink of war and 
turned Greco-Turkey relations into an issue that could hardly be ignored. Finally, 
change in Greek policy towards Turkey was decided in view of a European 
Council summit.
Simitis has indeed been arguing the need for further integration and a political 
union based on a federal model since before he was elected Prime Minister97. 
Simitis’ preferences for the future of the integration process, however, indicate 
little regarding his stance on EU-Turkey relations. Simitis’ ideological 
commitment to federalism does not explain the decision to grant Turkey 
candidate country status. German Christian Democrats are an instructive example 
in this respect. While they share Simitis’ commitment to federalism98, they were
369-373. In such cases, leadership style matters most because an individual -  a predominant 
leader -  is the unit of decision. It should be noted that these conditions are found across various 
types of political regimes; see J. D. Hagan, “Does Decision Making Matter? Systemic 
Assumptions vs. Historical Reality in International Relations Theory”, International Studies 
Review, 3: 2, 2001, p. 34
97 Simitis was initially using the term “confederation”; see C. Simitis, “For a European Strategy”, 
Oikonomikos Tahydromos, 22 October 1992 reprinted in C. Simitis, Nationalistic Populism or 
National Strategy? (in Greek), Athens, Gnosi, 1992, pp. 54-9; C. Simitis, “Eleven Goals for the 
Europe of Peoples: Political Guidelines for the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference”, 
Contribution to PASOK’s conference on the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference for the revision 
of the European Union’s treaties, 2 June 1995 reprinted in C. Simitis, For A Powerful Society, 
For A Powerful Greece (in Greek), Athens, Plethron, 1995, pp. 129-30; C. Simitis, “The 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference”, Speech in Parliament, 18 March 1996 reprinted in C. Simitis, 
For a Powerful Greece in Europe and in the World (in Greek), Athens, Kastaniotis, 2002, pp. 60- 
3; C. Simitis, ‘Twenty Years of Greek Membership of the European Union, Fifty Years of 
European Integration”, Speech in Thessaloniki, 31 March 2001, http://www.costas- 
simitis.gr/content/66: C. Simitis, Speech at PASOK’s extraordinary conference in Athens, 6 
February 2004, http://www.costas-simitis.gr/content/62: C. Simitis, Speech in Piraeus, 2 June 
2004, http://www.costas-simitis.gr/content/50
98 Chancellor Kohl in particular considered German efforts to promote European unification “a 
political task of historic dimensions”; see A. Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose 
and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, London, UCL Press, 1999, p. 390
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opposed to the Turkish candidacy for EU membership". In order to establish the 
causal significance of Simitis’ beliefs one needs to identify an internal, pre­
conceived idea regarding Greek policy towards Turkey and a commitment to 
realising this idea regardless of external constraints or discontinuing evidence. 
The first explanation to be tested is the following:
The Helsinki strategy was the outcome o f Prime Minister Simitis ’ efforts to 
pursue what he referred to as the “communitisation ” o f Greco-Turkish relations. 
According to this notion, Greece should allow Turkey to develop its relations 
with the EU within a framework o f EU rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards 
Greece. The Helsinki strategy secured an EU decision that established such 
rules. Simitis was driven by this idea and he remained unequivocally committed 
to it even in the face offormidable constraints and disconfirming information100.
Conceptualising change in Greek policy as the outcome of Europeanisation
As was mentioned above, there is no consensus in the literature regarding the 
precise meaning of Europeanisation. While initially the growing number of 
meanings attributed to the concept received attention and was considered 
problematic, it is now understood that the usefulness of Europeanisation lies in 
its ability to raise interesting questions and the challenge for researchers is to 
develop explanatory models that provide answers to these questions101. This line 
of reasoning may, at first sight, lead one to conclude that any conceptualisation 
of Europeanisation can be useful provided that it poses certain questions. The 
argument, however, implicitly indicates two specific criteria that definitions of 
Europeanisation should meet. First, each conceptualisation should help
99 B. Kuniholm, “Turkey’s Accession to the European Union: Differences in European and US 
Attitudes and Challenges for Turkey”, Turkish Studies, 2: 1, 2001, pp. 27-8; Muftuler-Bac -  
McLaren, op. cit. pp. 23-4; C. Rumford, “From Luxembourg to Helsinki: Turkey, the Politics of 
EU Enlargement and Prospects for Accession”, Contemporary Politics, 6: 4, 2000, p. 340
100 It should be pointed out that when this particular explanation was tested empirically, it 
predicted that Simitis had an internal, pre-conceived idea that had implications for Greek policy 
towards Turkey and that he remained unequivocally committed to it, but not what that idea was. 
Simitis’ belief in the necessity of communitisation was an empirical finding, which is discussed 
here for the sake of clarity of presentation.
101 Olsen, op. cit. esp. pp. 922-3, 943-4; Radaelli, “Europeanisation: Solution...”, op. cit. esp. pp. 
1-2, 15-6
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researchers ask new questions: the concept of Europeanisation would indeed be 
redundant if it only directed our attention to and raised questions about 
phenomena captured by other concepts. Second, each conceptualisation should 
help researchers ask questions that are researchable: the concept of 
Europeanisation might remain interesting if it only raised questions the answers 
to which cannot be tested empirically, but it would not be useful.
At this point it would be instructive to consider some of the definitions of 
Europeanisation that feature most prominently in the literature in the light of 
these two criteria. In a comprehensive review, Olsen identified five different uses 
of Europeanisation: a) changes in external boundaries, b) developing institutions 
at the European level, c) central penetration of national systems of governance, 
d) exporting forms of political organisation and e) a political unification project 
and explained that he suspected that Europeanisation as a political unification 
project would turn out to be the most interesting because it includes the other 
four meanings102. This assessment, however, contradicts his understanding of 
Europeanisation as an “attention-directing device”. This conceptualisation 
encompasses European politics virtually in its entirety and thus fails to direct our 
attention to a specific set of phenomena. Furthermore, Olsen argues that this 
political unification project proceeds through “the mutual adaptation of co- 
evolving institutions”103. It is certainly important to point out that neither the EU, 
nor the domestic level is static; processes of change can be observed at both 
levels. Olsen, however, explicitly discusses “simultaneous processes of change” 
and European, national, sub-national and non-European institutions and actors 
changing at the same time104. If the two levels interact and change 
simultaneously, it is not possible to determine what the direction o f causality is. 
In Olsen’s own words, “no coherent empirical research programme is possible if 
everything is seen as endogenous and in flux”105. Reality is by definition more
102 Olsen, op. cit. pp. 923-4, 943
103 Ibid. p. 941
104 Ibid. pp. 941, 943
105 Ibid. p. 942; The problem here is similar to that Wendt faced, when he attempted to address 
issues of research design that stem from Giddens’s structuration theory. The research strategy 
Wendt proposed for the study of the interplay between agency and structure was incompatible 
with Giddens’s theory because, according to the latter, agency and structure presuppose each 
other; for a critical discussion see W. Carlsnaes, “The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign 
Policy Analysis”, International Studies Quarterly, 36: 3, 1992, esp. p. 258. While Olsen does not 
explicitly subscribe to such an extreme understanding of the mutual constitution of agency
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complex than theory. The purpose of theoretical frameworks is to isolate certain 
of the infinite elements that constitute reality, create order amongst them and, 
thus, simplify106. This conceptualisation does not isolate certain elements of 
European politics, but includes it in its entirety, effectively rendering research 
impossible. If the usefulness of Europeanisation lies in its ability to help us ask 
researchable questions, this conceptualisation severely limits the usefulness of 
the concept because it only raises questions the answers to which cannot be 
tested empirically.
It follows from the above that Europeanisation will be a useful concept if it only 
has one face , that is to say if it directs our attention to a single set o f phenomena. 
Of the four meanings of Europeanisation that Olsen’s preferred conceptualisation 
includes, only one refers to a new set of phenomena. According to a prominent 
use of the concept, Europeanisation refers to “the emergence and development at 
the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, legal 
and social institutions associated with political problem-solving that formalise 
interactions among the actors and of policy networks specialising in the creation 
of authoritative rules”107. These institutions, however, do not simply “emerge”. 
National governments establish these institutions as an integral part of the 
integration process. Consequently, this particular conceptualisation of 
Europeanisation renders it indistinguishable from integration108. Indeed, one of 
the key debates within the context of integration theory discusses the extent to 
which national executives are capable of exercising control over the institutional
(member-states) and structure (the EU), his conceptualisation of Europeanisation poses the same 
problem for empirical research because it refers to simultaneous change of both agency and 
structure.
106 M. Clarke, “Foreign Policy Analysis: A Theoretical Guide” in S. Stavridis -  C. Hill (eds), 
Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy: Western European Reactions to the Falklands Conflict, 
Oxford/ Washington, D.C., Berg, 1996, pp. 19-21; Waltz, op. cit. pp. 6-9
107 T. Risse -  M. G. Cowles -  J. Caporaso, “Europeanisation and Domestic Change: Introduction” 
in M. G. Cowles -  J. A. Caporaso -  T. Risse (eds), Transforming Europe: Europeanisation and 
Domestic Change, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2001, p. 3. It should be noted that 
Caporaso has conceded that this definition “poses some problems” and he has opted for a 
definition that is consistent with the third meaning on Olsen’s list, which does not render the 
concept “redundant”; see J. Caporaso, “The Three Worlds of Regional Integration Theory” in P. 
Graziano -  M. P. Vink (eds), Europeanisation: New Research Agendas, Basingstoke, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008, pp. 27,33
108 For this critique see Dyson -  Goetz, op. cit. pp. 13-15, 20; Featherstone, “Introduction: In the 
Name...”, op. cit. p. 10 andRadaelli, “The Europeanisation...”, op. cit. p. 34
40
evolution of the EU109. Similarly, Europeanisation as changes in external 
boundaries and exporting forms of political organisation refers to different 
aspects of the EU’s external relations - the process of enlargement, relations 
between the EU and other international actors and the EU’s attempts to define its 
international role -  which the literature on EU foreign policy has discussed 
extensively110. What remains unclear is the added value of their re­
conceptualisation as Europeanisation. If the usefulness of Europeanisation lies in 
its ability to help us ask new questions, these conceptualisations limit the 
usefulness of the concept because they only raise questions that have been asked 
before.
The final meaning -  central penetration of national systems of governance -  
seems more promising. In this vein, Radaelli has suggested that Europeanisation 
“consists of processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalisation 
of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of 
doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and 
consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of 
domestic (national and sub-national) discourse, political structures and public 
policies”111. The word “construction” in this definition signifies that 
Europeanisation can derive from the stage of policy formulation112. It is made 
explicit, however, that the stage of policy formulation is not synonymous with
109 See amongst others S. Hix, “Constitutional Agenda-Setting through Discretion in Rule 
Interpretation: Why the European Parliament Won at Amsterdam”, British Journal o f Political 
Science, 32: 2, 2002; Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe..., op. cit. esp. pp. 67-77 and P. Pierson, 
“The Path to European Integration”, Comparative Political Studies, 29: 2, 1996
110 See amongst others R. H. Ginsber, “Conceptualising the European Union as an International 
Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical Capability-Expectations Gap”, Journal o f Common Market 
Studies, 37: 3, 1999; C. Hill, “The Capability-Expectations Gap or Conceptualising Europe’s 
International Role”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 31: 3, 1993; A. Moravcsik -  M. A. 
Vachudova, “National Interests, State Power and EU Enlargement”, East European Politics and 
Societies, 17: 1, 2003; F. Schimmelfenning, “The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical 
Action and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union”, International Organization, 55: 1, 
2001; H. Sjursen, “Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU’s 
Enlargement Policy”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40: 3, 2002; K. E. Smith, The Making 
of EU Foreign Policy: The Case o f Eastern Europe, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2004 and B. White, 
“Foreign Policy Analysis and European Foreign Policy” in B. Tonra -  T. Christiansen (eds), 
Rethinking European Union foreign Policy, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2004
111 Radaelli, “Europeanisation: Solution...”, op. cit. p. 3
112 Bulmer and Radaelli contradict themselves at this point; even though they make the possibility 
of Europeanisation emanating from the stage of policy formulation - that is prior to the making of 
a decision - explicit, they then argue that, in the case of the CFSP, there can be no 
Europeanisation of national foreign policy, unless a decision is made at the EU level; see Bulmer 
-Radaelli, op. cit. pp. 3-5, 7 and Radaelli, “Europeanisation: Solution...”, op. cit. p. 12
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Europeanisation113. Consequently, Europeanisation does not consist of processes 
of construction of EU rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, “ways of doing 
things”, beliefs and norms, but may originate from such processes and these “EU 
ways of doing things” need not be “consolidated” at the EU level prior to their 
incorporation into the domestic level.
Furthermore, it remains unclear with which modes of governance 
“institutionalisation” and “diffusion” correspond. Given that diffusion is 
understood as incorporation in a fashion less structured than 
institutionalisation114, it would be reasonable to assume that diffusion 
corresponds with “facilitated coordination”, a mode of governance that relates to 
policy areas not subject to EU law, where decisions are made unanimously and 
the EU simply serves as an arena for the exchange of ideas115. In theory, 
however, there is no reason to assume a priori that EU rules, procedures, policy 
paradigms, styles, “ways of doing things”, beliefs and norms generated from 
facilitated coordination will not be institutionalised, but simply diffused into the 
domestic level. Such an assumption would appear to imply that the process of 
Europeanisation in such policy areas is more easily reversible, while the 
reversibility of the process remains a matter of empirical investigation.
It follows from the above that Europeanisation should be defined as “a process 
o f incorporation in the logic o f domestic (national and sub-national) discourse, 
political structures, and public policies o f formal and informal rules, 
procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways o f doing things ’ and shared beliefs 
and norms that are first defined in the EU policy processes”.
This revised definition retains all the advantages of Radaelli’s initial 
formulation116 and meets the two criteria set out above. First, it emphasises the 
importance of change. Second, it refers to “EU policy processes” as opposed to 
EU laws. It is, therefore, clear that a truly common EU policy with legally
113 Bulmer -  Radaelli, op. cit. p. 5
114 Ibid. p. 3
115 Ibid. p. 7
116 For a discussion of these advantages see Radaelli, “The Europeanisation o f...”, op. cit. pp. 30- 
1
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binding instruments and under judicial review is not a pre-requisite of 
Europeanisation. Third, it is broad enough to cover both member-states and non- 
member-states, both national and sub-national levels and both political 
structures, political processes, public policies and the cognitive and normative 
frames that cut across the former. Finally, it secures the usefulness of the concept 
because it allows researchers to demarcate a set of empirically manageable 
phenomena (the incorporation of EU norms, practices and procedures in the 
domestic level), which are not captured by other concepts.
It should be noted here that possible interactions between the process of 
institution building at the EU level and the process through which these 
institutions impact on the domestic level cannot be ruled out at the analytical 
level. Europeanisation, at this stage of research in the field of EU studies, 
however, is not useful as a conceptualisation of the interaction between or the 
mutual constitution of these processes117 simply because there is something 
missing. Before one attempts to study the interaction between these two 
processes, one needs to isolate each one of them and study them separately first. 
Such a conceptualisation attempts to take both steps at once. If agency (member- 
states) and structure (the EU) are mutually constitutive and integration theory 
informs us of how agency is “structuring”, then Europeanisation is best suited to 
direct our attention to how agency is being “structured”. That particular process 
whereby the EU causes change in national polities, public policies and domestic 
politics is what the concept of Europeanisation can help us identify, isolate, and 
ask questions about. Research on such questions logically precedes research on 
how processes of Europeanisation feed back into the integration process.
As the range of possible outcomes of this process has not been specified yet, 
researchers often establish the accession of a state to the EU or the beginning of 
cooperation in the field of foreign policy as their starting point and organise their 
research as a search for some sort of impact that can be attributed to the EU. 
Consequently, studies on Europeanisation often lack explicit rules for case 
selection. Given the above definition of the concept, why does change in Greek
117 Major, op. cit. pp. 176-7
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policy towards Turkey constitute a potential case of Europeanisation of national 
foreign policy?
As has been pointed out, one should begin by observing change in national 
foreign policy that follows the establishment of foreign policy norms, practices 
and procedures at the EU level and is consistent with the latter118. In order to be 
able to discern whether national foreign policy has been reoriented along the 
lines of the EU way of doing things, one needs to identify the relevant EU 
foreign policy norms, practices and procedures and the elements of national 
foreign policy each one of them has affected. As was mentioned above, the 
formulation of the Helsinki strategy constituted marked change in Greek policy 
towards Turkey and therefore it serves as a useful starting point. The Helsinki 
strategy can be conceptualised as the outcome of the incorporation of the type of 
conditionality that the EU applies within the context of enlargement into Greek 
policy towards Turkey. The mixture of predominantly diplomatic and economic 
EU foreign policy instruments includes the offer of EU membership, which has 
turned out to be the most effective119. A specific type of conditionality applies to 
the use of this instrument, which has been referred to as “reinforcement by 
reward”120. The EU offers the reward of membership and creates a link between 
payment of the reward and certain conditions. If the target government complies, 
the reward is paid. If the target government fails to comply, payment of the 
reward is withheld, but the EU “does not intervene either coercively or 
supportively”121. Greek governments had intended to use financial assistance and 
institutional ties between the Communities/the EU and Turkey -  including the 
offer of membership -  as an instrument of their policy towards Turkey since 
Greece applied for membership of the Communities122. There was, however, a
118 For these guidelines see Radaelli, “Europeanisation: Solution...”, op. cit. pp. 8-10
119 Smith, European Union Foreign Policy..., op. cit. p. 52, 67; A. Missiroli, “The EU and its 
Changing Neighbourhoods: Stabilisation, Integration and Partnership” in J. Batt et al., Partners 
and Neighbours: A CFSP for a Wider Europe, Chaillot Papers, No 64, 2003, p. 17. The use of 
military instruments, however, has increased to such an extent that it is no longer possible to 
classify the EU as a “civilian power”; see K. E. Smith, “Still ‘Civilian Power EU’?”, European 
Foreign Policy Unit Working Paper, No. 1, 2005
120 F. Schimmelfenning -  S. Engert -  H. Knobel, “Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The 
Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey”, Journal o f Common 
Market Studies, 41:3,2003
121 Ibid. p. 497
122 P. Yannas, “The Greek Factor in EC-Turkey Relations” in P. Kazakos -  P. C. Ioakimidis (eds), 
Greece and EC Membership Evaluated, London, Pinter, 1994, p. 216
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discrepancy between the way in which Greece applied conditionality and the EU 
practice of reinforcement by reward. When the EU formulated the Copenhagen 
criteria, it made the link between association and membership “clear and 
explicit”123. Conditionality was selected as a mode of governance of EU relations 
with third countries124. In contrast, Greek governments applied conditionality in 
an attempt to prevent the development of EU-Turkey relations. Greek 
governments never offered Turkey a reward payable upon compliance. Instead, 
they unilaterally withheld those rewards (financial assistance, Customs Union) 
Turkey had already been offered and the offer of the “tastiest”125 reward 
(membership) at the EU’s disposal. The Helsinki strategy marked a shift from 
attempts to block EU-Turkey relations to attempts to shape them as Greece 
allowed the EU to offer Turkey the reward of membership.
Furthermore, the policy previously pursued had allowed Greek governments to 
maintain control over EU-Turkey relations. Such control has been identified as 
the “principle (sic) objective” of Greek foreign policy126. Indeed, the right to veto 
progress in EU-Turkey relations was exercised unilaterally. The Helsinki strategy 
involved considerable multilateralisation127 because the offer of EU membership 
can only be made collectively at the EU level. As has been pointed out, EU level 
cooperation “has moved the conduct of national foreign policy...towards a 
collective endeavour”128. EU foreign policy is primarily about making collective 
decisions, coordinating, consulting or, at the very least, informing one’s partners. 
When the establishment of EU foreign policy instruments and practices (in this 
case the establishment of reinforcement by reward as the practice that governs
123 Missiroli, op. cit. p. 18; The irony of this is that Central and Eastern European Countries 
argued that they were entitled to the offer of membership because Greece and Turkey had 
concluded association agreements that included a future-membership clause; see 
Schimmelfenning, op. cit. p. 70
124 F. Schimmelfenning -  U. Sedelmeier, “Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the 
Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe”, Journal o f European Public Policy, 11:4, 
2004
125 K. E. Smith, “The Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality” in M. 
Ceremona (ed), The Enlargement o f the European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003,
p. 121
126 Kavakas, op. cit. p. 158
127 Economides, op. cit. p. 484
128 C. Hill -  W. Wallace, “Introduction: Actors and Actions” in C. Hill (ed), The Actors in 
Europe’s Foreign Policy, London and New York, Routledge, 1996, p. 6; see also M. Smith, 
“Toward a Theory of EU Policy-Making: Multi-Level Governance, Domestic Politics and 
National Adaptation to Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy”, Journal o f European 
Public Policy, 11:4, 2004, esp. p. 748
45
the use of the offer of EU membership as a foreign policy instrument) leads 
national foreign policy makers to calculate that “uploading” will allow them to 
achieve their goals more effectively, they decide to incorporate the norm of 
collective decision-making into their policies. While Europeanisation refers to 
the process of incorporation of procedural EU norms into national foreign policy, 
uploading refers to the outcome of the process. National foreign policy makers 
begin “to employ a formerly unused mechanism of institutional cooperation with 
other member-states”129 to pursue collective decision-making on issues, which 
they had previously sought to handle unilaterally. While policy goals are not 
transformed, the decision-making process itself is elevated onto the EU level and 
national foreign policy makers’ EU partners become co-equal decision-makers.
Finally, it is plausible to suggest that beyond the incorporation of the practice of 
reinforcement by reward and the procedural norm of collective decision-making 
the Helsinki strategy was also the result of the incorporation of substantive EU 
foreign policy norms into Greek policy towards Turkey. Once incorporated into 
national foreign policy, these behavioural norms change national foreign policy 
goals. When peace, democracy and the rule of law are threatened, when human 
rights, fundamental freedoms and the rights of minorities are being violated, 
when international cooperation and good governance falter, national foreign 
policy makers begin to identify foreign policy problems that need to be resolved. 
Their objective is to ensure that third countries start taking the course of action 
substantive EU foreign policy norms prescribe.
It should be noted here that any mention of a “European Union foreign policy” 
almost inevitably raises certain issues, which are the subject of heated debates in 
the literature. First of all, certain scholars would go as far as to debate the very 
existence of an EU foreign policy130. Second, the literature discusses whether and 
to what extent different aspects of EU foreign policy are “unique”131. It should be
129 S. Jacquot -  C. Woll, “Usage of European Integration: Europeanisation from a Sociological 
Perspective”, European Integration OnLine Papers, Vol 7 No 12, 2003, p. 8, emphasis added
130 For a review see W. Carlsnaes, “Forum Section: Where Is the Analysis o f European Foreign 
Policy Going?”, European Union Politics, 5: 4, 2004, esp. pp. 497-503
131 Manners argues that the EU is a “normative power” that is different from “pre-existing 
political forms” and this ontological difference “predisposes it to act in a normative way”; Smith 
argues that the objectives the EU’s “international identity” entails are not unique, yet the way in 
which they are pursued is; finally, Hyde-Price argues that EU foreign policy is not at all peculiar
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made explicit that these debates are only marginally related to the study of 
Europeanisation. Whether or not the substantive and procedural norms and 
practices discussed here amount to a “foreign policy” is a matter of 
conceptualisation that has implications for the theoretical approaches selected to 
answer the question of why these norms and practices have been established at 
the EU level. As was mentioned above, this is not one of the questions the 
concept of Europeanisation raises. Europeanisation helps us ask why these norms 
and practices are incorporated into national foreign policy, not why they were 
established at the EU level to begin with.
Furthermore, it is clear that the EU is not the only international actor that 
emphasises norms such as respect for human rights132. This is not to suggest, 
however, that the possibility that Europeanisation will occur can be ruled out at 
the analytical level. The fact remains that these are indeed features of the way in 
which the EU manages its external relations. Consequently, when national 
foreign policy changes so as to incorporate these norms, it is plausible to suggest 
that it might have been the EU that caused this change provided that causal 
mechanisms that explain this process of incorporation can be identified133. The 
fact that the EU is not the only actor that emphasises human rights simply means 
that the EU is not the only plausible source of this particular type of foreign 
policy change. This is partly why the set of research questions relevant to 
Europeanisation are puzzling and the multitude of possible explanatory factors 
should come as no surprise to students of foreign policy. The difference in terms 
of the analysis is that these norms are not incorporated into national policy 
because they are universally accepted, but because the course of action they 
prescribe is considered appropriate within the EU context. The concept of 
Europeanisation does not imply that EU foreign policy is unique or sui generis, 
but it suggests that it might be causally significant for processes of national 
foreign policy change.
when approached in the light of neo-realist international relations theory; see I. Manners, 
“Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? ”, Journal o f Common Market Studies, 40: 
2, 2002, esp. pp. 240-2, Smith, European Union Foreign Policy..., op. cit. pp. 195-9 and A. 
Hyde-Price, “Normative Power Europe: A Realist Critique”, Journal o f European Public Policy, 
13:2,2006
132 It is equally clear that not all international actors share these norms.
133 For the mechanisms that explain Europeanisation in the case of foreign policy see the next 
section of this chapter.
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Explaining change in Greek policy as the outcome of Europeanisation
Even though the literature on Europeanisation has been steadily growing and 
research has shown that it is mostly public policies that have been penetrated by 
the integration process, foreign policy has not been studied extensively134. Apart 
from doubts regarding the usefulness of the concept of Europeanisation in 
general, its applicability in the case of foreign policy in particular has also come 
into question due to the "unique nature of foreign policy" and the 
intergovernmental nature of decision-making at the EU level135. Europeanisation, 
it is argued, was initially applied to the study of policy areas where the 
Community method applies; applying the concept to the study of foreign policy 
is problematic because the latter lies at the core of national sovereignty, thus 
hindering the development of international cooperation. Limited and weakly 
institutionalised cooperation can only have a weak impact on national policies.
This skepticism is not theoretically justified. As was mentioned above, the 
growth of the literature on Europeanisation reflects a research interest in the 
implications of certain EU level developments, including the introduction of 
guidelines on employment and social security policy that followed the decision 
to establish EMU. While these policy areas fall within the scope of the first 
pillar, the Community method does not apply. Consequently, the concept of 
Europeanisation never referred exclusively to “Communitised” policy areas to 
begin with. Furthermore, it follows from the “unique nature” of foreign policy 
argument that one should not expect variation of preferences on cooperation in 
the field of foreign policy across countries. If the nature of the policy area 
determines member-states’ preferences, no member-state should be expected to 
prefer cooperation in the field of this uniquely sensitive policy area. Since 
national preferences do vary across countries, the nature of foreign policy does 
not constitute a convincing explanation of limited and weakly institutionalised 
cooperation. More importantly, regardless of the reason why cooperation in the
134 Featherstone, “Introduction: In the Name...”, op. cit. p. 6
135 Major, op. cit. pp. 182-3; A. Miskimmon -  W. E. Paterson, “Foreign and Security Policy: On 
the Cusp Between Transformation and Accommodation” in K. Dyson -  K. H. Goetz (eds), 
Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint, Oxford, Published for the British Academy by 
Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 329-330; Smith, “The EU in the World...”, op. cit. p. 17
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field of foreign policy remains limited, a high level of integration in a particular 
policy area is not a pre-requisite of Europeanisation. Indeed, there is no 
theoretical association between the level of integration and the magnitude of 
policy change. The latter remains a matter of empirical investigation136. In fact, it 
has been argued that the reason why national foreign policy makers incorporate 
EU norms, practices and procedures into their policies is their socialisation 
during EU level interactions. Socialisation may result in change in foreign policy 
objectives, that is to say in change of the greatest magnitude possible.
Finally, it should be pointed out that this skepticism is based on a 
misinterpretation of the implications of “intergovernmental” decision-making. It 
is assumed that since intergovernmental decisions require the agreement of all 
member-states, EU foreign policy norms, practices and procedures established 
intergovernmental^ simply constitute what all member-states want. 
Consequently, even if these norms, practices and procedures are incorporated 
into national policy, the EU could not possible have been causally significant. 
Both liberal intergovemmentalist and rational choice institutionalist analyses of 
the effects of unanimity -  which is the key feature of the institutional 
environment of EU foreign policy decision-making -  make explicit that this is 
inaccurate. The effect of unanimity is that the government with the least desire to 
change the status quo will be the most powerful and it will determine the content 
of the agreement137. Member-states will not get what they want, but simply an 
outcome that is preferable to the status quo. The agreement will not even 
perfectly reflect the preferences of the most recalcitrant government138. 
Consequently, even intergovernmental decision-making may create a 
discrepancy between national policy and EU policy. Furthermore, even if a 
member-state has achieved “perfect uploading”, a discrepancy may still emerge 
if national preferences change over time139. Finally, the fact that EU foreign
136 Bulmer -  Radaelli, op. cit. pp. 12-3
137 A. Moravcsik, “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal 
Intergovemmentalist Approach”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 31:4, 1993, pp. 499-502; 
G. Garrett, - G. Tsebelis, “An Institutionalist Critique of Intergovemmentalism”, International 
Organization, 50: 2, 1996, pp. 281-283
138 Moravcsik, op. cit. p. 501
139 Despite the fact that multilateralism has been the “defining characteristic” of German foreign 
policy since the end of World War Two (see A. Miskimmon -  W. E. Paterson, “Adapting to 
Europe? German Foreign Policy, Domestic Constraints and the Limitations of Europeanisation 
since Unification” in H. W. Maull (ed), Germany’s Uncertain Power, Basingstoke, Palgrave
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policy is a common, but not a single policy, the absence of legal impediments to 
refraining from using the EU foreign policy framework and the lack of 
mechanisms that could enforce compliance with EU foreign policy positions140 
only render the Europeanisation of national foreign policy more puzzling. Why 
do national foreign policy makers incorporate EU foreign policy norms, practices 
and procedures into their policies even though they cannot be forced to?
The intergovernmental nature of EU foreign policy making is reflected in the 
causal mechanisms through which Europeanisation produces foreign policy 
change141. The adaptational pressure mechanism is not applicable. According to 
the latter, the misfit between national and EU policy produces pressure for 
adaptation because the EU constitutes an “authoritative decision-making 
structure” and “member-states have no exit option given that EU law constitutes 
the law of the land”142. Despite the fact that the literature has discussed the 
adaptational pressure national foreign policy makers are supposedly under143, in 
policy areas where legally binding instruments are not available, by definition the 
misfit between national and EU policy does not produce adaptational pressure 
and EU policy produces its effects through different mechanisms. National 
executives are the key actors and the process is voluntary144.
Scholars have indeed identified such alternative causal mechanisms. As was 
mentioned above, it has been argued that reiterated interactions within the 
context of EU level cooperation in the field of foreign policy entail processes of 
socialisation145. During these interactions, national foreign policy makers become
Macmillan, 2006, p. 30), Germany refrained from adhering to procedural EC foreign policy 
norms and the issue-specific decision that had been made, when it decided to recognise Croatia 
and Slovenia (see S. J. Nuttall, European Foreign Policy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, 
pp. 195-224 and T. C. Salmon, “Testing Times for European Political Cooperation: The Gulf and 
Yugoslavia, 1990-1992”, International Affairs, 68: 2, 1992). Similarly, despite the fact that 
France initially insisted that the Community should impose sanctions on China in response to the 
Tiananmen massacre, it subsequently breached the sanctions (Wong, The Europeanisation o f  
French..., op. cit. pp. 76-99). As Pierson has pointed out, change in national preferences over 
time is one of the reasons why gaps emerge between national preferences and EU institutions and 
policies (Pierson, op. cit. pp. 139-40).
140Nuttall, op. cit. pp. 188-190,267; Smith, “The EU in the World...”, op. cit. p. 17
141 Radaelli, “The Europeanisation...”, op. cit. pp. 40-50
142 Borzel -  Risse, op. cit. p. 61
143 Miskimmon -  Paterson, op cit; J. I. Torreblanca, op cit
144 Bulmer -  Radaelli, op. cit. p. 7
145 For this explanatory model see ibid. p. 7; Economides, op. cit. p. 472; Smith, “Toward a 
Theory of EU Policy-Making...”, op cit; P. Rieker, Europeanisation o f National Security
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convinced of the appropriateness of the EU way of doing things and internalise 
EU behavioural rules. Consequently, when they re-enter the national decision­
making process, they begin to think of the foreign policy issues at hand through 
the prism of internalised rules and their preferences are thus transformed. 
National foreign policy makers identify policy problems and define policy goals 
in accordance with established substantive EU foreign policy norms and they 
select the instruments and procedures that are considered appropriate for EU 
member-states in each situation. Foreign policy change is guided by a logic of 
appropriateness, that is to say by considerations of what constitutes standard, 
normal, right or good behaviour within the context of the EU146. When social 
action is driven by the logic of appropriateness, actors try to answer the 
following questions: what kind of situation is this, what kind of person am I and 
what does a person such as I do in a situation such as this?147 The second 
explanation to be tested is the following:
Greek foreign policy makers redefined the situation they were facing. They 
began to see Turkey as an applicant country with a rather weak democratic 
regime, where the rule o f law was not observed and human rights, fundamental 
freedoms and the rights o f  minorities were being violated. Turkish violations o f  
these substantive EU foreign policy norms were defined as the problem Greek 
policy towards Turkey was intended to address. The objective was to ensure that 
Turkey ceased to violate these norms and started to take the course o f  action 
they prescribe. Greek foreign policy makers identified themselves as officials o f  
an EU member-state and they identified reinforcement by reward as the 
established practice that determines what constitutes appropriate behaviour fo r  
EU member-states when applicant countries violate substantive EU foreign 
policy norms. The Greek practice o f preventing Turkey from developing its 
relations with the EU was inappropriate because it contradicted established EU  
practice. Greek foreign policy makers chose to incorporate reinforcement by
Identity: The EU and the Changing Security Identities of the Nordic States, London, Routledge, 
2006; P. Rieker, “From Common Defence to Comprehensive Security: Towards the 
Europeanisation of French Foreign and Security Policy?”, Security Dialogue, 37: 4, 2006; Tonra, 
op cit; Torreblanca, op cit; Wong, “The Europeanisation of Foreign Policy”, op. cit. pp. 136, 138- 
40, 149-50; Wong, The Europeanisation o f French Foreign Policy..., op. cit.
146 J. G. March -  J. P. Olsen, “The Logic of Appropriateness”, ARENA Working Papers, WP 
04/09, 2004
147 Ibid. p. 4
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reward into their policy towards Turkey because they fe lt that this was the 
appropriate course o f  action for an EU member-state given the situation.
Constructivist explanations of the Europeanisation of national foreign policy 
have been widespread in the literature. In fact, in a most prominent contribution, 
Tonra offered no explicit definition of Europeanisation and he implicitly 
identified the concept with norm internalisation148. In the absence of legally 
binding instruments and adaptational pressure emanating from the EU level, an 
explanation based on processes of socialisation is certainly plausible and 
therefore requires empirical testing. Empirical evidence, however, suggests that it 
may not be the most convincing and certainly not the only plausible explanation. 
First of all, Hooghe’s research has shown that even in a most-likely critical case 
-  the European Commission -  there is little evidence to support the idea that 
adherence to EU norms is the outcome of international socialisation149. Since the 
argument has failed the rather undemanding empirical test of a most-likely case, 
the phenomenon of international socialisation might not be as common as the 
literature on EU foreign policy suggests. In fact, Nuttall has argued that the 
transition from European Political Cooperation (EPC) to the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) reinforced the decline of socialisation during EU 
level interactions and the empirical record appears to confirm this view150. 
Furthermore, with regard to the Europeanisation of foreign policy in particular, 
even though Tonra identifies Europeanisation with norm internalisation, his 
research has produced empirical evidence that suggests that when national 
foreign policy makers do adhere to EU foreign policy norms they do so for
148 As Karen Smith has pointed out “a rather colossal omission in the book is that Tonra never 
directly gets to grips with the concept of ‘Europeanisation’ -  there is no discussion of the 
meaning of this term (although it appears in the title), so his book can only make a 
disappointingly indirect contribution to the burgeoning literature on it” (see K. E. Smith, 
“Understanding the European Foreign Policy System”, Contemporary European History, 12: 2, 
2003, p. 250). Tonra made his understanding of the concept explicit in his contribution to the 
volume edited by Manners and Whitman, when he defined Europeanisation as “a transformation 
in the way in which national foreign policies are constructed, in the ways in which professional 
roles are defined and pursued and in the consequent internalisation of norms and expectations 
arising from a complex system of collective European policy making” (see B. Tonra, “Denmark 
and Ireland” in I. Manners -  R. G. Whitman (eds), The Foreign Policies o f European Union 
Member States, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2000, p. 229).
149 L. Hooghe, “Several Roads Lead to International Norms, but Few Via International 
Socialisation: A Case Study of the European Commission”, International Organization, 59: 4, 
2005
150 Nuttall, op. cit. pp. 271-274; P. H. Gordon, “Europe’s Uncommon Foreign Policy”, 
International Security, 22: 3,1998, p. 88
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instrumental reasons. The instrumental logic is clear when Danish, Dutch and 
Irish diplomats refer to the value of privileged access to information, the 
increased international weight and the greater impact their foreign policies have 
had through the EPC/CFSP151. Consequently, it is at least equally plausible to 
argue that norm conformance may be driven by self-interest152.
It follows from the above that the incorporation of EU ways of doing things into 
national foreign policy might be the result of strategic calculation153. The 
differences between the two explanatory models are considerable. According to 
this explanation, the definition of the policy problem and foreign policy goals are 
not transformed as a result of Europeanisation. Foreign policy makers engage in 
strategic calculation in order to maximise the attainment of clearly identifiable 
preferences, to secure specific foreign policy goals. They consider the 
consequences of alternatives (the costs and benefits of each alternative in terms 
of the goals set) and they choose the relevant EU foreign policy practices and 
procedures amongst them because they allow for such maximisation; they offer 
the means to achieve national foreign policy goals more effectively. Policy 
change is driven by a logic of expected consequences. The third explanation to 
be tested is the following:
The establishment o f EU enlargement conditionality altered the range o f  
alternatives available to Greek foreign policy makers and provided them with 
the option o f offering Turkey a conditional reward (EU membership). The 1996
151 Tonra, “Denmark and Ireland” op. cit. p. 229
152 M. Finnemore -  K. Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”, 
International Organization, 52: 4, 1998, p. 912
153 Rieker’s analysis constitutes a notable exception in the sense that it makes explicit that the 
Europeanisation of national foreign and security policy may be the outcome of instrumental 
calculations; see Rieker, Europeanisation o f National Security Identity..., op cit and Rieker, 
“From Common Defence to Comprehensive Security...”, op cit. This is considered as an early 
stage of a socialisation model. There is no reason, however, to assume that socialisation is 
invariably preceded by the incorporation of EU norms, practices and procedures for instrumental 
reasons. For rational choice models in foreign policy analysis see G. T. Allison, “Conceptual 
Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis”, The American Political Science Review, 63: 3, 1969 and 
G. Allison -  P. Zelikow, Essence o f Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, New York, 
Longman, 1999, esp. pp. 16-26. It should be pointed out that, in contrast to what Allison’s 
discussion of rational choice models in foreign policy analysis suggests, it is possible to construct 
such models without introducing the state-as-a-unitary-actor assumption and treat the preferences 
of different actors as a matter of empirical investigation; see M. Hollis -  S. Smith, “Roles and 
Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision Making”, British Journal o f Political Science, 16: 3, 1986, 
esp. pp. 273,278.
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Imia/Kardak crisis demonstrated the failure o f the policy based on withholding 
the offer o f rewards to induce Turkey’s compliance with Greek demands and 
prompted a search for a more effective alternative. Greek foreign policy makers 
identified the discrepancy between Greek policy and established EU practice 
and chose to incorporate the practice o f reinforcement by reward and the 
procedural norm o f collective decision making into their policy towards Turkey 
because they calculated that it might be more effective as it would offer Turkey 
greater incentive to comply with Greek demands.
Reconfiguring internal and external balancing154
As was the case with Simitis’ election as Prime Minister, while the end of the 
Cold War has been identified in the literature as a potentially significant 
development, its potential effects on Greek policy towards Turkey have not been 
specified in a theoretically informed manner155. This is particularly problematic 
in light of the fact that change in Greek policy can be conceptualised as the 
outcome of Europeanisation. In the same fashion that the EU effect needs to be 
distinguished from that of globalisation in the field of economic policy156, the EU 
effect also needs to be distinguished from that of international, non-EU related 
factors in the field of foreign policy.
It is often pointed out that the end of the Cold War resulted in a rearrangement of 
the items on the agenda of international politics: international economic 
relations, environmental protection, energy, immigration, the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, cross-border organised crime and terrorism have 
replaced relations between two great powers. With only one great power 
remaining in the international system, security competition has been limited (yet
154 This explanation constitutes a modified version of Tsakonas’ argument discussed in the 
introduction of this thesis. While Tsakonas discusses only the implications of Turkey’s military 
capabilities for power relations between Greece and Turkey, this version of the argument also 
discusses the similar implications of US policy within the context of the post-Cold War 
international system, thus reinforcing the argument.
155 Ioakimidis, “The Europeanisation of Greece’ s Foreign Policy...”, op. cit. pp. 368-9; Stavridis, 
“The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy...”, op. cit. p. 22
156 Featherstone, “Introduction: In the Name...”, op. cit. p. 4; Radaelli, “Europeanisation: 
Solution...”, op. cit. p. 8
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not eliminated). This development led to a shift in the focus of foreign policy 
agendas, the widening of the range of foreign policy actors and shifts in the 
location and instruments of foreign policy activity157.
These changes, however, have been of little consequence to Greco-Turkish 
relations. Relations between the two countries are still dominated by territorial 
disputes and, thus, by more “traditional” security considerations, which were 
prevalent during the Cold War158. It should be noted here that, prior to the 
Helsinki summit, Greece and Turkey had begun to explore the possibility of 
cooperation in low-politics issues. Those efforts led to the conclusion of nine 
bilateral agreements on Greco-Turkish cooperation in policy areas, which 
included trade, the environment, tourism, energy, immigration, organised crime 
and terrorism159. Such attempts at cooperation in low-politics issues, however, 
did not constitute a major innovation. Even the socialist governments of the 
1980s, which had decided to terminate negotiations over territorial issues with 
Turkey, tried to explore the possibility of cooperation in economic issues in 
1983, but those efforts were abandoned, after the establishment of the so-called 
“Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” in November of the same year160.
It is possible, however, to conceptualise the implications of the end of the Cold 
War in a rather different fashion. The Cold War was in Waltz’s terms a “system 
transforming” war: it eliminated one of the great powers in the system (the 
Soviet Union), thus changing the distribution of capabilities that constitutes one 
of the defining attributes of the system’s structure161. Clearly, any impact the end 
of the Cold War as systemic change may have had on Greek policy towards 
Turkey could not have been direct; it was not Greece that ceased to be a great 
power. It is possible, however, that there was an indirect structural effect: it is 
possible that the new distribution of capabilities had implications for the relative
157 C. Hill, The Changing Politics o f Foreign Policy, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 2003, pp. 13-4; S. 
W. Hook (ed), Comparative Foreign Policy: Adaptive Strategies o f the Great and Emerging 
Powers, Upper Saddle River NJ, Prentice Hall, 2002, pp. 1-3; M. Webber -  M. Smith, Foreign 
Policy in a Transformed World, Harlow, Prentice Hall, 2002, pp. 32-3,41-3
158 Tsakonas P., “Security Regimes and Regional Stability: The Case of the Greco-Turkish Arms 
Competition” in Yallouridis H. K. -  P. I. Tsakonas (eds), Greece and Turkey since the End o f the 
Cold War (in Greek), Athens, Sideris, 1999, p. 45; Tsakonas, “Socialising...”, op. cit. p. 49
159 Tsakonas, “Socialising ...”, op. cit. pp. 75-7
160 Valinakis, op. cit. p. 215
161 The other being its “ordering principle”, that is anarchy; see Waltz, op. cit. pp. 88-99
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power position of Greece in the system and vis-a-vis Turkey in particular162. 
Since Turkey was not directly affected by the end of the Cold War either, the 
structural effect would have had to be channeled through the remaining great 
power in the system (the US). As has been pointed out, in an international 
system, where a single state has achieved a dominant position, weaker states will 
worry about how that state will use its unparalleled power. Unbalanced power 
offers states incentives to balance against it163. Consequently, Greek foreign 
policy makers’ concerns should be expected to have revolved around the way in 
which the US would use its dominant position in the system.
While Waltz’s version of balance of power theory predicts that -  under 
conditions of anarchy and with two or more states that wish, at the very least, to 
survive -  unbalanced power will, eventually, be balanced, in Walt’s formulation 
states balance against threatening power164. In this sense, Greek foreign policy 
makers were not concerned with US power per se, but with the exercise of US 
power in a fashion detrimental to Greek security and US support for Turkish 
positions on Greco-Turkish relations in particular. Increased American support 
for Turkey may have been the result of the reduced geo-strategic importance of 
Greece and/or the increased geo-strategic importance of Turkey. In a unipolar 
international system, the ability of the allies of the great power to influence the 
latter are limited because their actions can only have a limited effect on the 
distribution of capabilities165. Consequently, the only option for Greek foreign 
policy makers was to attempt to counter US support for Turkey.
162 For a state’s relative power position as the explanatory variable in explanations of foreign 
policy change that draw on structural realism see R. Baumann -  V. Rittberger -  W. Wagner, 
“Neorealist Foreign Policy Theory” in V. Rittberger (ed), German Foreign Policy Since 
Unification: Theories and Case Studies, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2001, pp. 37- 
8
163 K. N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War”, International Security, 25: 1, 2000, pp. 
28-9
164 S. M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power”, International Security, 9: 
4, 1985, pp. 8-9 and S. M. Walt, The Origins o f Alliances, Ithaca and London, Cornell University 
Press, 1987, pp. 21-6. Essentially, the range of applicability of Walt’s argument is more limited. 
Greco-Turkish relations, however, fall within that range because Turkey is considered to pose a 
threat to Greek security. Indeed, Turkey qualifies as a state that possesses threatening power: 
Turkey’s total resources are greater than those of Greece, its geographical position is proximate, 
it possesses offensive capabilities and, finally, it is perceived as an aggressor that wishes to revise 
the status quo.
165 R. Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1997, pp. 115-7; Jervis discusses bipolar international systems, but the logic 
applies equally to unipolar ones.
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Such considerations regarding US policy would not have been unprecedented. 
Since 1974, when Greece started to consider Turkey as the main threat to its 
security, Greco-American relations have been seen in Greece through the prism 
of Greco-Turkish relations166. Greece’s withdrawal from NATO in the aftermath 
of Turkey’s military intervention in Cyprus in 1974 was a form of protest against 
the unwillingness or inability of the US to prevent Turkey’s intervention, as they 
had done ten years earlier167. Similarly, it has been suggested that in the late 
1980s the new detente of the Cold War that shifted the focus of US foreign 
policy further east, thus increasing the geo-strategic importance of Turkey 
prompted Greece to place greater emphasis on the framework of the 
Communities168. Finally, such considerations would not have been unique to 
Greek foreign policy makers. It has been argued that the end of the Cold War 
prompted similar concerns regarding US policy in Britain. British foreign policy 
makers were concerned with the possibility that the US would offer a reunified 
Germany a “partner in leadership” in the post-Cold War international order169.
The unfavourable exercise of US power would be demonstrated most clearly in 
cases of American intervention in Greco-Turkish relations. The case of the 
Imia/Kardak crisis, during which the US was directly involved, should be 
instructive in this respect. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the crisis, the Turkish 
government announced a large armaments programme. As the latter allowed 
Turkey to build up its military capabilities, it reinforced the weakening of 
Greece’s relative power position vis-a-vis Turkey, thus offering Greek foreign 
policy makers further incentives to balance against the neighbouring country170.
166 Valinakis, op. cit. p. 265
167 Ibid. p. 217
168 P. Tsakaloyannis, “Greece: The Limits to Convergence” in C. Hill (ed), The Actors in 
Europe’s Foreign Policy, London, Routledge, 1996, pp. 191-3; Tsardanidis -  Stavridis, op. cit. p. 
227
169 L. Richardson, “British State Strategies After the Cold War” in R. O. Keohane -  J. S. Nye -  S. 
Hoffman (eds), After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 
1989-1991, Cambridge and London, Harvard University Press, 1993, pp. 150-1; W. Wallace, 
“British Foreign Policy after the Cold War”, International Affairs, 68: 3, 1992, pp. 424-5
170 Tsakonas, “Socialising...”, op. cit. pp. 61-3
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Faced with threatening power, states will try to balance against the threat either 
by increasing their own power or by forming alliances with other states171. The 
shifts in power relations between Greece and Turkey, however, tell us very little 
about the particular configuration of internal and external balancing selected. 
Balance of power theory neither intends to nor is it capable of explaining “the 
particular policies of states”; in order to explain differences between states’ 
responses to structural incentives, one needs to focus on their internal 
characteristics172. As was mentioned above, Greece had accumulated economic 
problems throughout the 1980s, the process that was going to lead to the creation 
of EMU had been initiated and macroeconomic stabilisation had been set as a 
criterion for accession by the mid-1990s and a new government that defined 
EMU entry as its primary goal was elected in 1996. At the same time, public 
expenditure on defence was systematically rising and was far higher than both 
the EU and the NATO average173. Greece sought to deter Turkey and enter EMU. 
In order to achieve both foreign and economic policy goals it was necessary to 
re-allocate resources. As Hill has pointed out, while “heavy domestic costs, both 
financial and political, are sometimes accepted for external reasons...a point will 
sometimes be reached, where high expenditure on external goals imposes a 
crippling burden on a state, often leading to foreign policy decisions being taken 
for financial, domestic reasons”174. Consequently, it was necessary to reconfigure 
internal and external balancing. The logic of external balancing is based on the 
premise that bandwagoning entails risks both in terms of survival and influence: 
it entails a security risk because it requires trust in the benevolence of the 
dominant power and it limits influence because the dominant power is not in 
great need of assistance175. In that sense, the EU was the obvious choice for 
Greek foreign policy makers because institutionalised cooperation under the rule 
of unanimity involves no loss of sovereignty. The fourth explanation to be tested 
is the following:
171 Waltz, “Structural Realism...”, op. cit. p. 28
172 K. N. Waltz, “Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power” in R. O. Keohane (ed), Neorealism 
and Its Critics, New York, Columbia University Press, 1986, pp. 121-2
173 Tsakonas, “Security Regimes...”, op. cit. p. 59; Tsakonas, “Socialising...”, op. cit. p. 65
174 Hill, The Changing Politics..., op. cit. pp. 225-6
175 Walt, “Alliance Formation...”, op. cit. pp. 5-6
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The exercise o f US power in the post-Cold War international system and the 
build-up o f Turkish military capabilities weakened Greece’s relative power 
position vis-a-vis Turkey and rendered balancing against Turkey imperative. 
Accumulated economic problems, EMU accession criteria and the Greek 
government’s emphasis on EMU entry rendered the reallocation o f resources 
imperative. The Helsinki strategy was formulated in order to place greater 
emphasis on external (EU support) rather than internal (defence expenditure) 
balancing in an attempt to secure both foreign and economic policy goals.
Conclusions
The four alternatives formulated above offer theoretically informed parsimonious 
explanations of change in Greek policy towards Turkey that clarify the 
implications of the various explanatory variables mentioned in the previous 
chapter, thus maximising their explanatory potential. The explanation based on 
Simitis’ unequivocal commitment to communitisation emphasises domestic 
sources of foreign policy change and leadership style in particular. In contrast to 
what has been the case in the literature, it does not merely acknowledge the fact 
that Simitis has been a firm supporter of European integration. It identifies an 
internal, pre-conceived idea (communitisation) that had direct implications for 
Greek policy towards Turkey. As Simitis’ leadership style was marked by limited 
responsiveness to the policy context, his belief in the necessity of 
communitisation was more significant than contextual variables.
The conceptual analysis of Europeanisation pursued here showed that the 
concerns of those who have questioned the usefulness of the concept have not 
been entirely unjustified. The various meanings that have been attributed to the 
concept are not invariably useful for empirical research. The conceptual analysis 
of Europeanisation, however, has made considerable progress. It is now 
understood that Europeanisation is a concept that can help us ask interesting new 
research questions. In this sense, definitions of the concept should demarcate a 
set of empirically manageable phenomena, which are not captured by other 
concepts.
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The explanations of change in Greek policy towards Turkey as the outcome of a 
process of Europeanisation take the institutional environment of cooperation in 
the field of foreign policy into consideration. The latter is reflected in the causal 
mechanisms through which Europeanisation produces foreign policy change. 
While these explanations are not based on the adaptational pressure model, they 
do not equate Europeanisation with socialisation. Greek foreign policy makers 
chose to incorporate enlargement conditionality into their policy towards Turkey 
either because they became convinced it was appropriate or because they 
calculated it was utility maximising. In the case of foreign policy change driven 
by a logic of appropriateness, it is made explicit that rules that define what 
constitutes appropriate behaviour for EU member-states are matched to a specific 
definition of the situation. In the case of foreign policy change driven by a logic 
of expected consequences, it is made explicit that uploading is an outcome of the 
process of Europeanisation.
Finally, the balancing thesis draws on structural realist international politics 
theory in order to produce baseline predictions regarding the type of behaviour 
expected (balancing) and it is combined with the economic implications of 
foreign policy in order to predict the precise configuration of balancing selected 
(external balancing). Conceptualising the implications of the end of the Cold War 
in terms of the implications of US policy for Greek policy towards Turkey makes 
it possible to address this question that has hitherto remained open and at the 
same time reinforces the balancing thesis. The next chapter will show that the 
four explanations discussed above predict different pathways to the formulation 
of the Helsinki strategy and it will establish how it is possible to distinguish 
between them empirically.
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Chapter 3: Establishing causality 
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to establish how it is possible to empirically 
distinguish between alternative explanations of change in Greek policy towards 
Turkey and determine which of the variables discussed in the preceding chapters 
were causally significant. It will be shown that while the four explanations 
formulated in the previous chapter predict the same outcome (change in Greek 
policy towards Turkey), they predict different pathways to foreign policy change. 
It is possible to empirically distinguish between the four explanations by process 
tracing their observable implications for three dimensions of the foreign policy 
making process: Greek foreign policy makers’ definition of the policy problem 
the Helsinki strategy was intended to address, the alternative courses of action 
they considered and, finally, the manner in which the latter were assessed.
It will be shown that the balancing thesis predicts that Greek foreign policy 
makers intended to resolve a “guns-or-butter” dilemma when they formulated the 
Helsinki strategy. In contrast, both the Europeanisation and the leadership style 
thesis predict that Greek foreign policy makers identified the failure of Greek 
policy towards Turkey to achieve its objectives. While the Europeanisation thesis 
suggests that the 1996 Imia/Kardak crisis demonstrated policy failure and 
prompted a search for a more effective alternative, the leadership style thesis 
predicts that Simitis had identified policy failure prior to the crisis and that he 
had already selected the alternative he deemed optimal. Finally, the socialisation 
thesis predicts that Greek foreign policy makers began to identify Turkish 
violations of substantive EU foreign policy norms as the policy problem.
With regard to the alternatives Greek foreign policy makers considered, the 
balancing thesis predicts that the Helsinki strategy was formulated as an external 
balancing strategy that could substitute for defence expenditure. The 
Europeanisation and the socialisation thesis predict that Greek foreign policy 
makers distinguished between a policy based on withholding the offer of the 
reward of accession until Turkey complied with Greek demands and a policy 
based on offering the reward and making payment conditional upon compliance
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with Greek demands. In contrast, the leadership style thesis predicts that Simitis 
preferred a policy that would establish EU rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards 
Greece regardless of the offer of rewards and he was unwilling to consider 
alternatives to his preferred course of action.
Finally, while the socialisation thesis predicts that the Helsinki strategy was 
selected because it was considered the appropriate course of action for an EU 
member-state given the definition of the policy problem, the remaining 
explanations predict cost-benefit calculations. The balancing thesis suggests that 
the Helsinki strategy was selected over an internal balancing strategy for its 
economic benefits. The Europeanisation thesis suggests that the Helsinki strategy 
was selected over the policy traditionally pursued because it would offer Turkey 
greater incentive to comply with Greek demands. Finally, the leadership style 
thesis predicts that Simitis pursued the Helsinki strategy because he believed that 
if rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece were established at the EU level, 
the EU would assume responsibility for ensuring Turkey’s compliance.
Process tracing
Foreign policy analysis as a strand of international relations theory is based on 
the premise that foreign policy may be affected by a multitude of variables 
spread over different levels of analysis176. Similarly, having identified a potential 
case of Europeanisation, empirical research aims at establishing the causal 
significance of the EU. As has been pointed out, the problem here is that the 
emergence of the literature on Europeanisation has been triggered by attempts to 
answer the question of what has been the domestic impact of the EU. By posing 
this question, however, the literature has prejudged the significance of the EU as 
an explanatory variable177. The most advanced discussion of Europeanisation in 
the literature suggests that -  in contrast to what has been hitherto the case -  the 
starting point of research on Europeanisation should be an empirical puzzle and 
explanations that attribute causal significance to the EU should be tested against
176 Hudson, op. cit. pp. 2-4
177 Radaelli, “The Europeanisation of...”, op. cit. p. 50
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alternatives178. In other words, both literatures emphasise “comparison”179, in the 
sense of establishing the superiority of a particular cause in comparison with 
other possible causes, as a crucial property of powerful causal arguments.
Process tracing is a method that allows researchers to trace a series of 
“theoretically predicted intermediate steps” between the explanatory and the 
dependent variable180. First, this method allows researchers to establish causality 
in cases of equifinality -  that is to say in cases where there are multiple causal 
paths to the same outcome -  by focusing on the possible causal mechanisms, 
through which a particular outcome may have occurred181. As was indicated 
above, the empirical puzzles foreign policy analysis and Europeanisation are 
related to often constitute cases of equifinality. Indeed, change in Greek policy 
towards Turkey may have been the result of a shift in Greece’s relative power 
position vis-a-vis Turkey combined with the economic implications of Greek 
policy or a response to an external shock that demonstrated policy failure 
combined with the establishment of EU enlargement conditionality or a response 
to EU level interactions during which Greek foreign policy makers became 
convinced of the inappropriateness of their policy towards Turkey or, finally, the 
result of the efforts of a key foreign policy maker unequivocally committed to a 
specific type of foreign policy reform. The emphasis on the “point of 
intersection”182 of the determinants of foreign policy (the policy making process 
whereby actors make and change foreign policy) allows us to establish which 
sources of foreign policy change were causally significant and whether 
Europeanisation produced foreign policy change through socialisation or 
strategic calculation. Second, the emphasis on “intermediate steps” allows for
178 M. Haverland, “Methodology” in P. Graziano -  M. P. Vink (eds), Europeanisation: New 
Research Agendas, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p. 66; Radaelli, “Europeanisation: 
Solution...”, op. cit. p. 8
179 For “comparison” as a criterion good causal arguments ought to meet see Gerring, op. cit. pp. 
181-2; See also S. C. Brooks -  W. C. Wohlforth, “Hard Times for Soft Balancing”, International 
Security, 30: 1,2005, esp. p. 106, where Brooks and Wohlforth argue that the reason why various 
Russian, French, German and Turkish foreign policy decisions have been mistaken for “soft 
balancing” against the United States is that analysts “have failed to consider alternative 
explanations”.
180 J. T. Checkel, “It’s the Process Stupid: Process Tracing in the Study of European and 
International Politics”, ARENA Working Papers, No. 26, 2005, p. 5
181 Ibid. pp. 3-6, 14-5, 19-20; A. P. Cortell -  J. W. Davis Jr., “Understanding the Domestic Impact 
of International Norms: A Research Agenda”, The International Studies Review, 2: 1, 2000, pp. 
84-6; Mahoney -  Goertz, pp. 236-7
182 Hudson, op. cit. p. 3
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greater spatial and temporal continuity between the explanatory and the 
dependent variable than analyses based merely on correlation183. Consequently, it 
is not only possible to empirically distinguish between explanations based on 
different theoretical premises, but also to compare causal arguments with regard 
to this dimension and determine which is “richest”184. Finally, the emphasis on 
“intermediate steps” multiplies observable implications and makes it possible to 
establish causality within the context of a single case based on within-case 
observations185.
While process tracing does not focus on the “big picture” and, thus, does not 
allow researchers to identify possible explanatory variables, it does focus on the 
possible causal mechanisms, through which a particular outcome may have 
occurred186. Consequently, process tracing is complementary to research designs 
based on testing alternative explanations. It should be noted, however, that 
certain sources of foreign policy change will be more pertinent in some cases 
than in others. As Hill has pointed out, “every domestic environment is unique 
and is in a condition of perpetual movement.. .this means that generalizations are 
always contingent”187. Consider Greek foreign policy and bureaucratic 
advocacy188. It would not be useful to formulate a hypothesis based on 
bureaucratic advocacy and informed by a bureaucratic politics model of foreign 
policy analysis and test it in a case of change in Greek foreign policy, since it has 
been shown that access to the foreign policy making process in Greece is fairly 
restricted. Elected officials do not seek instructions from the diplomatic service 
and the latter do not consider it part of their job to make suggestions, but simply 
prefer to implement decisions made by elected officials instead189. It, therefore,
183 A. Bennett, “Beyond Hempel and Back to Hume: Causal Mechanisms and Causal 
Explanation”, Paper presented at the American Political Science Association annual conference, 
Philadelphia, 28 August 2003, pp. 13-19
184 For “richness” or “completeness” as a criterion good causal arguments ought to meet see 
Gerring, op. cit. pp. 173-4
185 A. Bennett -  C. Elman, “Complex Causal Relations and Case Study Methods: The Example of 
Path Dependence”, Political Analysis, 14: 3, 2006, p. 262
186 Ibid. pp. 3-6, 14-5,19-20; Cortell -  Davis Jr., op. cit. pp. 84-6
187 Hill, The Changing Politics..., op. cit. p. 224
188 For the term see Hermann, “Changing Course...”, op. cit. pp. 11-2
189 Ioakimidis P., “The Model of Foreign Policy Making in Greece: Individuals Versus 
Institutions” in Tsakonas P. I. (ed), Contemporary Greek Foreign Policy (in Greek), Athens, 
Sideris, 2003
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rests with each particular research project to determine which sources of foreign 
policy change are relevant to the case under investigation.
Defining the policy problem
In this sense, research should start by establishing how Greek foreign policy 
makers defined the policy problem the Helsinki strategy was intended to address. 
According to the balancing thesis, the Helsinki strategy was selected as a 
solution to a “guns-or-butter” dilemma. The policy previously pursued was not 
considered ineffective. Greek foreign policy makers did not identify foreign 
policy failure. Balancing against Turkey was considered an effective strategy. 
Yet Turkish policy towards Greece and US policy on Greco-Turkish relations 
had resulted in a weakening of Greece’s relative power position vis-a-vis Turkey. 
Turkey had grown more powerful, more threatening and enjoyed US support. 
The territorial integrity of the Greek state had to be secured. Consequently, 
further balancing was necessary. At the same time, however, macroeconomic 
stabilisation was also considered necessary and thus resources were scarce. The 
policy previously pursued could not accommodate economic policy goals.
In contrast to what the balancing thesis predicts, both the Europeanisation thesis 
and the leadership style thesis predict that the policy previously pursued was 
considered ineffective. Greek policy towards Turkey could not achieve its goals. 
According to the Europeanisation thesis it was the 1996 crisis that demonstrated 
policy failure and led to this realisation, which in turn led to a search for a new 
policy, within the context of which the discrepancy between Greek policy 
towards Turkey and EU enlargement conditionality was assessed. In contrast, the 
leadership style thesis predicts that Simitis had identified policy failure prior to 
the crisis and he had already selected the alternative he thought best. The crisis 
did not prompt a search for a new policy towards Turkey. It was simply 
interpreted as evidence that reinforced Simitis’ belief that the policy he preferred 
was necessary. His understanding of the policy problem remained unchanged 
during the period under investigation.
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Finally, the socialisation thesis predicts that Greek foreign policy makers began 
to identify Turkish violations o f substantive EUforeign policy norms as a foreign 
policy problem. They started to see Turkey as an applicant country with a weak 
democratic regime that lacked good governance, where the rule of law was not 
observed and human rights and the rights of minorities were being violated and 
set the transformation of the Turkish regime as their goal.
The four explanations of change in Greek policy towards Turkey make different 
predictions, which in turn raise the following questions. Did Greek foreign policy 
makers identify a deterioration of the relative power position of Greece vis-a-vis 
Turkey as the balancing thesis predicts? If so, what caused it? Were Greek 
foreign policy makers primarily concerned with Turkish or US policy? Did 
Greek foreign policy makers identify policy failure? If so, when was this 
assessment made: prior to or in the aftermath of the 1996 crisis as the leadership 
style and the Europeanisation thesis respectively predict? Did the Prime Minister 
present his own vision for Greek policy towards Turkey? Did he remain 
committed to his preferred course of action during the period under investigation 
as the leadership style thesis predicts? Did Greek foreign policy makers redefine 
the situation they were facing as the socialisation thesis predicts? Did they begin 
to identify Turkish violations of substantive EU foreign policy norms as a foreign 
policy problem?
The following table summarises the observable implications of the four 
alternative explanations for the definition of the policy problem the Helsinki 
strategy was intended to address:
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Explanation Policy Problem
The
socialisation
thesis
• Turkish violations of substantive EUforeign policy norms 
began to be understood as a foreign policy problem
• Greek foreign policy makers identified Turkish violations 
as a problem for the first time during the period under 
investigation
• The objective was to ensure Turkey’s compliance with 
substantive EU foreign policy norms
• Greek foreign policy makers did not identify foreign 
policy failure
• Greek foreign policy makers did not define the policy 
problem as a guns-or-butter dilemma
• The Prime Minister did not present his own, internal, pre­
conceived understanding of the policy problem
The
Europeanisation
thesis
• Greek foreign policy makers identified foreign policy 
failure
• The 1996 Imia/Kardak crisis led to the realisation that 
Greek policy towards Turkey had failed to prevent Turkish 
aggression
• Greek foreign policy makers decided that Greek policy 
towards Turkey ought to be discontinued and they began 
to consider alternatives
• Greek foreign policy makers did not begin to identify 
Turkish violations of EU foreign policy norms as a foreign 
policy problem
• Greek foreign policy makers did not define the policy 
problem as a guns-or-butter dilemma
• The Prime Minister did not present his own, internal, pre­
conceived understanding of the policy problem
The balancing 
thesis
• Greek foreign policy makers defined the policy problem as 
a guns-or-butter dilemma
• Greece foreign policy makers were concerned about the 
implications of Turkish and US policy for Greece’s 
relative power position
• Greek foreign policy makers considered the economic 
costs of their policy towards Turkey as a reason why 
foreign policy change should be pursued
• Greek foreign policy makers did not identify foreign 
policy failure
• Greek foreign policy makers did not begin to identify 
Turkish violations of EU foreign policy norms as a foreign 
policy problem
• The Prime Minister did not present his own, internal, pre­
conceived understanding of the policy problem
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The leadership 
style thesis
The Prime Minister presented his own, internal, pre­
conceived understanding of the policy problem 
The Prime Minister identified foreign policy failure prior 
to the Imia/Kardak crisis and he had selected the policy he 
thought best prior to his election 
The Imia/Kardak crisis was interpreted as evidence that 
confirmed the Prime Minister’s beliefs 
The Prime Minister’s understanding of the policy problem 
remained fixed during the period under investigation 
Greek foreign policy makers did not begin to identify 
Turkish violations of EU foreign policy norms as a foreign 
policy problem
Greek foreign policy makers did not define the policy 
problem as a guns-or-butter dilemma
Framing alternatives
The next step is to identify the various courses o f action that were considered as 
alternative options. According to the balancing thesis, Greek foreign policy 
makers distinguished between a policy based on high defence expenditure that 
would allow Greece to build up its military capabilities (internal balancing) and 
a policy based on EU support for their positions on Greco-Turkish relations 
(<external balancing). Both explanations that conceptualise change in Greek 
policy towards Turkey as the outcome of Europeanisation predict that Greek 
foreign policy makers identified enlargement conditionality as a relevant 
established EU practice and distinguished between the Greek practice of 
withholding the offer o f  EU membership until Turkey complied with Greek 
demands and the EU practice of offering applicant states the reward o f  
membership, whilst making payment of the reward conditional upon the target 
country’s compliance. If the evidence shows that substantive EU foreign policy 
norms did not affect the definition of the policy problem and the practice of 
reinforcement by reward did not affect the alternative courses of action Greek 
foreign policy makers considered, both explanations that conceptualise change in 
Greek policy towards Turkey as the outcome of a process of Europeanisation can 
be refuted. In contrast, the leadership style thesis predicts that enlargement 
conditionality was not considered as an alternative course of action. Greek 
foreign policy makers distinguished between the policy previously pursued
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(preventing progress in EU-Turkey relations) and the policy Simitis ’ vision for  
reform prescribed (allowing progress within a framework o f EU rules for  
Turkey ’s behaviour towards Greece regardless o f whether those rules would be 
part o f  a conditional offer o f EU membership). Finally, Simitis was unwilling to 
consider alternatives to his preferred course of action.
The following table summarises the observable implications of the four 
alternative explanations for the alternative courses of action Greek foreign policy 
makers considered:
Explanation Alternatives
The
socialisation
thesis
• Greek foreign policy makers identified enlargement 
conditionality as a relevant established EU practice
• Greek foreign policy makers distinguished between the 
national policy previously pursued (unilaterally 
withholding the offer of EU membership until Turkey 
complied with Greek demands) and EU enlargement 
conditionality (collectively offering Turkey EU 
membership and making payment of the reward 
conditional on compliance with Greek demands)
• Greek foreign policy makers did not consider allowing 
progress in EU-Turkey relations without offering Turkey 
the reward of EU membership
• Greek foreign policy makers did not consider the Helsinki 
strategy an alternative to defence expenditure
The
Europeanisation
thesis
The balancing 
thesis
• Greek foreign policy makers considered the Helsinki 
strategy an alternative to defence expenditure
• Greek foreign policy makers did not identify enlargement 
conditionality as a relevant established EU practice
The leadership 
style thesis
• Greek foreign policy makers distinguished between the 
policy previously pursued (unilaterally preventing progress 
in EU-Turkey relations) and Simitis’ preferred course of 
action (collectively allowing progress within a framework 
of EU rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece 
regardless of whether those rules would be part of a 
conditional offer of EU membership)
• The Prime Minister was unwilling to consider alternatives 
to his preferred course of action
• Greek foreign policy makers did not identify enlargement 
conditionality as a relevant EU practice
• Greek foreign policy makers did not consider the Helsinki 
strategy an alternative to defence expenditure
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Assessing alternatives
The final step is to establish whether Greek foreign policy makers considered the 
consequences (costs and benefits) o f  each alternative and, i f  so, what type o f 
costs and benefits they calculated. According to the balancing thesis, alternatives 
were assessed on the basis of their economic costs and benefits. The Helsinki 
strategy was selected as an external balancing strategy over internal balancing 
because it could accommodate both foreign and economic policy goals. Given 
the general state of the economy, the EMU accession criteria and the new 
government’s emphasis on EMU entry, a policy based on internal balancing 
would be too costly in terms of economic policy goals.
According to the Europeanisation thesis, enlargement conditionality was selected 
over the “Greek way of doing things” because it would offer Turkey a greater 
incentive to comply with Greek demands. As was mentioned above, Greek policy 
towards Turkey had for long been based on the idea that Greek membership of 
the Communities/the EU would prevent Turkey from pursuing an aggressive 
policy towards Greece and that the ability of Greece to prevent progress in EU- 
Turkey relations would force Turkey to accept Greek positions on Greco-Turkish 
relations190. From that perspective, the crisis showed that Greek policy had failed. 
Neither did Greek membership of the EU suffice to prevent Turkey from 
pursuing an aggressive policy towards Greece, nor did it manage to prevent a 
crisis that brought the two countries to the brink of war, in the aftermath of which 
Turkey was claiming sovereignty over numerous islets in the Aegean, which 
Greece considers its own territory.
While the Imia/Kardak crisis demonstrated foreign policy failure and, thus, 
established the need for policy change, it can provide us with little insight into 
the direction and shape the new policy was going to take. This is precisely the 
point where EU enlargement conditionality entered Greek foreign policy makers’ 
calculations and became a point of reference. Enlargement conditionality 
constituted an EU practice that was very different, if not diametrically opposed to 
the Greek way of doing things and, thus, constituted an alternative to be
190 Valinakis, op. cit. pp. 244-5
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considered. If Greece withdrew its objections and allowed the EU to offer 
Turkey the reward of membership, Turkey would be offered a powerful incentive 
to comply with Greek demands.
As Turkey is considered the main threat to Greek security and Greco-Turkish 
relations are classified as a national issue, Greek preferences on the substantive 
issues in Greco-Turkish relations are extremely intense. In fact, Greek 
governments appear most reluctant to make any concession on any of the issues 
related to the Aegean and they seem to prefer the status quo to any settlement 
that would not entail Turkey’s full compliance with all Greek demands. Turkish 
preferences, on the other hand, are not nearly as intense. As one analyst put it, 
Greece occupies “perhaps one-sixth of Turkey’s foreign policy problems”191. The 
differences in preference intensity and -  consequently — bargaining power are 
manifested in the two countries’ approaches to the dispute. Greece has always 
insisted on a judicial settlement, whereas Turkey has favoured political 
negotiations.
Enlargement conditionality could remedy the problem. If Greece withdrew its 
objections and allowed the EU to offer Turkey membership, limited bargaining 
power would no longer present a problem because Greco-Turkish relations 
would be placed within the context of enlargement, where a “profoundly 
asymmetrical power relationship”192 exists between member-states and candidate 
countries. In that particular context, EU member-states are policy makers and 
candidate countries are policy takers, which are obliged to comply with non- 
negotiable rules that they did not make193. The reward of membership constitutes 
the incentive that renders compliance likely194.
191 P. Carley, “US Foreign Policy and the Future of Greek-Turkish Relations” in T. Bachceli -  T. 
A. Couloumbis -  P. Carley, Greek-Turkish Relations and US Foreign Policy: Cyprus, the 
Aegean and Regional Stability, United States Institute of Peace -  Peaceworks No. 17, 1997, p. 4
192 M. A. Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage and Integration After 
Communism, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 63
193 Ibid. p. 110; K. H. Goetz, “The New Member-States and the EU” in S. Buhner -  C. Lequesne 
(eds), Member States and the European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004
194 In this sense enlargement conditionality resembles what is referred to as a policy of 
“engagement”, which is defined as “a foreign policy strategy which depends to a significant 
degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives”; see R. N. Haass -  M. L. O’ Sullivan, 
“Terms of Engagement: Alternative to Punitive Policies”, Survival, 42: 2, 2000, p. 114. See also 
Ifantis, “Greece’s Turkish Dilemmas...”, op. cit. where Ifantis refers to Greek policy towards 
Turkey as a policy of engagement; in his formulation, however, engagement refers to “increased
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While the benefits of incorporating enlargement conditionality into Greek policy 
towards Turkey are clear, there were also certain costs involved, as the offer of 
EU membership can only be made collectively at the EU level. In order for 
Greek demands to be turned into a criterion that the EU was going to apply to 
Turkey195, Greek foreign policy makers had to accept that subsequent decisions 
were going to be made collectively by all EU member-states. Since the rule of 
unanimity applies to such decisions, collective decision-making did not involve 
loss of sovereignty, but Greek foreign policy makers had to accept a certain loss 
of autonomy with regard to a national issue that pertains to the territorial 
integrity of the Greek state. While the rule of unanimity allowed Greece to 
maintain the right to veto further progress in EU-Turkey relations in the future, 
the ability to allow progress in response to compliance on Turkey’s part became 
conditional upon the agreement of Greece’s EU partners196. Given that the policy 
previously pursued had failed and could not secure Greek objectives, Greek 
foreign policy makers became willing to accept the autonomy costs collective 
decision-making entailed. Consequently, Greek foreign policy makers were 
willing to allow progress in EU-Turkey relations only within a framework that 
would render compliance with Greek demands more likely by offering Turkey 
rewards and especially membership of the EU.
Apart from the differences discussed above, the two explanations of change in 
Greek policy towards Turkey as the outcome of Europeanisation have different 
implications for the possible interactions between EU norms, procedures and 
practices and other sources of foreign policy change. According to the 
socialisation thesis, Greek foreign policy makers did not calculate the costs and 
benefits of the relevant established EU practice that they felt obliged to follow 
and they did not take other relevant developments and their implications for
contacts” and “dense relationships” and not to the offer of incentives.
195 While the logic o f behaviour (reinforcement by reward) is the same, the criteria are different, 
as “good neighbourliness” - including referring unresolved border disputes to the ICJ - had been 
set as a criterion before and it was also included in the Commission’s Agenda 2000, but it was 
not one of the Copenhagen criteria; see Smith, “The Evolution...”, op. cit. p. 118
196 For these costs see I. O. Lesser, “Greece’s New Geopolitical Environment”, Southeast 
European and Black Sea Studies, 5: 3, 2005, p. 350. Apart from costs in terms of the 
government’s ability to achieve its foreign policy goals autonomously, this policy also entails 
domestic-political costs because “engagement is open to charges of appeasement”; see Haass -  
O’ Sullivan, op. cit. p. 115
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Greek policy towards Turkey into consideration. What constitutes appropriate 
behaviour is determined independently of such developments and policy choices 
are made regardless of such considerations. Consequently, all other 
developments discussed above can only be part of explanations that constitute 
alternatives to the socialisation thesis.
In contrast, the Europeanisation thesis predicts that Greek foreign policy makers 
took into consideration developments other than the establishment of EU norms, 
procedures and practices and their implications for Greek policy towards Turkey. 
According to this explanation, EU enlargement conditionality was not the utility 
maximising course of action at the time of its establishment. The Imia/Kardak 
crisis, however, rendered enlargement conditionality utility maximising. 
Established EU practice became a point of reference with a delay and it was the 
interaction between enlargement conditionality and the crisis that affected Greek 
foreign policy makers’ considerations.
In contrast, the leadership style thesis predicts that alternatives were assessed on 
the basis of the Prime Minister’s vision for foreign policy reform. The Helsinki 
strategy was selected because it brought Greece closer to the realisation of 
Simitis’ vision. While the Europeanisation thesis predicts that the EU had an 
effect on Greek policy towards Turkey that was channeled through Greek foreign 
policy makers as enlargement conditionality affected their calculations and the 
balancing thesis predicts that Greece’s relative power position combined with the 
economic implications of Greek policy affected their calculations, the leadership 
style thesis attributes no such role to contextual variables. Choices were made on 
the basis of considerations of consequences for an internally defined task, which 
remained independent of the policy context. In this case, foreign policy did not 
change in response to EU norms, procedures and practices or any other external 
event, but because a key policy maker saw something that he wanted to change 
and moved197. Furthermore, leadership that challenges constraints and is closed to 
information implies considerable commitment and continuity. The behaviour of 
unresponsive leaders is generally consistent over time and, thus, predictable. 
Consequently, Simitis was willing to allow progress in EU-Turkey relations only
197 Allison, op. cit. p. 50
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within a framework that would establish EU rules for Turkey’s behaviour 
towards Greece that would attribute the role of guarantor of the resolution of 
Greco-Turkish problems to the EU and regardless of whether Turkey would be 
offered incentives to comply.
Finally, the socialisation thesis predicts that Greek foreign policy makers 
incorporated enlargement conditionality into their policy towards Turkey because 
they became convinced that it was the right thing to do for an EU member-state 
given the situation. By definition, behaviour based on the logic of 
appropriateness is behaviour that is not driven by considerations o f  
consequences198. If the evidence shows that Greek foreign policy makers 
calculated the costs and benefits of the alternatives they considered, the 
socialisation thesis can be refuted. Furthermore, it is important to check for 
consistency199. Given that change, according to this explanation, is caused by the 
internalisation of behavioural rules, national foreign policy makers are expected 
to take the course of action internalised rules prescribe consistently across issues 
and over time. If Greek foreign policy makers took the course of action 
prescribed by EU norms in the case of certain policy issues but not in others, if 
they took the course of action prescribed by EU norms once or if they alternated 
between courses of action that are prescribed by EU norms and courses of action 
that are not, the explanation based on socialisation can be refuted.
The following table summarises the observable implications of the four 
alternative explanations for the manner in which Greek foreign policy makers 
assessed the alternatives they considered:
198 March -  Olsen, op. cit. p. 3
199 Cortell -  Davis Jr., op. cit. pp. 71-2
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Explanation Assessment
The
socialisation
thesis
• Greek foreign policy makers did not calculate the costs 
and benefits of the alternative courses of action they 
considered
• Greek foreign policy makers were concerned with what 
their EU counterparts expected of them
• Greek foreign policy makers began to consider the policy 
previously pursued (unilaterally withholding the offer of 
EU membership) inappropriate because it contradicted 
established EU practice (enlargement conditionality)
• The Helsinki strategy was presented as the right thing for 
an EU member-state to do given the situation
• Greek foreign policy makers applied enlargement 
conditionality consistently across issues and over time
The
Europeanisation
thesis
• Greek foreign policy makers calculated the costs and 
benefits of the alternative courses of action they 
considered
• Greek foreign policy makers did not calculate the 
economic costs and benefits of the alternative courses of 
action they considered
• Greek foreign policy makers calculated that enlargement 
conditionality would offer Turkey a greater incentive to 
comply with Greek demands
• Greek foreign policy makers allowed progress in EU- 
Turkey relations only when Turkey was offered an 
incentive to comply with Greek demands
The balancing 
thesis
• Greek foreign policy makers calculated the economic costs 
and benefits of the alternative courses of action they 
considered
• Greek foreign policy makers did not calculate that the 
Helsinki strategy would offer Turkey a greater incentive to 
comply with Greek demands
The leadership 
style thesis
• The Prime Minister calculated the costs and benefits of the 
alternatives he considered
• The Prime Minister selected the Helsinki strategy because 
it allowed progress in EU-Turkey relations within a 
framework of additional EU rules for Turkey’s behaviour 
towards Greece that attributed the role of guarantor of 
Turkey’s compliance to the EU
Finally, it should be pointed out that the assessment of the evidence did not begin 
with EU level interactions, but at the domestic level prior to these interactions. 
This has been referred to as a “bottom-up” as opposed to a “top-down” research 
design200. Top-down research designs that trace the “absorption” of EU practices
200 Radaelli, “The Europeanisation of...”, op. cit. p. 51
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are more likely to produce evidence that confirms the causal significance of the 
EU because they ignore other processes that may be taking place at the domestic 
level. In contrast, bottom-up research designs begin by mapping out the state of 
affairs at the domestic level in order to determine whether “there was something 
moving on before Brussels entered the scene”201. Then research moves upwards 
to the EU level in order to trace relevant developments. Finally, the national level 
is revisited in an attempt to detect the effects, if any, of the developments at the 
EU level and further developments at the national level that may have occurred 
prior to policy change. In other words, bottom-up research designs allow 
researchers to compile a detailed chronology of the events that led to policy 
change202. This research strategy is particularly pertinent in this case, since one of 
the explanations formulated here (the leadership style thesis) emphasises the 
causal significance of a key foreign policy maker’s (Prime Minister Simitis) 
commitment to internal ideas that had been crystallised before he assumed his 
duties.
The evidence presented in the following chapters was drawn from the Greek 
government’s policy actions and Greek foreign policy makers’ policy statements. 
The latter include speeches, articles published in the press, interviews with 
reporters, press conferences, Parliamentary debates and statements by the 
government’s and the Foreign Ministry’s spokesmen. In 2005, Simitis published 
his memoirs, which constitute a most useful source of information. Finally, 
evidence was drawn from twenty-three interviews conducted by the author 
between March and August 2008. Interviewees included members of the inner 
Cabinet, high-ranking Foreign Ministry officials, diplomats and advisors to the 
Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister. Reports in the press were used as 
sources of information only when they included quoted public statements by 
Greek foreign policy makers and in conjunction with evidence from other 
sources in order to confirm events.
The period covered by this thesis began with the Imia/Kardak crisis that brought 
Greece and Turkey to the brink of war and relations between the two countries
201 C. M. Radaelli -  R. Pasquier, “Conceptual Issues” in P. Graziano -  M. P. Vink (eds), 
Europeanisation: New Research Agendas, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p. 40
202 Major, op. cit. p. 184
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did not improve significantly until late 1999. Consequently, Greco-Turkish 
relations were particularly salient during the period between January 1996 and 
December 1999 and both policy actions and policy statements were numerous. 
Empirical testing of the leadership style thesis benefited from the fact that Simitis 
has been publicly expressing his views on government policy -  including foreign 
policy -  during the better part of the past two decades. Consequently, it was 
possible to establish Simitis’ ideas about Greek policy towards Turkey before, 
during and after his Premiership and assess their consistency. The assessment of 
the views Simitis had expressed prior to his election as Prime Minister made it 
possible to establish whether his beliefs regarding Greek policy towards Turkey 
had been crystallised prior to his Premiership and whether they were distinctive. 
A similar assessment of Simitis’ analyses of Greco-Turkish relations during and 
after his Premiership made it possible to establish the degree of his commitment 
to these beliefs and their consistency over time. The period between the 
December 1997 Luxembourg European Council summit and the formulation of 
the Helsinki strategy (June 1999) in particular -  during which the 
communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations that Simitis had pursued had not had 
the desired effect and the Greek government was facing pressure from its EU 
partners, the US and Turkey and the reluctance of domestic political actors -  was 
instructive with regard to the manner in which he handled constraints and 
assessed information that contradicted his beliefs.
As the 1996 Imia/Kardak crisis that marked the beginning of Simitis’ 
Premiership was a traumatic event, its implications were discussed extensively 
and the relevant policy statements made it possible to establish whether it was 
interpreted as a demonstration of policy failure. In the aftermath of the crisis, the 
Turkish government took several initiatives and the US became particularly pro­
active. The Greek government’s response -  or the lack thereof -  indicates Greek 
foreign policy makers’ concerns regarding the implications of Turkish and US 
policy for Greece’s relative power position. Similarly, debates regarding 
economic policy indicate whether the above implications were assessed in 
conjunction with the economic implications of Greek policy towards Turkey.
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The numerous initiatives the Greek government pursued during the period under 
investigation -  which have hitherto received little attention in the literature -  
were instructive especially with regard to the alternatives Greek foreign policy 
makers considered. The government’s initiatives exhibit considerable variation 
with regard to the political arena, the procedures and the instruments selected. 
Consequently, it was possible to compare the Helsinki strategy with policy 
actions taken earlier during the period covered by this thesis and establish 
patterns and their consistency with the predictions of the four explanations 
discussed above for the alternative courses of action Greek foreign policy makers 
considered.
Furthermore, the fact that Greek policy towards Turkey was driven by a quite 
distinctive logic that was not generally accepted resulted in numerous 
comprehensive and detailed policy statements that intended to clarify that logic 
both prior to and in the aftermath of the Helsinki summit. Prior to the summit it 
was widely held that Greece was under pressure to make unilateral concessions 
and Greek foreign policy makers systematically attempted to explain why the 
strategy they had formulated could secure a beneficial decision for Greece. Since 
the 2004 general election, further debate on the benefits of the Helsinki strategy 
has taken place as PASOK has argued that the newly elected conservative 
government abandoned the Helsinki strategy. Besides increasing the time span of 
policy statements, the collection of evidence ensured that policy statements made 
before different audiences were considered203, as the purpose of what is being 
said varies depending not only on circumstance, but also on whom it is being 
said to204. Finally, answers to questions posed during interviews or press 
conferences were privileged over policy statements in speeches or published 
articles in order to ensure spontaneity and reliability205.
203 O. R. Holsti, “Foreign Policy Formation Viewed Cognitively” in R. Axelrod (ed), Structure o f 
Decision: The Cognitive Maps o f Political Elites, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1976
204 A. L. George, Propaganda Analysis, Westport, Greenwood Press, 1973 cited in D. W. Larson, 
“Sources and Methods in Cold War History” in C. Elman -  M. F. Elman (eds), Bridges and 
Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists and the Study o f International Relations, Cambridge, 
MIT Press, 2001, p. 343
205 M. G. Herman, “Assessing Leadership Style: A Trait Analysis ”, Social Science Automation, 
November 1999
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Conclusions
It follows from the above that while all four explanations predict the same 
outcome (change in Greek policy towards Turkey), they predict different 
pathways to foreign policy change. It is possible to empirically distinguish 
between these explanations and determine which variables were causally 
significant by process tracing their observable implications for the definition of 
the policy problem the Helsinki strategy was intended to address, the alternative 
courses of action Greek foreign policy makers considered and the manner in 
which they were assessed.
The acknowledgement of the voluntary nature of the Europeanisation of foreign 
policy, the construction of two alternative explanations of change in Greek policy 
towards Turkey as the outcome of Europeanisation and the consequent emphasis 
on process tracing allows research on Europeanisation to fit traditional analyses 
of foreign policy well. The theoretical framework presented here refrains from 
assuming that foreign policy change produced by Europeanisation constitutes a 
sui generis phenomenon, which requires ad hoc explanations. The emphasis is 
placed on the actors who make and change foreign policy and the process 
through which change is produced. The emphasis on this “point of intersection” 
of the determinants of foreign policy makes it possible to take into consideration 
a multitude of variables from different levels of analysis. The concept of 
Europeanisation suggests one further factor (the EU) that may (or may not) be of 
significance, thus preserving the multifactorial and multilevel character of the 
study of foreign policy206.
It has been argued that explanations based on the premise that actors are rational 
and attempt to maximise the attainment of their preferences are often formulated 
in an abstract and empirically intractable fashion and that researchers search for 
confirming evidence only and ignore alternative explanations207. Precise 
predictions regarding actors’ understanding of the policy problem and their 
preferences, detailed predictions regarding variation in the cost-benefit
206 Hudson, op. cit. pp. 2-4
207 M. A. Pollack, “Rational Choice and EU Politics”, ARENA Working Papers, No. 12,2006, pp. 
7, 24-5
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calculations that actors are expected to make depending on what their 
preferences are and research designs that allow for competitive testing avoid 
these pitfalls208. Research designs based on testing alternative explanations, 
however, “run the risk of excluding crucial aspects from the researchers’ 
attention, notably those aspects which at the outset were not supposed to exist or 
matter”209. Process tracing minimises this risk because it is “as amenable as 
possible to recognizing unexpected dynamics and diverse causal effects”210. 
Indeed, qualitative research in general and process tracing in particular is much 
like detective work that occasionally reveals initially unforeseen causes211.
208 Ibid
209 G. Falkner, “Introduction: EU Treaty Reform as a Three-Level Process”, Journal o f European 
Public Policy, 9:1, 2002, p. 4
210 Ibid
211 Bennet -  Elman, op. cit. pp. 262-3; Mahoney -  Goertz, op. cit. pp. 241-2
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Chapter 4: Greek policy towards Turkey 1996-1999
Introduction
This chapter will show that as soon as Simitis was elected Prime Minister, the 
Greek government began to systematically pursue EU decisions that bear 
similarities to the agreement that Greece secured in Helsinki despite the fact that 
it was severely constrained by domestic opposition to foreign policy reform. The 
first phase of the period under investigation (January -  September 1996), was 
marked by considerable uncertainty. The beginning of Simitis’ Premiership 
literally coincided with the Imia/Kardak crisis. Subsequently, Turkey engaged in 
what was perceived by Greek officials as an escalation of its territorial claims. At 
the same time, the hospitalised Andreas Papandreou had resigned from his post 
as Prime Minister, but not from PASOK’s leadership. This irregular situation 
created speculation until the start of July, when Simitis was elected leader of 
PASOK. Subsequently, speculation revolved around whether the Prime Minister 
was going to call for an early election. Despite the fact that this first phase was a 
transitional one, the Greek government was particularly proactive and Greek 
foreign policy makers’ efforts culminated in the 15 July 1996 EU statement on 
Greco-Turkish relations, which suggested that territorial disputes “such as the 
Imia Islet issue” should be submitted to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
As the uncertainty that marked the first phase gradually subsided, further 
initiatives were pursued. The second phase (October 1996 -  December 1997) 
was marked by the initiatives of the Dutch Presidency and the US and it 
culminated in the decision made during the Luxembourg European Council 
summit. The Dutch Presidency proposed the formation of a wise-men committee 
that would discuss Greco-Turkish relations and even though the US concentrated 
its efforts on the Cyprus problem, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright 
assumed a mediating role in purely bilateral relations between Greece and 
Turkey. The Dutch Presidency’s proposal resulted in a mere exchange of reports 
between Greek and Turkish experts. While Secretary of State Albright’s 
mediation resulted in the so-called “Madrid Declaration” on certain rules of 
conduct for Greece and Turkey, the spirit of the latter was undermined by
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persistent disagreements on the appropriate method of resolution of Greco- 
Turkish problems. The decision made during the Luxembourg European Council 
constitutes the most significant shift in Greek policy towards Turkey during this 
phase, as the Greek government agreed to offer Turkey participation in the 
European Conference, an offer conditional upon Turkey’s acceptance of the 
jurisdiction of the ICJ.
In contrast, the third phase (from January 1998 to the Cologne European Council 
summit in June 1999) was marked by the Greek government’s efforts to avoid 
any revision of the agreement reached in Luxembourg despite pressure from 
Turkey, other EU member-states, the European Commission and the US. The 
final phase of the period under investigation began shortly after the Cologne 
summit in June 1999, when the Helsinki strategy was formulated and culminated 
in the negotiations in Helsinki in December 1999, where the Greek government 
managed to secure the agreement that it preferred.
From the crisis to the election
In December 1995 -  January 1996, the Imia/Kardak crisis broke out212. When a 
Turkish ship run ashore two islets referred to as Imia by the Greeks and Kardak 
by the Turks, controversy arose regarding the state that had the authority to 
salvage the ship. Soon enough it became clear that both countries were claiming 
sovereignty over the islets. A few weeks later, civilians from both countries 
started sailing to the islet and raising their national flag. Within a matter of days, 
military forces were gathering in the area and the two countries came to the brink 
of war. At that point, Greece was in the process of electing a new Prime Minister 
to replace the hospitalised Andreas Papandreou and Turkey was in the process of 
forming a coalition government. Once again, war was avoided only after 
American intervention213.
212 For the Imia/Kardak crisis see Marcias, op. cit. pp. 353-424; C. Simitis, Policy for a Creative 
Greece 1996-2004 (in Greek), Athens, Polis, 2005, pp. 58-74
213 While Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Richard Holbrook 
commented that “Europeans were literally sleeping through the night” and Prime Minister Simitis 
argued that “the European Union was impressively absent”, Commissioner Hans Van den Broek 
was reportedly outraged because Greece had not sought the EU’s assistance during the crisis; see 
“Ciller Threatens Us with War”, Eleftherotypia, 5 February 1996, D. P. Dimas, “Holbrook: The
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The crisis marked the beginning of a considerably long period of criticism that 
went as far as to question the “patriotic character” of the government’s policies. 
During the Parliamentary debate on the new government’s programmatic 
statements, the leader of the main opposition party spoke of treason. “The 
incompetence and the timidity of the government”, Miltiades Evert argued, “led 
our country to national humiliation. The withdrawal of Greek military forces and 
the removal of the Greek flag constitute abandonment of national soil. They 
constitute (an) act of treason”214. Similarly, the future Head of the Greek Church 
commented: “The real dilemma was and still is: peace or freedom”215.
After a meeting of the Council of Ministers in January 1996, Foreign Minister 
Theodore Pangalos warned that since Turkey had responded to the Greek 
government’s decision to consent to the EU-Turkey Customs Union with 
provocations, the Greek government was going to take that behaviour into 
account whilst considering its stance on EU-Turkey relations216. A few days later 
he stated: “There are no European prospects in the EU for anyone who 
challenges the post-war status quo and international treaties”217. The 
government’s response was referred to as a “step-by-step” approach218. This 
approach did not specify a course of action to be taken by Greece; it actually 
referred to the “steps” Turkey ought to take according to the Greek government. 
According to this approach, Turkey was asked to denounce the use of force and 
the threat of the use of force, to accept the international treaties that determined 
the status quo in the Aegean and abandon its claims on the islets or submit the 
issue to the ICJ. The second step Turkey ought to take was to agree to refer the 
issue of the Aegean continental shelf to the ICJ. Subsequently it would be 
possible for the two countries to discuss other issues of mutual interest. Unless 
Turkey complied, Greece would have to block the release of EU financial 
assistance to Turkey.
Europeans Were Sleeping That Night”, Eleftherotypia, 9 February 1996 and Simitis, Policy..., 
op. cit. p. 67
214 “Patriotic Bidding Storm in Parliament”, Eleftherotypia, 1 February 1996; Mardas, op. cit. p. 
380
215 Vasilakis, op. cit. pp. 307-8
216 “Warning in Brussels”, Eleftherotypia, 30 January 1996; Mardas, op. cit. p. 364
217 “Ciller Threatens Us with War”, op cit
218 For the step-by-step approach see Simitis, Policy..., op. cit. pp. 82-3
83
The following month, the European Parliament (EP) adopted a resolution, where 
it acknowledged “Turkey’s provocative military operations” and a few days later, 
Foreign Minister Pangalos warned that unless the Council of Ministers adopted 
the EP’s positions Greece would not allow a meeting of the EU-Turkey 
Association Council219. By the end of the month, however, a Council of Ministers 
statement that explicitly identified the situation in the Aegean as one that 
concerned the EU as a whole and its relations with Turkey was vetoed by the 
British government220.
At the same time Prime Minister Simitis embarked on a tour of EU member- 
states’ capitals in an attempt to inform Greece’s EU partners about recent 
developments and his government’s positions on Greco-Turkish relations221. By 
the end of February 1996, the Prime Minister was indicating that he intended to 
continue to pursue such initiatives. “Turkey”, Simitis stated, “should get used (to 
the fact) that we are going to be moving in the European Union. And its stance 
will have consequences”222. At the start of March, the government vetoed the 
release of a European Investment Bank loan to Turkey included in the Customs 
Union Agreement. Simitis reiterated the Greek government’s position during a 
meeting with Italian Prime Minister Lamberto Dini and Foreign Minister 
Pangalos stated that “from now on, the explicit abandonment of territorial claims 
on the Dodecanese...will be a condition for any development of Turkey’s 
relations with the EU”223.
Criticism of the government’s policy continued unabated. During a meeting of 
PASOK’s Central Committee in February, the Prime Minister described the 
situation his government was facing: “Daily frictions about the self-evident.
219 European Parliament, Resolution on the provocative actions and contestation of sovereign 
rights by Turkey against a Member State of the Union, 15 February 1996. For Pangalos’ 
statements see B. Yannakidis, “Pangalos: Of Course A Storm Is Gathering”, Eleftherotypia, 19 
February 1996
220 Simitis, Policy..., op. cit. p. 81; see also P. Pantelis, “British Torpedo In Greece”, 
Eleftherotypia, 27 February 1996
221 Simitis visited Belgium (where he also met EU officials), Germany and France in February, 
Italy in March, the UK and Ireland in April. He also visited US President Clinton in April.
222 A. Abatzis, “Ankara Recalled Its Ambassador and Threatens”, Eleftherotypia, 23 February 
1996
223 G. Roubanis, “Simitis Presented 3 Principles to EU-15”, Eleftherotypia, 22 March 1996; 
“Pangalos’ Warning To Turkey and Partners”, Eleftherotypia, 23 March 1996
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Confrontation over fundamental choices. An image of questioning the 
government’s choices not because of the choices as such, but for the sake of 
questioning alone”224. Shortly afterwards, controversy arose regarding a televised 
interview Foreign Minister Pangalos gave to Mehmet Ali Birand. In an article 
published before the interview was broadcast on television, the Turkish reporter 
mentioned that a statement by the Greek Foreign Minister had led him to 
conclude that Greece would be willing to de-militarise the Aegean islands, if 
Turkey were to remove the Aegean Army (also know as the Fourth Army) from 
its west coast. The opposition accused Pangalos of exercising foreign policy on 
television and referred both to the Foreign Minister and to his proposals as 
dangerous for the nation225. Even Defence Minister Gerasimos Arsenis in a letter 
to the Prime Minister called for a meeting of the Foreign Affairs and Defence 
Council in order to discuss what he saw as the Foreign Minister’s deviation from 
the government’s policy226. His request was denied. Later that month, it was 
reported that Arsenis had sent yet another letter to the Prime Minister, where he 
hinted at the existence of secret agreements regarding the Imia/Kardak islets227. 
The opposition picked up on this demanding a clarification from the government, 
forcing the government’s spokesman to make explicit that no such agreements 
existed. In April 1996 the Foreign Minister colourfully described the situation he 
was facing: “I would prefer a strong national front and understanding from 
opposition parties and the support of my own party. I am under the impression, 
however, that I am walking a tight rope. There is no safety net underneath, but 
there are crocodiles. I have not seen their colour. I hope they are not green”228. In 
an attempt to deflect criticism, he pointed out that it was the previous 
government that had lifted its veto on the EU-Turkey Customs Union Agreement 
and that the government he was a member of had reversed that policy since the 
Imia/Kardak crisis. He concluded with a rhetorical question: “Was it then or is it 
now that we are compromising?” 229
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Later that month, continuing his diplomatic campaign, the Prime Minister visited 
US President Bill Clinton and Irish Prime Minister John Bruton, initiating the 
practice of holding bilateral meetings with the head of state or government that 
was going to hold the Presidency of the Council next. According to Simitis, the 
meeting with Clinton was successful, in the sense that a series of statements by 
US officials verified US support for a judicial settlement of the dispute regarding 
the Imia/Kardak islets, which Greece had proposed230. The Greek government 
was monitoring public statements on the issue made by other EU member-states’ 
government officials and it was believed that Simitis’ campaign had been 
successful as these statements followed Greek positions quite closely231. A 
meeting between Foreign Minister Pangalos and his Turkish counterpart Emre 
Gonensay in Bucharest a few days later, however, verified the differences of 
approach to the resolution of Greco-Turkish problems. The Greek Foreign 
Minister insisted on a judicial settlement, while his Turkish counterpart insisted 
on bilateral negotiations. Pangalos stated that Greece was going to continue to 
consider EU financial assistance to Turkey impossible to grant232. It was decided 
that the two Foreign Ministers should meet again, yet Pangalos made explicit that 
those meetings constituted neither dialogue nor negotiations.
The following month, twenty-one PASOK MPs issued a statement, where they 
argued that the “patriotic character” of the party had been “distorted”. Amongst 
other things, they discussed EU-Turkey relations: “From concession to 
concession, we opened -  by lifting our veto -  wide the door for Turkey to enter 
the EU”233. Domestic opposition seemed to lead the government to assume a 
more uncompromising stance. The Prime Minister sent a letter to EU officials, 
member-state officials, the US and Russian Presidents and the Secretary 
Generals of NATO and the UN, where he discussed the escalation of Turkish 
territorial claims234. As PASOK’s conference was drawing near, he stated: “If 
need be we are going to teach the Turks a lesson which they are going to
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remember for years”. “We will defend our national sovereignty with arms”, he 
continued, “and in such a way that anyone who attacks us will regret it bitterly -  
most bitterly”235. In May 1996, a letter given to the Prime Minister by Justice 
Minister Evangelos Venizelos a few weeks earlier was published, where 
Venizelos expressed his concerns regarding the “step-by-step” approach. In 
particular, he explained that he was concerned with the possibility that the 
government’s main response to the crisis -  asking Turkey to abandon its claims 
on the islets or submit the issue to the ICJ -  might spill over into a number of 
other issues related to the Aegean, which Turkey had raised and Greece had not 
acknowledged as disputes236. Later that month, it was a member of the Cabinet -  
Interior Minister Akis Tsohatzopoulos -  that called the Foreign Minister 
“dangerous”, forcing the government’s spokesman to make explicit that the 
Prime Minister did not share this view237.
July saw the most significant development during the first phase of the period 
under investigation. Despite the fact that domestic opposition to the 
government’s policy had continued virtually uninterrupted since the Imia/Kardak 
crisis and Turkey had not taken the first step prescribed by the step-by-step 
approach, the Greek government decided to lift its veto of the MEDA regulation 
in exchange for an EU statement that made explicit that disputes such as the one 
over the islets should be submitted to the ICJ and instructed the Presidency to ask 
Turkey to indicate whether it committed itself to this principle238. As Turkey 
declined to respond, no progress was achieved by the end of the year. The 
Presidency Conclusions of the Dublin European Council summit simply referred 
to the 15 July statement and requested the Presidency to “continue its efforts”239. 
Greek initiatives outside the context of the EU were not particularly successful 
either. In a letter to NATO’s Secretary General Javier Solana in September 1996, 
Foreign Minister Pangalos suggested that a dispute settlement mechanism should
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be established within the alliance, but no member-state looked upon the request 
particularly favourably during the Alliance’s summit in December240.
Towards Luxembourg
Criticism continued unabated even after the party won an early election in 
September 1996. During a meeting of PASOK’s Central Committee meant to 
assess the party’s electoral performance, the Prime Minister was criticised for the 
party’s failure to attract left wing voters241. During a meeting of PASOK’s 
Executive Bureau the Prime Minister reportedly stated: “Those who think that 
they are hurting Simitis are mistaken. It is not a personal issue. If we fall, we 
(will) all fall”242. Apart from domestic, intra-party opposition, the government 
was facing Turkey’s attempts to develop its relations with the EU further and the 
explicit linkage between Turkey’s prospects of accession to the EU and Turkey’s 
policy towards Greece. In the aftermath of the Dublin European Council summit, 
Turkish Foreign Minister Tansu Ciller was stating that “Greece should indeed 
fear Turkey, should the latter be left out of the European Union”243.
During the Dublin European Council summit, Deputy Foreign Minister George 
Papandreou had a meeting with Foreign Minister Ciller. When Dutch Foreign 
Minister Hans Van Mierlo referred to the meeting as “the beginning of a Greco- 
Turkish dialogue”, the Greek government’s spokesman Dimitris Reppas was 
prompted to clarify that the above discussion constituted no such dialogue244. The 
press, however, was reporting that the Prime Minister was in the process of 
“studying” Greco-Turkish relations in order to formulate the main aspects of 
Greece’s strategy and that the discussion between Papandreou and Ciller was a 
manifestation of a new idea, according to which Greece could engage in
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dialogue, yet not in negotiations245. It would appear that divisions emerged 
amongst Greek foreign policy makers after the election. The press was reporting 
that the latter were divided between those referred to as “traditionalists” or 
“unyielding” and “modernisers” or “retreatists”246. Foreign Minister Pangalos 
was identified with the former, while Prime Minister Simitis, Deputy Foreign 
Minister Papandreou and Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs Christos Rozakis 
with the latter. These reports focused on “new ideas” about Greek policy on EU- 
Turkey relations. In his memoirs, while Simitis confirmed that ideas regarding 
Greco-Turkish dialogue on low-politics issues on one hand and EU-Turkey 
relations on the other were discussed after the election in September, he 
mentioned no differences of opinion247.
In January 1997, however, shortly before a meeting of government officials on 
Greco-Turkish relations, Undersecretary Rozakis resigned from his post. Rozakis 
argued that the reason for his resignation was his deteriorating health, yet he also 
referred to “unjust attacks” that he had suffered during his tenure248. The press 
was reporting that an equally substantial reason for his resignation was his less 
than harmonious collaboration with Foreign Minister Pangalos249. During a 
meeting of the Governmental Committee, both the Prime Minister and the 
Foreign Minister argued that the issue had been blown out of proportion by the 
press. Pangalos, in particular, argued that the distinction between “tough” 
Pangalos and “soft” Rozakis was inaccurate250. Deputy Foreign Minister 
Papandreou, however, conceded that Rozakis’ resignation constituted an 
“enormous symbolic blow to the forces of modernisation”251. Rozakis’ 
resignation certainly did not bring an end to the criticism the government was 
facing. According to government spokesman Reppas, the Governmental 
Committee had investigated alternatives with regard to tactics. Minister for
245 N. Marakis, “Ankara Shows Her Cards”, To Vima, 3 November 1996; G. H. Papageorgiou, 
“Yes to Dialogue with Turkey, No to Negotiations”, Eleftherotypia, 21 December 1996; P. 
Efthymiou, “Mr. Simitis’ Political Agenda”, To Vima, 29 December 1996
246 G. Karelias, “Two Fronts and A Headache for Simitis”, Eleftherotypia, 4 November 1996; S. 
Kasimatis, “Veto Is Dawning”, Eleftherotypia, 24 November 1996; N. Marakis, “Athens’ 
Weapons in the Battle of Brussels”, To Vima, 24 November 1996
247 Simitis, Policy.. op. cit. pp. 85-6
248 “Rozakis’ Resignation Letters”, Eleftherotypia, 3 January 1997
249 “Blow for Simitis”, Eleftherotypia, 3 January 1997
250 “Bandages on the Wound”, Eleftherotypia, 4 January 1997
251 “Modernisers’ Massive Reaction”, Eleftherotypia, 16 January 1997
89
Education Arsenis, however, had indicated that differentiation in terms of tactics 
might result in an overturning of strategy252. The following month, five members 
of PASOK’s Central Committee sent a letter to the Prime Minister, the party’s 
Secretary and the members of the Executive Bureau and the Central Committee, 
where they criticised Cabinet members whose divergent approaches to national 
issues gave the impression that there were deviations from PASOK’s traditional 
foreign policy positions253.
Pangalos himself became the target of criticism in March 1997, when, in 
response to a statement by the European People’s Party, according to which 
Turkey had no place within the EU, he stated: “Turkey is certainly a part of 
Europe...a big part of European history...Greece should never change its mind 
on this issue...if Turkey is not a part of European history, then neither is 
Greece”254. Defence Minister Tsohatzopoulos argued that the Foreign Minister 
was overstating matters255. The conservatives’ spokesman claimed that either due 
to inexperience or inaccurate political assessment the Foreign Minister had either 
made an historical mistake or he was trying to cover up the concessions he had 
made or he was planning on making and that it was no longer acceptable for him 
to be in charge of Greek foreign policy. According to the head of splinter party 
“Political Spring” Antonis Samaras, it was neither naivety, nor a gaffe, but a 
conscious announcement of Greece yielding in favour of Turkey in the EU256. In 
a similar vein, Greek President Costas Stefanopoulos stated: “Hellenism in its 
long history has been subjected to and is still being subjected to other nations’ 
pressures, but no more. No further concession is conceivable and none shall be 
made”257.
In the meantime, Greece’s EU partners were pursuing the release of EU financial 
assistance to Turkey within the context of the EU-Turkey Customs Union. 
During a meeting of the Council of Ministers in Apeldoom, when German
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Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel asked his Greek counterpart to give him a yes-or- 
no answer, Pangalos replied “no, no, no”, infuriating Kinkel, who walked out on 
the meeting258. The following month, however, Greek and Turkish Deputy 
Foreign Ministers and the Dutch Foreign Minister met in Malta in order to 
discuss a proposal by the Dutch Presidency, according to which the two countries 
were going to set up a wise-men committee that would discuss possible ways to 
resolve Greco-Turkish problems. The Dutch Presidency had presumably been 
encouraged by the fact that, during a visit to the Hague in December 1996, Prime 
Minister Simitis had indicated that Greece would be willing to assume a 
constructive attitude, should the Dutch Presidency decide to take the initiative259. 
While Deputy Foreign Minister Onur Oymen explained that it had been agreed 
that no public statements would be made, it was reported in the press that 
initially an agreement was reached on a text, which included provisions 
regarding the resolution of the Imia/Kardak dispute, yet Foreign Minister 
Pangalos and Undersecretary Yannos Kranidiotis (who had replaced Rozakis) 
appeared more reluctant than Deputy Foreign Minister Papandreou and certain 
revisions were discussed260.
While the details of the proposal were still under consideration, thirty-two 
PASOK MPs sent a letter to the Prime Minister, where they argued against any 
form of dialogue between Greece and Turkey. While government spokesman 
Reppas stated that their concerns were unjustified261, the incident demonstrated 
the persistent opposition to the idea, according to which Greece could engage in 
dialogue, but not in negotiations. As Deputy Foreign Minister Papandreou 
explained during a visit to Germany, Greece was not going to lift its veto of EU 
financial assistance to Turkey, unless an agreement was reached on the 
settlement of disputes before the ICJ, an issue that the wise-men committee was
258 P. Pantelis, “No, No, No”, Eleftherotypia, 17 March 1997; “Greece Reiterates Position on EU 
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going to discuss262. By the end of the month, the Greek government consented to 
a meeting of the EU-Turkey Association Council (29 April 1997). The member- 
states’ common position reiterated the content of the 15 July 1996 EU statement 
regarding the settlement of territorial disputes and an agreement was reached on 
the Dutch Presidency’s proposal. It was agreed that the Presidency -  in an 
unprecedented direct involvement of the EU in Greco-Turkish relations -  would 
facilitate the efforts of experts appointed by Greece and Turkey to produce a 
report on procedural aspects of the resolution of Greco-Turkish problems263.
In May 1997, the Greek government announced the names of the two experts, 
who were going to represent Greece: Professor Krateros Ioannou and Professor 
Argyris Fatouros264. The appointments reflected Greek preferences on the 
resolution of Greco-Turkish problems. Since the Greek government insisted on a 
judicial settlement through the ICJ, the appointment of two international law 
professors was to be expected. As Professor Ioannou pointed out right from the 
start, however, the procedure had not been planned in great detail and what had 
been agreed between the Greek and Turkish governments and the Presidency 
remained unclear to him265. The agreement was indeed “diluted”266 later that 
month, when Foreign Minister Pangalos rejected the Presidency’s proposal for a 
joint meeting of the groups of experts from the two countries at the end of May, 
insisting that the two groups should first exchange reports in order to establish 
that a joint meeting would indeed be meaningful267. By the start of June 1997, 
Foreign Minister Pangalos was stating during a meeting of the Council of 
Ministers that the Presidency appeared “frustrated” with the process and that he 
did not think that the Presidency was particularly concerned with the experts’ 
reports268.
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In the meantime, the government continued to struggle to convince its critics that 
the procedure that had been agreed upon did not constitute a negotiation of 
“Greek sovereign rights”. During a meeting of PASOK MPs, Prime Minister 
Simitis made explicit that Greece would only allow the release of EU financial 
assistance to Turkey, if Turkey denounced the threat of war and the use of force 
and accepted the international treaties that determine the status quo in the Aegean 
and the ICJ as the appropriate institution for the interpretation of those treaties. 
He also made explicit that the procedure that had been agreed upon did not 
constitute “political dialogue”, but “an exchange of views on procedural issues 
pertaining to the implementation of the legal framework”269. During the same 
meeting, Foreign Minister Pangalos argued that the thirty-two PASOK MPs’ 
letter had undermined the government’s bargaining position because it gave the 
impression that the government was about to yield and stated that he suspected 
that those who had been defeated in their attempt to succeed Andreas 
Papandreou, were criticising the government’s policy towards Turkey because 
they still intended to claim the party’s leadership. “I fear”, he said, “that some 
said not that they lost, but that they lost for the time being”270.
Public opinion did not appear to approve of the government’s policy either. An 
opinion poll published in June 1997 showed that the public preferred the foreign 
(amongst others) policy of PASOK governments under Andreas Papandreou to 
that of PASOK governments under Simitis. Barely over twenty percent of those 
surveyed thought the foreign policy of the Simitis governments better than those 
of the Papandreou governments, while over forty-three percent of those surveyed 
thought it worse, with the figure rising to over forty-five percent amongst 
PASOK voters271.
As a result of US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s mediation during a 
NATO summit in July 1997, the Greek Prime Minister and the Turkish President 
signed the so-called “Madrid Declaration”. According to the latter, the two 
countries would “pursue efforts to promote bilateral relations based on: a mutual
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commitment to peace, security and the continuing development of good 
neighborly relations, respect for each other's sovereignty, respect for the 
principles of international law and international agreements, respect for each 
other's legitimate, vital interests and concerns in the Aegean which are of great 
importance for their security and national sovereignty, commitment to refrain 
from unilateral acts on the basis of mutual respect and willingness to avoid 
conflicts arising from misunderstanding and commitment to settle disputes by 
peaceful means based on mutual consent and without use of force or threat of 
force”272. As Undersecretary Kranidiotis explained273, the implication of the 
Madrid Declaration was that Turkey had withdrawn the threat of war and it had 
accepted the international legal framework that determines that status quo in the 
Aegean. What Turkey had not accepted was the submission of territorial disputes 
to the ICJ as the appropriate method to resolve Greco-Turkish problems, an issue 
which was going to prove crucial both during bilateral meetings between Greek 
and Turkish officials and during EU level meetings on EU-Turkey relations.
Twenty-two PASOK MPs signed a letter critical of the Madrid Declaration and 
Minister for Education Arsenis expressed his disagreement274. The spirit of the 
Declaration, however, was quickly undermined. In August 1997, Turkish Prime 
Minister Mesut Yilmaz stated during an interview with “The Washington Post” 
that the Aegean Sea was a “very special case”, where “international law cannot 
be applied” and Turkey signed an Association Agreement with the so-called 
“Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”, prompting Defence Minister 
Tsohatzopoulos to draw parallels between Hitler’s policy towards 
Czechoslovakia and Turkey’s policy towards Cyprus275.
In an attempt to restore the spirit of the Madrid Declaration, Greek Foreign 
Minister Pangalos and Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem met in New York
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during the meeting of the UN General Assembly in September 1997. The 
meeting was unsuccessful due to the differences of approach to the resolution of 
Greco-Turkish problems. As Pangalos explained in a telegram to Prime Minister 
Simitis, he insisted on the submission of the Imia/Kardak issue to the ICJ as a 
necessary first step, while Cem proposed a discussion on all issues, which 
Pangalos rejected276. The spirit of the Madrid Declaration was further 
undermined after the meeting, when Pangalos stated: “A certain.. .part of their 
military and diplomatic establishment has conceived the idea of challenging 
Greek borders in the Aegean. This will not pass as international practice and of 
course it is impossible to discuss this or even have the beginning of an exchange 
of views because you cannot discuss with the thief, the murderer and the rapist. It 
is impossible”277. By November 1997, when Prime Ministers Simitis and Yilmaz 
met in Crete during the Balkan Conference organised by Greece, it became clear 
that the process had come to a standstill. While their commitment to the 
principles included in the Madrid agreement was reiterated, their differences of 
approach to the resolution of Greco-Turkish problems were yet again confirmed.
At that point EU level developments became crucial. During the November 1997 
Extraordinary European Council summit on employment in Luxembourg, the 
issue of Turkey’s participation in the proposed European Conference -  a forum 
for consultation between member-states and applicant countries -  was raised. As 
Luxembourg’s Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker had informed Simitis during 
a bilateral meeting the day before, all member-states wished to make a gesture 
towards Turkey. Simitis insisted on the need for Turkey to accept the jurisdiction 
of the ICJ and change its policy towards Cyprus before any such gesture was 
made by the EU and suggested that the latter should put pressure on Turkey, if 
they wished an agreement to be reached during the European Council summit in 
December278. The Luxembourgish Presidency informed the Turkish government 
of the conditions that Greece had set for Turkey’s participation in the European 
Conference, yet the Turkish government was not only unwilling to accept those
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terms, but also considered the offer to participate in the European Conference to 
be unsatisfactory279.
Later that month, Prime Minister Simitis met his British counterpart in London, 
where their disagreements over Turkey’s participation in the European 
Conference were confirmed. While Tony Blair supported Turkey’s participation, 
Simitis explained that the necessary pre-conditions for Turkey’s participation had 
not been met and that the Greek government doubted that Turkey was eventually 
going to accept these terms once it had been admitted to the European 
Conference, as Blair had suggested280. Similar disagreements arose between 
Simitis and French President Jacques Chirac and French Prime Minister Lionel 
Jospin, when they met in Paris at the start of December. During a press 
conference after the meeting, Simitis explained that states that wished to 
participate in the European Conference would have to accept UN resolutions on 
the Cyprus problem, the desire of other states to accede to the EU and the 
jurisdiction of the ICJ. While French officials considered the first two conditions 
to be “self-evident”, they were more reluctant to ask Turkey to commit itself to a 
specific method of settlement of its disputes with Greece281. Simitis also 
indicated that the issue of the European Conference might turn out to be less 
controversial during the European Council summit in December, since the 
Turkish government had indicated to the Presidency that the offer to participate 
in the European Conference was unsatisfactory282. A few days later, Foreign 
Minister Pangalos reiterated the Greek government’s reservations regarding the 
usefulness of the European Conference and its intention to propose conditions for 
participation should the European Conference materialise283.
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At the start of December 1997, an agreement on the new military structure of 
NATO re-activated domestic opposition. Minister for Education Arsenis argued 
that Greece had entered a “minefield” and warned against “blindly following 
signposts (others) have set up for us”284. Arsenis made explicit that the situation 
would have been “satisfactory”, had Tsohatzopoulos consulted him285. Public 
opinion continued to disapprove of the government’s foreign policy. A poll 
published the day before the Luxembourg summit showed that over fifty-three 
percent of those surveyed believed that during 1997 Greece’s position vis-a-vis 
Turkey had been weakened or remained as weak as it was previously286.
The decision of the December 1997 Luxembourg European Council summit 
constitutes the most significant development during the second phase of the 
period under investigation. It was decided that a European Conference would be 
set up in order to “bring together the Member States of the European Union and 
the European States aspiring to accede to it”. The EU offer to participate in the 
European Conference was addressed to Cyprus, the states of Central and Eastern 
Europe and Turkey. Despite the fact that the European Conference was seen as 
being largely symbolic, Greece was for the first time consenting to the offer of a 
reward that went beyond what was provided for by the 1963 Association 
Agreement. The offer, however, was conditional and the conditions reflected 
Greek preferences quite accurately: “The members of the Conference must share 
a common commitment to peace, security and good neighbourliness, respect for 
other countries' sovereignty, the principles upon which the European Union is 
founded, the integrity and inviolability of external borders and the principles of 
international law and a commitment to the settlement of territorial disputes by 
peaceful means, in particular through the jurisdiction of the International Court 
of Justice in the Hague. Countries which endorse these principles and respect the 
right of any European country fulfilling the required criteria to accede to the 
European Union and sharing the Union's commitment to building a Europe free
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of the divisions and difficulties of the past will be invited to take part in the 
Conference”287.
While the summit was marked by lasting British and especially French support 
for Turkey, Greece benefited from Germany’s reluctance and Turkey’s 
uncompromising stance288. By the end of the first day of the summit, it had been 
agreed that Turkey was not going to be given candidate country status and that 
EU-Turkey relations would have to be improved in a different way289. The 
following day France attempted to secure an agreement on the question of 
Cyprus’ accession that would satisfy Turkey. French President Chirac argued 
that the Cyprus problem would have to be settled prior to Cyprus’ accession to 
the EU and he indicated that failing a settlement, France would have to veto 
Cyprus’ accession. Greek Prime Minister Simitis replied that in that case Greece 
would have to veto the enlargement process in its entirety290. While no conclusive 
agreement was reached at that time and the issue re-emerged during the next two 
years, the French position was weakened by the fact that it lacked British 
support, as Britain was in favour of Cyprus’ accession, regardless of the 
resolution of the political problem291. Finally, as Prime Minister Simitis 
confirmed in his memoirs, Luxembourg’s Prime Minister Juncker significantly 
contributed to the adoption of Greek positions by the EU292. During an interview 
with the Luxembourgish daily “Wort” ahead of the summit, Juncker stated: “A 
country in which torture is still a common practice cannot have a seat at the table
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of the European Union”. According to Juncker, apart from respect for human 
rights, Turkey would also have to stop impeding Cyprus’ accession to the EU 
and accept the submission of its disputes with Greece to the ICJ293. He reiterated 
this position during a speech in the EP after the summit294. The Turkish 
government dismissed the offer to participate in the European Conference as 
insignificant and made explicit that Turkey was not going to accept any terms295. 
Turkish Prime Minister Yilmaz stated that Turkey was going to withdraw its 
application for membership of the EU, if the latter did not change its attitude 
towards Turkey before June 1998296.
From Luxembourg to Helsinki
The decision made at the Luxembourg European Council summit was considered 
unsatisfactory -  to say the least -  by Turkey. Political dialogue with the EU was 
suspended and relations with Greece started to deteriorate. At the start of 1998, 
Turkey announced a military exercise in the Aegean and Turkish military aircraft 
infringed Athens’ FIR and violated Greek airspace297. According to US 
Undersecretary of State Marc Grossman, Turkey had cancelled part of its 
planned exercise at the request of the US, so that Turkish aircraft would not fly 
over islets, which Greece considered part of its territory298. At the same time, a 
series of exchanges between the two countries began, when Foreign Minister
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Pangalos drew parallels between the treatment of Kurds by Turkish authorities 
and the treatment of Jews by Hitler299.
In response to Turkish violations of Greek airspace, Foreign Minister Pangalos 
argued during an interview in January 1998 that there was nothing keeping 
Turkey from challenging Greek views on Aegean airspace before the ICJ300. The 
following day, government spokesman Reppas confirmed that, even though no 
specific proposal on that particular issue had been made, the general position of 
the Greek government was that any country that believed there was a problem 
should try to resolve it through the ICJ301.
The following month, Turkish Foreign Minister Cem responded by presenting a 
set of proposals on Greco-Turkish relations. It was suggested that Greece and 
Turkey should jointly define disputes over the Aegean, the Madrid Declaration 
should be transformed into a formal agreement, NATO’s Secretary General’s 
Confidence Building Measures should be developed and implemented, a meeting 
of the wise-men committee should be held and a high-level meeting of Foreign 
Ministry officials should be held in order to discuss the above proposals302. 
Government spokesman Reppas dismissed the proposals as “nothing new”, yet 
Deputy Foreign Minister Papandreou and Undersecretary Kranidiotis stated that 
the government was going to study them303. A few days later, the government 
responded be reiterating its commitment to the ICJ as the appropriate means to 
resolve Greco-Turkish problems304.
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In response to the stalemate, the British government -  which was holding the 
Presidency of the Council -  indicated that the EU should “redouble its efforts” to 
give Turkey “a very clear signal” about its “true intentions”305. Indeed, during the 
Cardiff European Council summit, the British Presidency presented a draft of the 
Presidency Conclusions, which referred to twelve candidate countries, implicitly 
identifying Turkey as a candidate for EU membership. Greek Prime Minister 
Simitis insisted that there were only eleven candidate countries and that the 
decision made during the Luxembourg European Council summit should not be 
discussed further306. The relevant passage was removed from the text and the 
section that discussed the Commission’s progress reports explicitly differentiated 
Turkey from candidate countries. “The European Council welcomes the 
Commission’s confirmation that it will submit at the end of 1998 its first regular 
reports on each candidate’s progress towards accession. In the case of Turkey, 
reports will be based on Article 28 of the Association Agreement and the 
conclusions of the Luxembourg European Council”307. The European Council 
also asked the Commission to table proposals for the implementation of the 
European strategy for Turkey and noted the Commission’s intention to do so, 
specifically referring to the need for financial support for the European 
strategy308.
During a press conference after the summit, Prime Minister Simitis discussed a 
phone call that he had received from US President Clinton. Clinton had asked 
Simitis to accept the Presidency’s proposals and promised that the US would put 
pressure on Turkey in return. Simitis declined and explained to Clinton that his 
assessment of the situation in Turkey was erroneous. With an election drawing 
near, Simitis argued, Turkey was in no position to make any decision regarding 
Greco-Turkish relations. When Clinton indicated that lack of progress in EU- 
Turkey relations might lead to tension in the region, Simitis responded by saying 
that in that case Turkey would be responsible309. Two rather irregular incidents 
followed. First, shortly after the summit, four military aircraft flew from a Greek
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military base to a Cypriot airport, without any relevant announcement having 
been made beforehand310. Second, a few days after the summit, Foreign Minister 
Pangalos referred to a Commission employee of Greek nationality -  whom he 
did not name -  as a traitor, who was trying to find a way for the EU to release its 
financial assistance to Turkey, despite the Greek government’s veto311.
Given Greece’s refusal to consent to the Turkish candidacy, efforts focused on 
the release of EU financial assistance. Commissioner Hans van den Broek 
indicated to the Greek government that the Commission intended to submit to the 
Council two proposals for regulations regarding EU financial assistance to 
Turkey, one of which was based on a treaty article that allowed for a decision to 
be made by qualified majority. In a letter to Commission President Jacques 
Santer, Simitis explained that the situation had led him to conclude that the sole 
purpose of the proposal the Commission intended to table was to overcome 
Greek objections to the release of EU financial assistance to Turkey and 
indicated that a decision based on such a proposal could be challenged before the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ)312. The issue was discussed during a meeting of 
the Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER) in October 1998, where 
no agreement was reached due to the objections expressed by the Greek 
Permanent Representative313. Deputy Foreign Minister Papandreou reiterated 
these objections during a meeting of the Council of Ministers at the start of 
November. While no decision was made, France, Germany, the Netherlands and 
Italy issued a statement, where they drew attention to the problems the situation 
in Cyprus would raise for the CFSP, if Cyprus were to join the EU prior to the 
settlement of the Cyprus question. Papandreou stated that it would be impossible 
for the Greek Parliament to ratify the Treaty of Accession of any candidate 
country, if Cyprus were not allowed to join the EU, essentially reiterating the 
threat to veto the entire process of enlargement, previously expressed by Simitis 
during the Luxembourg European Council summit. With regard to Turkey, he 
insisted that there should be no deviation from the Luxembourg European 
Council decision, which clearly separated Turkey from candidate countries, and
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that Greece would refer the issue of EU financial assistance to Turkey to the ECJ 
if necessary, as Simitis had indicated in his letter to Commission President 
Santer314.
In the meantime, Simitis announced a Cabinet reshuffle and asked for a vote of 
confidence from Parliament. As government spokesman Reppas explained, the 
majority of those present required by the Constitution would not suffice, as the 
Prime Minister wished that all PASOK MPs offered the new government their 
support315. Eleven PASOK MPs, however, submitted a letter to the Speaker of 
the House, where they explained that, while they were going to provide the 
government with their vote of confidence, they did not intend to cease to express 
objections to the government’s policies316. Government spokesman Reppas 
informed the press that the Prime Minister had decided not to accept their 
votes317. As Simitis put it: “The government cannot be based on a vote of 
tolerance. At the moment of this vote, clear answers are required. There can be 
no ‘yes, but’. Terms and conditions constitute evasions. The government asks for 
a vote (of confidence) on all its policies. A clear ‘yes’. Footnotes are recorded as 
negative votes. Clear positions are required. Whoever disagrees should have the 
courage to say it with a ‘no’”318. The letter was eventually withdrawn and the 
government won the vote.
Simitis’ success in consolidating his position did not last more than a few weeks. 
At the end of the year, Cypriot President Glafcos Clerides announced the 
decision not to deploy the S 300 missiles -  the purchase of which the Cypriot 
government had announced two years earlier prompting the Turkish government 
to warn that it would destroy them -  in Cyprus. The decision proved quite 
controversial. According to Cypriot Foreign Minister Ioannis Kasoulidis, Greek 
Foreign Minister Pangalos had indicated to the Cypriot government that it would 
be inadvisable to deploy the missiles in Cyprus six months before the decision
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was announced. This was emphatically denied in a statement issued by the Greek 
Embassy in Nicosia, where it was reiterated that the decision was the outcome of 
talks between Greek Prime Minister Simitis and Cypriot President Clerides held 
shortly before the official announcement319. A few days later, leader of the 
Cypriot coalition government’s junior partner Nikos Anastasiadis argued that 
Pangalos had made explicit to Kasoulidis that the Greek government was not 
going to stand by Cyprus on the issue at the start of November 1997320, while two 
members of the Cypriot Cabinet resigned protesting against the decision321. 
Finally, Kasoulidis argued that the French government had linked the issue with 
Cyprus’ accession to the EU322. In Greece, the decision was seen by those who 
opposed the government’s foreign policy as yet another failure to safeguard the 
national interest. As member of PASOK’s Executive Bureau Pantelis 
Oikonomou put it: “(Pangalos) has participated in unprecedented in number and 
size failures. (The agreement on the Dutch Presidency’s proposal reached in) 
Malta, (the) Madrid (Declaration), the non-expansion of our territorial waters to 
twelve nautical miles, (the) S 300 (affair)”323.
A few weeks later, the arguments of those who presented the government’s 
policy as a series of fiascos were reinforced by the capture of Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdulah Ocalan, while he was being transported 
from the Greek Embassy in Nairobi to the Kenyan capital’s airport. The Turkish 
government argued that the incident constituted evidence that confirmed its 
claims that Greece was supporting PKK. The Kurds argued that the Greek 
government had betrayed their leader, a Kurdish man set himself on fire in front 
of the Greek Parliament and PKK members occupied the Greek Embassy in 
Vienna during President Stefanopoulos’ official visit. Finally, forty-two members 
of PASOK’s Central Committee argued that the government was “obviously” 
responsible for the incident, drew parallels between the Imia/Kardak crisis, the S- 
300 affair and the Ocalan incident and asked for a meeting of the party’s Central 
Committee because “no one has the right to stain with actions or omissions the
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honour and morale of the Greek people”324. In an attempt to relieve the pressure 
on his government, Prime Minister Simitis requested the resignation of Foreign 
Minister Pangalos, Interior Minister Alekos Papadopoulos and Minister for 
Justice Filippos Petsalnikos. Commenting on the Cabinet reshuffle, the main 
opposition party’s leader Costas Karamanlis stated: “If someone had to resign, 
that was Mr. Simitis...the problem remains, as long as the major and main 
(person) responsible for the national humiliation remains in his post”325. Apart 
from renewed Turkish claims that Greece was supporting terrorists and 
opposition claims that it had led the country to yet another “national defeat”, the 
government earned itself yet another outspoken critic of its policy towards 
Turkey, namely former Foreign Minister Pangalos.
As the issue of terrorism had become particularly salient, Turkish Foreign 
Minister Cem sent his Greek counterpart a letter at the end of May 1999, where 
he argued in favour of cooperation between Greece and Turkey in the fight 
against terrorism326. A few weeks later, Greek Foreign Minister Papandreou (who 
had replaced Pangalos after the Ocalan incident) replied by suggesting that 
cooperation was also possible in a number of other low-politics areas. 
Papandreou and Cem met a few days later in New York, where it was agreed that 
six committees of high-ranking Foreign Ministry officials from the two countries 
would meet and explore the possibility of cooperation in low-politics issues327. 
The opposition remained unconvinced. As the first round of talks was about to 
begin, leader of the main opposition party Karamanlis stated: “The Simitis 
government is once more making a supposed good will gesture towards Turkey. 
It is proceeding without terms and conditions and especially without setting, at 
least clearly, the framework, within which any attempt to move closer to 
dialogue could assume constructive form. And while this is happening, Turkey is 
escalating tension and its unyieldingness”328.
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In June 1999, during the European Council summit in Cologne, the German 
Presidency submitted a draft of the Presidency Conclusions that identified 
Turkey as a candidate country. As Prime Minister Simitis explained during the 
press conference after the summit329, he expressed Greece’s objection to the 
proposal, cited the decisions made in Luxembourg and Cardiff and argued that 
another decision would be premature, since EU-Turkey relations were going to 
be discussed during the Helsinki European Council summit. The Presidency 
removed the relevant passages from its Conclusions.
At the end of July 1999, Foreign Minister Papandreou caused controversy with a 
statement, which he subsequently defended during an interview with Greek daily 
“Eleftherotypia”, regarding the Muslim minority in Greece. Papandreou argued 
that Greece should not deny members of the Muslim minority the right to 
identify themselves as Turks330. Papandreou’s statement prompted eighteen 
members of PASOK’s Central Committee to demand his resignation, while a 
spokesman for the opposition spoke of “vague” and “naive” views, which were 
“dangerous for the nation”331.
The lack of tension between Greece and Turkey, in which bilateral negotiations 
on low-politics issues had resulted, was consolidated at the start of September 
1999, when the Greek government consented to the release of EU financial 
assistance to Turkey, on condition that it would be used to relieve the problems 
caused by the earthquake that had hit Turkey a few weeks earlier332. In the 
meantime, Foreign Minister Papandreou stated for the first time during an 
interview in August 1999 that Greece did not object to the Turkish candidacy “in 
principle”333. The statement was somewhat vague, but a Greek foreign policy 
maker was for the first time referring explicitly to the Turkish candidacy as 
opposed to Turkey’s “European vocation”, while only one month earlier
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Papandreou had stated with regard to the government’s position on the Turkish 
candidacy that “we will decide when the time comes”334.
As soon as the government indicated that it might consent to the Turkish 
candidacy, arguments regarding “national defeat” re-emerged. Former Foreign 
Minister Pangalos, in particular, was highly critical of the government’s policy 
towards Turkey. During an interview with Greek daily “To Vima” at the start of 
October 1999335, he argued that the policy he had pursued as Foreign Minister 
was not different from the standard policy of all Greek governments since 1974. 
“The policy that is being pursued today”, he continued, “is not in accordance 
with what we had announced. This policy of dialogue, friendship and creating 
impressions, without it being clear for what reason these impressions are being 
created”. When asked whether he disagreed with the attempts to relieve tension 
in Greco-Turkish relations, Pangalos argued that those efforts had not managed 
to elicit a response from Turkey, while at the same time they had made it 
increasingly difficult for the Greek government to support its positions during the 
Helsinki European Council summit. “How will the Prime Minister and the 
Foreign Minister go to Helsinki tomorrow and say: ‘No, we cannot withdraw all 
our demands’? (Their EU counterparts) will tell them and rightly so ‘but were 
you not dancing with the Turks? Were you not looking at each other with tears in 
your eyes? What was all that?”’. When asked to comment on what had changed 
since his resignation, the former Foreign Minister argued that his successor’s 
advisors believed that the national interest was served best by not disagreeing 
with the most powerful state in the system, namely the US. When asked about 
the bargaining position the government was going to assume in Helsinki, 
Pangalos’ phrasing was virtually identical to that of those who had been arguing 
that the government’s policy was distorting PASOK’s so-called “patriotic 
character”. “A possible retreat would correspond with a national defeat”, he 
replied and he concluded by posing the following rhetorical question: “Why do
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quoted Kranidiotis as saying that Greece might lift its veto of the Turkish candidacy under certain 
conditions in July; see J. Gaunt, “Greece Offer EU Way to Make Turkey Candidate”, Reuters, 12 
July 1999. Kranidiotis denied he had made any such statement.
335 Theodore Pangalos interview with Thanasis Lalas, To Vima, 3 October 1999
107
not we admit Taiwan in the European Union as well, which is industrially and 
culturally more advanced (than Turkey)?”
According to Prime Minister Simitis, during the Tampere European Council 
summit in October 1999, all EU member-states agreed that Turkey should be 
given candidate country status, but there was no agreement on what the precise 
conditions that Turkey would have to meet should be. A few days after the 
Tampere summit, Foreign Minister Papandreou started touring EU member- 
states’ capitals in an attempt to convince Greece’s EU partners to accept the 
government’s positions. Subsequently, Simitis had bilateral meetings with all his 
EU counterparts in November 1999 during the Socialist International summit in 
Paris and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE ) 
summit in Istanbul. According to Simitis, the meeting with French President 
Chirac in Paris at the start of November was a “pleasant surprise”. Chirac argued 
that it was necessary to take issues of special interest to Greece into 
consideration and Simitis concluded that their relationship had changed since 
their “not so pleasant” confrontation during the Luxembourg European Council 
summit336. Later that month, Simitis met Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit 
during the OSCE summit in Istanbul. According to Simitis, no progress was 
achieved, “as (he) had expected”337. At the same time, a Turkish news agency 
was reporting that European leaders and especially French President Chirac had 
urged Ecevit to accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ, a position reiterated by US 
President Clinton during his visit to Greece338.
The link between public opinion and domestic actors opposing foreign policy 
reform was clearly manifested shortly before the Helsinki summit. During the 
last meeting of the Cabinet before the summit, certain Cabinet members opposed 
the strategy that the Prime Minister seemed determined to pursue. As the next 
election was drawing near and opinion polls showed skepticism towards Turkey 
increasing amongst the public, several Cabinet members preferred to postpone
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the decision339. In fact, it was reported in the press that several Cabinet and party 
members believed that a Greek veto would allow the ruling party to call for and 
win an early election340.
The day before the Greek delegation travelled to Helsinki, Finnish 
Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs Jaakko Blomberg visited Athens representing 
the Finnish Presidency and submitted written proposals for the first time. A 
meeting at the Foreign Ministry led to the conclusion that “serious 
disagreements” remained341. Disagreements were confirmed the day before the 
beginning of the summit, when the Finnish Presidency presented a draft of the 
Presidency Conclusions to the Greek delegation, which Prime Minister Simitis 
“rejected immediately”342. The Greek delegation and the Finnish Presidency 
continued to negotiate until late that night, while Finnish Undersecretary of State 
Blomberg was invited to the hotel the Greek delegation was staying at the 
following morning for a final round of talks. Negotiations were unsuccessful and 
at the start of the summit Simitis stated that he was “unable to consent”343, since 
Greek positions had not been accepted. The summit came to a halt and further 
negotiations between the Greek delegation and the Finnish Presidency followed.
While Greece’s EU partners did not object to the Greek government’s demand to 
reiterate the obligation of candidate countries to submit unresolved disputes to 
the ICJ in principle, they remained unwilling to accept the specific deadline for 
compliance that the Greek government had proposed in fear of Turkey’s 
response344. What was considered to be even more problematic was the condition 
regarding Cyprus’s accession to the EU regardless of the resolution of the 
political problem because the rest of the member-states feared that Greek- 
Cypriots were going to assume an uncompromising stance on the Cyprus
339 Marakis, “Two and a Half Lines for Helsinki”, op cit
340 Lakopoulos, op cit.
341 Christos Rokofyllos interview with Stelios Chrysostomides, Horizon, Issue 6, January 2000 
reprinted in C. Rokofyllos, Greece Against the Challenges o f the Modem World (in Greek), 
Athens, Papazisis, 2000, pp. 69-70
342 Simitis, Policy. .., op. cit. p. 96
343 Ibid. p. 97
344 Ibid; Interviews with high-ranking Greek government official, 2 April 2008, member of the 
Cabinet, 7 May 2008 and Greek Foreign Ministry official, 15 May 2008
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question after Cyprus’ accession to the EU345. As the Greek government had 
made explicit that the above demands constituted “red lines”, the provisions that 
it had proposed were eventually accepted. According to the Presidency 
Conclusions346, “ ...the European Council stresses the principle of peaceful 
settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter and urges 
candidate States to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes 
and other related issues. Failing this they should within a reasonable time bring 
the dispute to the International Court of Justice. The European Council will 
review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes, in particular concerning 
the repercussions on the accession process and in order to promote their 
settlement through the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 
2004”. With regard to Cyprus, “the European Council underlines that a political 
settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no 
settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the 
Council’s decision on accession will be made without the above being a 
precondition. In this the Council will take account of all relevant factors”347. 
Turkey was identified as “a candidate State destined to join the Union”, the pre­
accession strategy for which “will include enhanced political dialogue, with 
emphasis on progressing towards fulfilling the political criteria for accession 
with particular reference to the issue of human rights, as well as on the issues 
referred to in paragraphs 4 and 9(a)”.
345 Interviews with member of the Cabinet, 7 May 2008, high-ranking Greek government 
officials, 2 April 2008 and 5 May 2008 and Greek Foreign Ministry official, 14 March 2008
346 Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999
347 This particular provision of the agreement that was reached in Helsinki was the result of 
Greece’s policy on the Cyprus problem. The latter was formulated by the late Yannos 
Kranidiotis, who believed that the pursuit of Cyprus’ accession to the EU was the most effective 
way to resolve the Cyprus problem. As was mentioned above, the main objective of this policy 
during the period under investigation was to secure an EU commitment that Cyprus would join 
the EU regardless o f the resolution of the Cyprus problem. This policy will not be discussed in 
great detail here, as Greece began to pursue it prior to Simitis’ election as Prime Minister in 1996 
and the opposition was supportive of it during the period under investigation. For this policy see 
amongst others Y. Kranidiotis, Greek Foreign Policy: Thoughts and Concerns at the Threshold 
of the 21s' Century (in Greek), Athens, Sideris, 2000 and Simitis, Policy..., op cit. pp. 106-124.
Conclusions
It follows from the above detailed narrative of Greek policy towards Turkey that 
between the Imia/Kardak crisis and the Helsinki European Council summit the 
Greek government took or supported numerous initiatives with the purpose of 
improving Greco-Turkish relations despite the fact that it was severely 
constrained by domestic actors that opposed foreign policy reform. These 
initiatives included proposals directed to Turkey (the step-by-step approach, 
Papandreou’s response to Cem’s letter) and subsequent bilateral meetings, 
proposals tabled within the context of NATO (Pangalos’ proposal for an intra­
alliance dispute settlement mechanism) and even ad hoc arrangements during 
international summits (the Madrid Declaration). While these initiatives were 
developed within a number of different frameworks, the Greek government most 
consistently pursued initiatives within the context o f  the EU. The Greek 
government had pursued and secured EU decisions prior to December 1999 that 
bear considerable similarities to the outcome of the Helsinki summit, namely the 
15 July 1996 EU statement, the member-states’ common position for the 29 
April 1997 EU-Turkey Association Council and, finally, the decision made 
during the Luxembourg European Council summit. All these decisions were 
made in the EU, they became possible only when the Greek government had 
lifted its veto on a certain aspect of EU-Turkey relations despite the fact that 
Turkey had not complied with Greece’s demands, they established rules for 
Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece and they attributed a role in Greco-Turkish 
relations to the EU. The following chapters will show why this series of 
decisions was pursued, especially by establishing how Greek foreign policy 
makers defined the problem that Greek policy towards Turkey was intended to 
address, what alternative courses of action Greek foreign policy makers 
considered and, finally, how the latter were assessed.
I l l
Chapter 5: Defining the policy problem 
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to establish how Greek foreign policy makers 
defined the policy problem the Helsinki strategy was intended to address. 
According to the balancing thesis, Greek foreign policy makers were facing a 
guns-or-butter dilemma: Greek policy towards Turkey could achieve its 
objectives, but it could not accommodate economic policy goals. In contrast, 
both the Europeanisation thesis and the leadership style thesis predict that Greek 
foreign policy makers identified policy failure. While the Europeanisation thesis 
predicts that the Imia/Kardak crisis demonstrated policy failure and prompted an 
assessment of the discrepancy between Greek policy towards Turkey and EU 
enlargement conditionality, the leadership style thesis predicts that Simitis had 
identified policy failure prior to the crisis and that he had selected a new strategy 
for Greek policy towards Turkey prior to his election as Prime Minister. Finally, 
the socialisation thesis predicts that Greek foreign policy makers began to 
understand Turkish violations of substantive EU foreign policy norms as the 
policy problem.
It will be shown here that the evidence supports the explanation based on the 
Prime Minister’s leadership style. As the latter predicts, Simitis was driven by an 
internal, pre-conceived idea, to which he remained unequivocally committed 
throughout the period under investigation. In notable contrast to what the 
Europeanisation thesis predicts, Simitis had already identified policy failure 
prior to the Imia/Kardak crisis and he had argued the need for a different policy 
towards Turkey prior to the establishment o f enlargement conditionality. 
Consequently, the establishment of this EU foreign policy practice could not 
have influenced his calculations. Simitis had been publicly arguing the need for 
what he referred to as the “communitisation” of Greco-Turkish relations since 
the early 1990s and he interpreted the 1996 crisis as evidence that confirmed his 
belief in the necessity of this strategy. In contrast to what the balancing thesis 
predicts, there is only limited evidence that the economic implications of Greek 
policy towards Turkey were considered a reason why Greece should change its
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policy. The implications of Turkey’s policy towards Greece constituted a greater 
cause for concern than US support for Turkey. Finally and in contrast to what the 
socialisation thesis predicts, Greek foreign policy makers did not begin to 
identify Turkish violations of substantive EU foreign policy norms as a policy 
problem for the first time during the period under investigation.
Simitis9 vision for reform
In his memoirs, Simitis argued that, when he was elected Prime Minister, he “had 
a specific policy plan for PASOK and its government”348. With regard to foreign 
policy, “Greece above all had to place Greco-Turkish relations on a different 
basis. To show that Turkey’s stance causes problems for European integration 
and constitutes a constraining factor on the route to unification. Peace in the 
region and the territorial integrity of Greece should therefore become the 
objective of all European states”349. Indeed, Simitis had been arguing this point 
since the early 1990s.
Simitis shared the view that Greco-Turkish problems were the result of Turkey’s 
aggressive policy towards Greece. The fact that these problems remained 
unresolved, however, was not only the result of Turkey’s consistently revisionist 
policy, but also of Greece’s failure to formulate an effective strategy that could 
be followed steadfastly. According to the former Prime Minister350, between 
1981 and 1996, Greece “systematically prevents the improvement of Turkey’s 
relations with the European Community. The logic of this political tactic was 
based on the idea that preventing the international upgrading of Turkey and 
especially its European course would result in bending Turkish resistance and the 
reduction or elimination of Turkey’s claims in the Aegean and in Cyprus”. While 
he argues that it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of this policy and that this 
is a task for historians, he does offer his own rather balanced assessment. He 
concedes that this policy contributed to the preservation of the status quo in the 
Aegean, “on the other hand, however, during the same period of time...certain
348 Simitis, Policy..., op. cit. p. 38
349 Ibid. p. 40
350 Ibid. pp. 56-8
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incidents between Greece and Turkey reached the brink of armed conflict.. .while 
Turkish claims in the Aegean not only did not cease, but also included, for the 
first time in this period, territories of the island complex (grey zones)”. Simitis 
discusses those events in the history of Greco-Turkish relations that challenge the 
assumption that Greece would manage to force Turkey to abandon its claims if it 
prevented progress in EU-Turkey relations and clearly considers these crises as 
manifestations of the failure of Greek policy towards Turkey to achieve its goals.
As has been pointed out, the fairly prominent idea that Greece is a state that 
seeks to preserve the status quo in the Aegean has resulted in a rather defensive 
policy towards Turkey351. Simitis was diametrically opposed to the view that as a 
status quo power Greece should pursue a defensive policy. He intended to 
formulate a pro-active Greek policy towards Turkey and reduce its 
responsiveness to Turkey’s aggressiveness and other contextual factors. “A 
hyper-reactive and defensive mentality defines the country’s foreign policy 
today”, he argued in 1992. “Our positions follow from reactions to Turkish 
provocations, statements by American officials, developments in neighbouring 
countries and not from our own initiatives”352. Strikingly enough, Simitis was 
suggesting that Greece’s “hyper-reactive” policy towards Turkey should be 
replaced by a policy on European integration. “We must move from a defensive 
and reflexive policy towards Turkey to a promoting and constructive strategy 
towards European integration”353.
“Europe” has been a central element of Simitis’ ideas about governance in 
Greece since before his Premiership. As was mentioned above, Simitis has been 
arguing the need for further integration and a political union based on a federal
351 V. Coufoudakis, “Greek-Turkish Relations, 1973-1983: The View from Athens”, 
International Security, 9: 4, 1985, pp. 206-7; D. Keridis, “Political Culture and Foreign Policy: 
Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of European Integration and Globalisation”, NATO 
Fellowship Final Report, Cambridge, June 1999, pp. 50-1; D. Triantaphyllou, “The Priorities of 
Greek Foreign Policy Today”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 5: 3, 2005, pp. 328-9. 
The opposite is true in the case of Cyprus, where Greece’s goal is to reverse the status quo.
352 C. Simitis, “Towards a National Strategic Doctrine”, Eleftherotypia, 2 February 1992 reprinted 
in C. Simitis, Nationalistic Populism or National Strategy? (in Greek), Athens, Gnosi, 1992, op. 
cit. p. 21
353 C. Simitis, “Relations between the US -  Greece -  Turkey”, Speech at the Greco-American 
Chamber’s conference on Relations between the US -  Greece -  Turkey, Intercontinental, 18 June 
1993 in C. Simitis, For A Powerful Society, For A Powerful Greece (in Greek), Athens, Plethron, 
1995, p. 163
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model. With regard to Greece’s role in the EU, he has emphasised the need for 
Greece to be part of “core Europe”. This was going to emerge as one of the main 
themes of Simitis’ discourse. During a speech at PASOK’s third conference in 
1994 he stated: “The effort for international participation on an equal footing is 
painful and uncertain. We must participate. This is a one-way street. We will face 
great difficulties. There are, however, no other options”354. Two years later, 
whilst reading his government’s programmatic statements in Parliament, he 
mentioned the need for Greece to participate in the integration process on an 
equal footing seven times. The emphasis on this point is associated with EMU. 
Writing in the early 1990s, Simitis argued that EMU entry was possible, yet 
doubtful because of the great distance Greece needed to cover in order to meet 
entry criteria355. The same is true of his understanding of “modernisation”. 
During a round-table discussion of modernisation in Greece at the LSE in 1994, 
he extensively discussed the precise meaning of the concept. “A modernisation 
programme for Greece”, he concluded, “ should be a programme that will allow 
it to participate in and shape the European society”356.
Simitis had made explicit that Greece’s failure to accede to EMU would have 
negative implications for variables beyond those that the European Central 
Bank’s common monetary policy and the fiscal policy rules of the Stability and 
Growth Pact may affect. The exclusion of Greece from “core Europe” would 
impose financial costs and result in reduced bargaining power and limited ability 
to “use European institutions”. Simitis feared that in a “two-speed Europe” EMU 
member-states would form a “core” of economically advanced countries, which 
would be reluctant to continue to finance EU budgetary policies (the Common 
Agricultural Policy and EU cohesion policy) that benefit their less developed 
partners357. Simitis believed that economic development was a significant
354 C. Simitis, “Let Us Fight and We Shall Win”, Speech at PASOK’s third conference, 15 April 
1994 reprinted in C. Simitis, For A Powerful Society, For A Powerful Greece (in Greek), Athens, 
Plethron, 1995, p. 182
355 Simitis, “Towards...”, op. cit. pp. 14-7
356 C. Simitis, “Modernisation and Convergence with Europe”, speech at the LSE, Roundtable on 
modernisation in Greece, 19 November 1994 reprinted in C. Simitis, For A Powerful Society, For 
A Powerful Greece (in Greek), Athens, Plethron, 1995, p. 115
357 Eastern enlargement would exacerbate this problem; see Simitis, “Towards...”, op. cit. pp. 17- 
8. As Scharpf has pointed out, “objections to closer cooperation may be based on the suspicion 
that rich member-states might form a club of their own in order to escape from the obligations of 
solidarity and from the side-payments exacted by the beneficiaries of cohesion programmes 
whenever advances of European integration were on the agenda”; see F. W. Scharpf, “The
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determinant of state power and that successful economic policies resulted in 
increased bargaining power in the EU358. In this sense, the economic policy 
failure Greece was facing in the early 1990s had already reduced Greece’s 
bargaining power. If not resolved, economic problems would prevent EMU entry 
and the latter coupled with limited EU funds would reduce Greece’s bargaining 
power further. Formally excluded from EMU and with its bargaining power 
reduced, Greece would be unable to “use European institutions” in order to 
gather support from its EU partners359.
This last point is particularly relevant with regard to Greco-Turkish relations. 
Considerable influence in the EU was necessary for the pursuit of the policy 
towards Turkey that Simitis preferred. Simitis believed that Turkish policy 
towards Greece was fairly consistent and in fact he expected that Turkish 
pressure on Greece would intensify. Nevertheless, this was a constraint he was 
willing to challenge. “We will check the pressure and handle it effectively”, he 
argued, “if we manage to alter the framework of the confrontation. Today we 
have accepted the existence of (a) Greco-Turkish problem, Greco-Turkish 
competition, the hyphenation of Greece and Turkey. Every issue related to 
Turkey, either within the EEC or within NATO, is assessed by our partners in 
conjunction with Greek reactions. We should change this dominant view. (We 
should) place (Greco-Turkish) problems on a different level. Our position should 
be that the Turkish stance creates problems for European integration and 
constitutes a constraining factor on the route to unification. Peace in the region 
and the territorial integrity of Greece should not just be a goal of ours, but of all 
European states”360. In sharp contrast to what the Europeanisation thesis predicts, 
the selection of the Community as the preferable “framework” for Greco-Turkish 
relations was not the outcome of calculations, according to which incorporating 
an established EU practice (enlargement conditionality) into Greek policy 
towards Turkey could achieve Greek goals more effectively. Simitis had already
European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity”, Journal o f Common Market 
Studies, 40: 4, 2002, p. 661
358 Simitis, “Towards...”, op. cit. pp. 13-16
359 Ibid. p. 17
360 Ibid. pp. 26-7, emphasis added; It is interesting to note that peace is implicitly considered 
synonymous with the territorial integrity of Greece. Turkey has expressed claims over Greek 
territory and seeks to revise the status quo, even through the use of military force (Cyprus). 
Greece seeks to maintain the status quo and thus preserve peace.
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argued this point prior to the establishment o f enlargement conditionality and 
therefore the latter could not have affected his calculations. Apart from the fact 
that this particular practice had not been established, leading European foreign 
policy analysts suggest that European foreign policy in general did not appear 
particularly promising at that time. The Gulf War and the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia had shown that “the Community (was) not an effective international 
actor, in terms both of its capacity to produce collective decisions and its impact 
on events”361 and the recognition of the former Yugoslav Republics fiasco had 
brought the very notion of a European foreign policy into “disrepute”362. In 1992, 
Simitis had selected the Community as the “default arena”363 for the exercise of 
Greek policy towards Turkey nonetheless364. During a speech the following year, 
Simitis reiterated the need for Greece to develop a multilateral strategy towards 
Turkey within the context of the Community, despite the fact that his speech was 
entitled “Relations between the US -  Greece -  Turkey”. “(Greece)”, he argued, 
“should make clear to its Community partners that the problems in Greco- 
Turkish relations are not problems that concern only the two countries. They are 
Community problems because they affect Community action and presence both 
in the Balkans and in the Eastern Mediterranean negatively”365.
Even though they offered little insight into what exactly he intended to do, 
reports on political developments in Greece during Simitis’ Premiership 
identified his distinctiveness. Shortly after his election, Greek policy towards 
Turkey was identified as his “top foreign priority”366 and his desire to improve 
Greco-Turkish relations was immediately assessed as “remarkable for a Greek 
politician”367. Less than a year after his election, it was being pointed out that he 
appeared “determined to get on better with Turkey”368 and half way through his 
first term in office it was argued that changes in Greek foreign policy “could be
361 Hill, “The Capability-Expectations Gap...”, op. cit. p. 306
362 Nuttall, op. cit. p. 223
363 For the term “default arena” see L. Quaglia -  C. M. Radaelli, “Italian Politics and the 
European Union: A Tale of Two Research Designs”, West European Politics, 30: 4, 2007
364 This shows that uploading per se cannot be considered synonymous with Europeanisation. 
Uploading may be an outcome of the process of Europeanisation. Clearly, this is not the case 
here.
365 Simitis, “Relations...”, op. cit. p. 162, emphasis added
366 “A Gleam of Hope in Greece”, Economist, 338: 7954, 24/02/96 (emphasis added)
367 “Looking More Modem”, Economist, 338: 7950, 27/01/96 (emphasis added)
368 “Unrevmalutionary”, Economist, 340: 7983, 14/09/96 (emphasis added)
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traced to the man at the top, Prime Minister Simitis”169. Indeed, it is often 
pointed out that Simitis was imbued with an entirely different understanding of 
what Greek policy towards Turkey ought to be, that he intended to pursue policy 
change as soon as he was elected Prime Minister, that he did so with a clear and 
firm sense of purpose and that the shift in Greek policy towards Turkey would 
not have been possible without his leadership370. Professor Ioakimidis, Prime 
Minister Simitis’ advisor on EU affairs, identified this particular understanding 
of the policy problem as the “crucial factor” that drove foreign policy change371. 
By mid-1996, Simitis’ understanding of the policy problem and his preference 
for communitisation had penetrated the Greek government’s official discourse to 
such an extent that government spokesman Reppas was stating: “It is time the 
European Union understood that the problems in relations between Greece and 
Turkey are problems bom out of Turkish provocations and claims on our national 
sovereign rights and Greek territory and they should understand that the 
preservation of calm, peace and security in the region is their concern too -  I 
would say -  it should be primarily their concern”372.
The 1996 crisis and Greek concerns about Turkey’s policy
The evidence shows that the 1996 Imia/Kardak crisis did not alter Simitis’ 
understanding of the policy problem. On the contrary, the crisis was interpreted 
as evidence that confirmed his beliefs, as the leadership style thesis predicts. In 
contrast to what the Europeanisation thesis predicts, the crisis did not lead to the 
realisation of policy failure and it did not prompt a search for a more effective 
policy. As was shown above, Simitis had identified the inability of Greek policy 
towards Turkey to achieve its goals prior to the crisis and he had selected the 
strategy that he believed should replace it. The new policy ought to challenge the
369 R. J. Guttman, “Greek Foreign Policy”, Europe, Issue 370, October 1997
370 Interviews with member of the Cabinet, 7 May 2008, high-ranking Greek government 
officials, 13 March 2008, 2 April 2008 and 5 May 2008, Greek Foreign Ministry officials, 18 
April 2008 and 27 May 2008. It is interesting to note that little attention has been paid to the 
views Simitis had expressed on the subject prior to his election as Prime Minister. It is instructive 
in this respect that, while several policy makers confirm the significance of Simitis’ personal 
beliefs, few are able to assess whether his beliefs had been formed prior to his Premiership.
371 Interview with Professor Panayotis Ioakimidis, advisor to Prime Minister Simitis, Athens, 3 
April 2008
372 For the Reppas’ statements see “Turks Insist”, Eleftherotypia, 8 August 1996, emphasis added
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idea that Greco-Turkish problems were bilateral problems and pursue the EU’s 
involvement in Greco-Turkish relations.
In contrast to what the Europeanisation thesis predicts, the crisis performed none 
of the functions that the literature on external shocks suggests it might have. First 
of all, the new government’s electoral mandate was not quite “impressive”373. On 
the contrary, PASOK’s share of the vote (41.49%) in the election of September 
1996 was “the lowest of any victorious party since 1977” and 5.39% lower 
compared with the previous election of 1993374. More significantly, the crisis did 
not discredit the ideas that the policy previously pursued was based on375. 
Instead, the idea that the government’s lack of resolve during the crisis had led 
the country to a defeat emerged and remained popular until the Helsinki summit. 
In fact, even members of PASOK were systematically arguing that the 
government’s policy towards Turkey was little more than a series of fiascos376. 
As Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs and advisor to the Prime Minister Christos 
Rozakis has pointed out, the crisis “undermined at the most inappropriate 
moment the new tendencies for change in foreign policy towards Turkey”377. The 
crisis led the government to veto the release of EU financial assistance to Turkey 
-  a policy that contradicted the Prime Minister’s preferences -  in an attempt to 
gain the time necessary to pursue communitisation378.
Simitis made it clear that the crisis constituted an escalation of Turkish 
aggression -  which he had anticipated -  that required Greece to maintain 
sufficient military capabilities: “ ...we must arm our country against the threats 
manifested at its borders.. .we are the only EU member-state that faces a threat to 
its national sovereign rights and its territorial integrity. Turkish malevolence now 
assumes a rawer form, rises to a new degree of escalation. Turkey, with its new
373 Keeler, op. cit. p. 436
374 K. Featherstone -  G. Kazamias, “In the Absence of Charisma: The Greek Elections of 
September 1996”, West European Politics, 20: 2, 1997, pp. 161-2. The lack of an “impressive” 
mandate invalidated all three mandate-related mechanisms (public authorisation, legislative 
empowerment -  which is not particularly relevant to foreign policy reform -  and party pressure) 
that may have opened a window for reform; see Keeler, op. cit. pp. 437-9
375 Keeler, op. cit. pp. 440-1
376 Pantelis Oikonomou interview, Eleftherotypia, 3 January 1999
377 C. L. Rozakis, “International Law and its Function in Greco-Turkish Relations (1974-2004)” 
in K. Arvanitopoulos -  M. Koppa (eds), 30 Years o f Greek Foreign Policy 1974-2004 (in Greek), 
Athens, Livani, 2005, p. 160
378 Interview with high-ranking Greek government official, 2 April 2008
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theory of “grey zones” in the Aegean, has made its darkest aspirations visible: 
“gray zones” are intended to alter the recognised by international treaties status 
quo in the Aegean”379. Simitis also drew attention to the implications of Turkey’s 
policy for the broader region: “(Our country) is facing Turkish aggressiveness in 
the Aegean and in Cyprus. Turkey has turned into the greatest de-stabilising 
factor in the Aegean, the Balkans, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Caucasus and 
the Middle East. The unhistorical visions of reviving the Ottoman Empire are an 
invention of the Turkish establishment in order to relieve the sharp domestic 
problems and acquire an increased role in the area”380. At the same time, 
however, Simitis made it clear that he wished to reverse the situation: “We want 
to have cooperative relations. We want to develop our economic relations with 
Turkey, (our) societal, cultural relations with Turkey”381. The problem, however, 
was that Turkey’s policy had proven consistently revisionist. “The Turkish 
stance, I should think, has not changed for a long time. All representatives of 
Turkey...handle issues within a general framework. And this general 
framework...that determines Turkey’s stance is the attempt to revise the status 
quo in the Aegean”382.
It is instructive to note that a year after the Imia/Kardak crisis the possibility of 
armed conflict was openly discussed. When asked about that possibility in 
February 1997, government spokesman Reppas stated: “Given the aggressive and 
belligerent policy that Turkey is following, Greece is obliged to prepare itself, so 
that its defence is at a high level of deterrence. If these efforts that are being 
made by different parties to search and find solutions in the diplomatic and 
political field fail, you understand that given Turkey’s behaviour, which is 
intensifying at the expense of Greece, this possibility is not in the area of the 
improbable”383. A few days later, British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind 
stated during an interview with BBC radio that there was a “serious possibility”
379 “Speech Against Centralisation, Lack of Transparency, The Oh-Never-Mind-That Attitude”, 
Eleftherotypia, 28 June 1996
380 C. Simitis, Reading of the government’s programmatic statements in Parliament, 10 October 
1996
381 “Simitis’ 6 Foreign Policy Commitments”, Eleftherotypia, 12 September 1996
382 K. Adam, “Discussion without Rules Is out of the Question”, Eleftherotypia, 28 May 1997
383 “Reppas: It Is Not Improbable, War Against Turkey...”, Eleftherotypia, 4 February 1997
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of armed conflict between Greece and Turkey384 and during a relevant 
Congressional committee session US Secretary of State Albright spoke of a “new 
cycle that is dangerous for stability in the region”385. Undersecretary Kranidiotis 
confirmed this assessment of the situation. “These ‘belligerent’ statements”, he 
argued, “show that it is beginning to be understood how critical the pending 
situation in Cyprus is and how many dangers the crisis in Greco-Turkish 
relations holds386”. By the end of the month, Foreign Minister Pangalos was 
arguing that the Greek government knew of a Turkish map, which depicted the 
entire Eastern Aegean as an area, sovereignty over which was under 
negotiation387. Finally, when Simitis was asked whether the Turkish threat was a 
Greek obsession rather than a real threat during an interview with German 
magazine “Der Spiegel” in November 1997388, he replied: “You cannot argue that 
the threat is a figment of our imagination! I shall remind you of the dispute over 
the Greek island Imia”. When the interviewer insisted, explaining that Imia was 
only an uninhabited islet in the Aegean, Simitis replied: “Turkish soldiers 
violently removed the Greek flag in January 1996 and brought the region to the 
brink of war. Ankara argues that there are ‘grey zones’ in the Aegean, that is to 
say areas sovereignty over which remains unclear. That is why, according to 
Turkey’s logic, whom these islands belong to should be examined. There can be, 
however, no discussion on sovereign rights recognised by international law”.
Despite the fact that the crisis was interpreted as an escalation of Turkish 
aggression -  which Simitis had predicted -  that necessitated Greek military 
preparedness, Simitis’ belief in the necessity of communitisation remained 
unchallenged, as the leadership style thesis predicts. According to Simitis, “the
384 “Serious Possibility of War Against Turkey”, Eleftherotypia, 11 February 1997; “Rifkind 
comments of Greek-Turkish conflict 'exaggerated', Athens notes”, Greek Embassy in Washington 
Press Office News Archive, 12 February 1997, available at 
http://www.greekembassy.org/embassy/content/en/Article.aspx? 
office=3&foldei=253&article=1401. accessed on 19 November 2007
385 D. P. Dimas, “Albright Too Speaks of Danger”, Eleftherotypia, 13 February 1997
386 S. Kasimatis, “Resolution Right Here and Now!”, Eleftherotypia, 16 February 1997; 
“Kranidiotis calls for US, EU initiatives on Cyprus, Greek-Turkish relations”, Greek Embassy in 
Washington Press Office News Archive, 17 February 1997, available at 
http://www.greekembassv.org/embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?
office=3 &folder=253 &article=1408. accessed on 20 November 2007
387 “Turkish Plan for the Entire Eastern Aegean”, Eleftherotypia, 27 February 1997. Pangalos 
reiterated this view the following month during an interview with Turkish daily “Yeni Yuzyil”; 
see A. Abatzis, “Opening for Turkey”, Eleftherotypia, 22 March 1997
388 “Simitis: Neither Veto, Nor Package”, Eleftherotypia, 3 November 1997
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Imia crisis revealed, first, the latent aggressive -  expansionist -  strategy of 
Ankara...second, that, for the first time during the troubled post-1974 period, 
Turkish claims were not just limited to challenges of the legal regime of the 
waters and the airspace of the Aegean, but also included claims (on Greek) soil... 
finally, the need for a new integrated strategy on Greco-Turkish relations for 
Greece”389. After discussing the government’s immediate response to the crisis in 
his memoirs, he wrote: “That, however, would not suffice. We had to intensify 
our efforts in the intra-European direction as well. Turkey’s European vocation 
had to become the central issue of our policy because a development on this 
point would drastically limit any sort of aggressiveness towards us. The 
effectiveness of this strategy, however, depended on the extent to which we 
could achieve terms and preconditions that would definitively transform the 
Greco-Turkish dispute into a Euro-Turkish one”390.
Clearly Greek foreign policy makers were particularly concerned about the 
implications of the crisis and what they perceived as an escalation of Turkey’s 
aggressiveness. Such a traumatic external shock could have hardly gone 
unnoticed. Their interpretations of the crisis, however, seem to vary. The 
significance of Simitis’ beliefs is reinforced by the fact that the views he was 
expressing were not invariably shared. A comparison with the conclusions 
Foreign Minister Pangalos drew is instructive. More often than not Pangalos is 
referred to as a “nationalist”, a “hard-liner” and even “rabidly anti-Turkish”, 
known for his “nationalist outbursts” and “inflammatory and derogatory 
comments”391. The most often cited of the latter was the reference to “thieves, 
murderers and rapists” mentioned above. While most believe that Pangalos was 
indiscriminately referring to all Turks, he was in fact referring to “a certain part 
of the Turkish military and diplomatic establishment”. The emphasis placed on 
such comments, which certainly did not contribute to the improvement of Greco-
389 Simitis, Policy.. op. cit. pp. 74-5
390 Ibid. p. 86, emphasis added; It remains unclear how exactly Turkey’s behaviour poses 
problems for the integration process or how Greece could manage to convince its EU partners to 
share its goals.
391 Economides, op. cit. p. 489 (footnote 11); Keridis, “Political Culture and Foreign Policy...”, 
op. cit. p. 39; Kazamias, op. cit. pp. 85-7; B. Kuniholm, op. cit. p. 29; Z. Onis, “Greek-Turkish 
Relations and the European Union: A Critical Perspective”, Mediterranean Politics, 6: 3, 2001, p. 
38
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Turkish relations, has overshadowed Pangalos’ views on the matter, which 
indicate a rather more substantial reluctance towards Turkey.
While Pangalos identified the crisis as an indication of increased aggressiveness, 
he did not seem to identify policy failure. He has repeatedly stressed that the 
crisis marked the first time that Turkey claimed a part of land that Greece 
considered its own. His initial reaction was to refer to it as an “outrageous 
demand”392. When Interior Minister Tsohatzopoulos revealed that Andreas 
Papandreou had confessed his concerns regarding Greco-Turkish relations to 
him, the Foreign Minister stated: “How could I not share (these concerns)? We 
now have a qualitative change in the promotion of Turkey’s standard claims. We 
are moving from questioning (sovereignty over) to claiming territory”393. 
According to Pangalos, the fact that Turkey had claimed “a part of land that 
belongs to (Greece)...disturbed us a great deal because thus far we have never 
faced such a situation...I felt that war could break out”394. Pangalos also made it 
abundantly clear that Turkey constituted a threat to Greek security. In fact, 
during his speech at a conference on Greco-American relations in May 1996, he 
remarked: “We are afraid of a (Turkish) invasion”395.
Pangalos repeatedly argued that Greco-Turkish problems were the result of 
Turkey’s systematically and purposefully hostile policy towards Greece, “the 
purpose of which is a general political negotiation for the transformation of the 
status quo in the Aegean”396. During a speech in Parliament in January 1999, 
where he discussed his understanding of the nature of Greco-Turkish problems 
extensively, Pangalos argued that those who claim that the latter are “the product 
of a long history” are either “misinformed” or “ill-intended” and that Greco- 
Turkish relations began to deteriorate in the early post-World War II period, 
“when Turkey joined NATO and started to search for a broader strategic role in
392 “Outrageous Demand about the Islet”, Eleftherotypia, 27 January 1996
393 Yannakidis, op. cit.
394 “This Is The Only Way We Will Resolve Our Issues With Turkey”, Eleftherotypia, 6 March 
1996
395 K. Adam, “We Fear A Turkish Invasion”, Eleftherotypia, 9 May 1996. According to Greek 
ambassador in Ankara Dimitris Nezeritis, “since the (Imia/Kardak) crisis, Greece considers 
Turkey a far greater danger and threat than it used to be”; see “Ankara Forbids U s...”, 
Eleftherotypia, 20 January 1998
396 Theodore Pangalos interview with Kyra Adam, Eleftherotypia, 30 April 1998
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the region... (and pursue) a policy of systematic hostility towards Greece” 397. He 
concluded by attributing the 1996 crisis to Turkey’s policy: “Since you 
mentioned (the) Imia (crisis) as something that resulted from the swearing in of 
the Simitis government, I will tell you that we have all the evidence and 
information that shows that the relevant opinion at theoretical and practical level 
had been prepared in Ankara seventeen years before the Imia incident. That is to 
say (they) had expressed the opinion that (sovereignty over) certain islets in the 
Aegean is questionable seventeen years earlier and (they) had also prepared a 
series of moves in case anything arose at diplomatic or practical level”398.
During a conversation with members of the press the Foreign Minister reportedly 
criticised the foreign policy of previous Greek governments and its poor 
results399. What he seemed to identify as problematic, however, was not the 
practice of preventing progress in EU-Turkey relations, but deviation from that 
practice, when Greece consented to the EU-Turkey Customs Union. When asked 
to comment on Turkish Prime Minister Yilmaz’ statements according to which 
referring the issue of the islets to the ICJ was not out of the question, Pangalos 
pointed out that even though Turkish officials had made similar statements prior 
to Greece’s decision to allow the Customs Union to take effect, “as soon as 
Greece conceded and accepted the Customs Union, overlooking as I have been 
repeatedly reminding during the past few days the situation with human rights in 
Turkey, the Cyprus problem and all of Turkey’s blackmails and threats at our 
expense, we had the Imia incident”400. It is clear that Simitis and Pangalos’ 
assessments of the effectiveness of the policy that Greece had been traditionally 
pursuing diverged. Pangalos believed that “unilateral good will gestures” -  such 
as Greece’s consent to the EU-Turkey Customs Union -  should be avoided 
because they would be interpreted as signs of weakness and result in further 
aggression401. This view constitutes PASOK’s traditional understanding of the
397 Theodore Pangalos, Speech in Parliament, 29 January 1999
398 Ibid.
399 P. Zagorianitis -  D. P. Dimas, “The Visit Began With Shots By Pangalos”, Eleftherotypia, 8 
May 1996
400 “Meeting of the Council Only After Turkey’s Explicit Commitment”, Eleftherotypia, 16 
March 1996
401 T. Pangalos, “EU Financial assistance to Turkey”, Ta Nea, 30 August 1999. According to 
former Ambassador Zaharakis, Pangalos believed that Greece did not need to make any 
concessions towards Turkey unless it lost a war against it; see C. Zaharakis, Top Secret -  Special 
Handling: Deposition o f Memory and Thoughts, 1979-2004 (in Greek), Athens, Livanis, 2008, p.
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problem that Turkey poses and formed the basis of PASOK’s critique of the 
conservative governments’ policy towards Turkey during the second half of the 
1970s402. This particular issue had also been a source of friction in Greco- 
American relations. When the US would suggest that Greece should make certain 
“gestures” towards Turkey -  including allowing the EU to grant Turkey 
candidate country status -  Pangalos would insist: “Name one time, when the 
Turks did not attack after a concession (made) by Greece”403. Pangalos was 
certain that Turkey was going to continue to pursue this policy in the future: “this 
(is what) has happened so far, this (is what) is going to happen in the future”404. 
Finally, Pangalos made explicit that “friendly relations” between Greece and 
Turkey were “impossible” and a personal friendship between him and a Turk was 
undesirable405.
Given these beliefs regarding the nature of Greco-Turkish problems, it is fairly 
unsurprising that Pangalos has criticised the agreement reached in Helsinki. 
During an interview a few weeks after the Helsinki summit Pangalos expressed 
his concern with regard to future developments and when the interviewer 
indicated that there was a possibility that Greece would have to make 
concessions Pangalos interrupted and stated: “Why do you speak in future tense? 
We have made substantial concessions towards the Turks. The Turks have gained 
two monumental benefits of the highest significance, the first two goals of their 
foreign policy from this policy, which the Greek Foreign Ministry has been 
following since February. The first was funding from the European Union.. .And 
we are also talking about candidate country status, Turkey’s colossal 
achievement of strategic significance...Turkey achieved, beyond any European
623
402 For PASOK’s traditional positions on Greco-Turkish relations see Coufoudakis, “Greco- 
Turkish Relations and the Greek Socialists...”, op. cit. pp. 380-1 and Coufoudakis, “Greek- 
Turkish Relations, 1973-1983...”, op. cit. p. 211. Despite the fact that the changes that PASOK 
introduced in the 1980s have been occasionally dismissed as insignificant, they have had a lasting 
impact on the dominant understanding of the nature of Greco-Turkish relations. As an advisor to 
former Prime Minister Simitis pointed out to the author (14 July 2008), the conservatives’ 
critique of the government’s policy towards Turkey during Simitis’ Premiership was remarkably 
similar to PASOK’s critique of the conservative governments’ policy during the second half of 
the 1970s.
403 Theodore Pangalos interview with T. Lalas, To Vima, 3 October 1999
404 Theodore Pangalos interview with N. Meletis -  P. Tsoutsias, To Ethnos, 19 November 2000
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logic, its dream of a Europe a la cartel She will be in Europe without being in 
Europe! This is what Turkey achieved and I am asking: what did we achieve in 
the whole process?.. .Nothing. Absolutely nothing!”406
While Foreign Minister Pangalos’ belief that Greece should refrain from making 
any concession rendered his support for communitisation reluctant, Deputy 
Foreign Minister Papandreou shared Simitis’ commitment to it. During his first 
interview after his appointment, Papandreou argued that Greece “should not be 
speaking of ‘national issues’ when referring to issues of (its) external relations” 
and that it would be “in the interest of Americans and Europeans (if) Turkey 
respected Greek borders, (if) the Cyprus problem were resolved and (if Turkey) 
joined Europe”. Indeed, classifying Greco-Turkish relations as a “national issue” 
for Greece was by definition incompatible with the notion of communitisation 
and the transformation of Greco-Turkish problems into EU-Turkey problems. In 
a critique of the policy previously pursued, he identified Greece’s inability to 
understand the point of view of third actors and the consequent inability to 
“engage” them in a line of reasoning they can accept407. Finally, during a speech 
delivered a few weeks after the Helsinki summit, Papandreou acknowledged 
Simitis’ role in the pursuit of communitisation. “The Prime Minister”, he stated, 
“Mr. Simitis, our President, (by) rapidly touring European capitals 
‘communitised’ the handling of our disputes and our relations (with Turkey)”408.
While Pangalos emphasised the systematic and purposeful character of Turkish 
policy towards Greece, Papandreou emphasised the possibility of improvement 
of relations between Greece and Turkey. “What unites us”, he argued during an 
interview with Turkish daily “Milliyet” in September 1999, “is in fact a lot more 
than what divides us...if you think of our problems as a sphere, we have 
managed to penetrate several layers that surround this sphere and we may have 
realised that the issues at the centre are in fact not so big...undoubtedly, no one 
should express claims on others’ territories, but for countries that cooperate on a 
global scale, issues that their borders and the seas between them create cannot be
406 Theodore Pangalos interview with Y. Papadopoulos, Apoyeumatini, 24 January 2000
407 George A. Papandreou interview, Eleftherotypia, 6 October 1996
408 George A. Papandreou, Speech, 6 February 2000
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that significant”409. Papandreou’s statement should be understood within the 
context of the favourable climate that the earthquakes had resulted in, which he 
consistently tried to sustain in an attempt to reinforce the process of bilateral 
negations in low politics issues, in which he was indeed the “main 
protagonist”410. What constitutes a more substantial matter is the difference of 
opinion with regard to what constituted an appropriate Greek response. Pangalos 
had made explicit that “gestures” or “concessions” were to be avoided because 
they would result in further aggression. Papandreou, however, persisted despite 
incidents that appeared to confirm Pangalos’ views. A few days before the first 
round of talks on low politics issues between Greek and Turkish officials, 
Turkish military aircraft harassed the civilian aircraft that was transporting 
Minister for Transport Tasos Mandelis from Cyprus to Greece. Papandreou 
issued a statement, where he denounced the incident and argued that Turkey was 
giving out mixed signals. He made explicit, however, that the incident would not 
affect Greece’s efforts to pursue the improvement of Greco-Turkish relations411.
Simitis’ understanding of the problem was quite distinct. While Simitis never 
argued that a Greek gesture would result in further aggressiveness, he did think 
gestures inadequate because Turkey would simply not respond. This is precisely 
what he indicated to US President Clinton, when the latter tried to convince 
Simitis to accept the draft of the Presidency Conclusions that Britain had 
prepared for the Cardiff European Council summit in June 1998, which 
implicitly identified Turkey as a candidate country. Simply granting Turkey 
candidate country status would be inadequate, especially shortly before an 
election in Turkey. Greco-Turkish relations had to be transformed into EU- 
Turkey relations. This was the central element of Simitis’ strategy and it was not 
affected by the earthquakes and their impact. While Papandreou had argued that 
the earthquake in Turkey had created a “historic opportunity”412 for the 
improvement of Greco-Turkish relations, when asked whether the earthquake
409 “George’s New Line on the Aegean”, Eleftherotypia, 24 September 1999
410 Ker-Lindsay, Crisis and Conciliation. .., op. cit. p. 9
411 G. Tsakiris, “Turbulence for the Minister and the Dialogue”, Eleftherotypia, 22 July 1999; 
“Athens Condemns Latest Turkish Provocations as Minister’s Plane Harassed”, Greek Embassy 
in Washington Press Office News Archive, 22 July 1999, available at 
http://www.greekembassy.org/embassv/content/en/Article.aspx?
office=3&folder=:281 &article=3929. accessed on 27 January 2008
412 George A. Papandreou, Interview with Christina Poulidou, Avyi, 29 August 1999
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constituted such an opportunity, Simitis responded: “I would say that the 
earthquake cannot be seen as an opportunity at all. That would cheapen our 
policy”413. Similarly, during a speech in October 1999 he stated: “The recent 
earthquakes in Turkey and Greece caused moving acts of help and solidarity. All 
this opens roads of friendship between peoples. However, there should be no 
confusion between humanitarian aid at a time of disaster and the exercise of 
foreign policy”414.
The lack of US influence
While Greek foreign policy makers were particularly concerned about Turkey’s 
policy, their calculations were not significantly affected by US policy. The 
evidence shows that the role the US played during this period was not causally 
significant, despite the fact that the US was particularly proactive and pressure 
on Greece rose considerably. Despite the fact that the literature has largely 
overlooked the role of the US, Greek foreign policy makers have acknowledged 
the US as a relevant actor, yet they did not consider eliciting support from the EU 
as a balancing act against US support for Turkey. Simitis has indeed discussed 
Greco-Turkish relations in the post-Cold War era in relation to the US. He seems 
to acknowledge the significance of great power politics for smaller states, as 
theorised by structural realism. Yet he also emphasises agency in the form of 
states’ initiatives. He has drawn attention to Turkey’s attempts to find “new 
roles” in the post-Cold War world, especially in the Middle East and in the 
former Soviet Republics, in an attempt to increase its geo-strategic significance. 
Greece’s balancing act had to be similar. Greece should not try to elicit EU 
support in response, but to claim a “new role” for itself in the Balkans415.
Simitis’ narrative of the Imia/Kardak crisis is interesting in this respect. In his 
memoirs, the Prime Minister explained that at some point during the crisis he 
suspected that Turkey’s goals might have been endorsed by the US. Eventually,
413 Constantine Simitis, Press Conference, Thessaloniki International Fair, 5 September 1999, 
available at http://www.pasok.gr/oldwebsite/gr/nea/050999.html. accessed on 6 February 2008
414 C. Simitis, Speech, Lesbos, 21 October 1999, available at
http://www.pasok.gr/oldwebsite/gr/nea/211099sim.html. accessed on 6 February 2008
415 Simitis, “Relations...”, op. cit. pp. 159-160
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however, he concluded that the US did not support Turkey’s demands and that 
“Turkey was probably acting on its own initiative”416. The decisions he made in 
the aftermath of the crisis are even more instructive. “I decided”, he wrote, “that 
we should be constantly present in the EU and in the US”. Furthermore, on the 
flight to the US, he told reporters that he was going to ask of the US the same 
thing he had asked of EU member-states: “To help Turkey understand that 
aggression leads nowhere”417. Finally, the Prime Minister has argued that during 
his meeting with US President Clinton, the latter adopted the Greek 
government’s approach without reservation418.
Foreign Minister Pangalos has also made explicit that the US was not supporting 
Turkey. In fact, that had always been the problem: “It has been known for a long 
time that the US is keeping equal distances. And this is something we have 
repeatedly denied to accept. Because we believe that it is not a dispute between 
two similar parties. It is a dispute between a side that is based on international 
law and treaties and a side that uses violence and threat as a means of presence in 
international relations. This is why we believe that the US should discourage the 
attacker and the aggressor, which in this case are the Turks”419. While the Foreign 
Minister was critical of US policy, government spokesman Reppas thought it 
justified. US policy, he stated, “cannot be identical to Greek positions for many 
reasons”420.
While occasionally US mediation followed the Greek government’s preferences 
fairly closely, Greek and US policy towards Turkey, especially with regard to 
EU-Turkey relations, often diverged. As was mentioned above, the Madrid 
Declaration -  which was the final product of US Secretary of State Albright’s 
initiative -  satisfied two of the conditions (denouncement of the threat of war and 
acceptance of the relevant international legal framework) that the Greek 
government had set as part of the first step of its step-by-step approach and, 
when American mediation resumed in September 1997, the US was also
416 Simitis, Policy..., op. cit. pp. 65, 67
417 Y. Pantelakis, “Simitis: We Are Going To Determine The Country’s Role”, Eleftherotypia, 8 
April 1996
418 Simitis, Policy..., op. cit. pp. 82-3
419 K. Adam, “Problems with Holbrook’s Visit”, Eleftherotypia, 3 February 1996
420 “Greek Understanding of US’ Equal Distances”, Eleftherotypia, 18 April 1996
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supportive of the third condition (submission of the Imia/Kardak dispute to the 
ICJ), as the Secretary of State’s spokesman publicly stated and Foreign Minister 
Pangalos confirmed421. During a press conference after a G7 summit in May 
1998, however, US President Clinton argued that it was not possible “to solve 
one problem in isolation from the other” and that Greece and Turkey would have 
to make “difficult decisions”422. The package deal that Clinton was implicitly 
referring to was precisely the type of settlement that the Greek government was 
trying to avoid, when it formulated its step-by-step approach. As Foreign 
Minister Pangalos put it: “Neither the notion of a package (consisting) of the 
Cyprus problem and Greco-Turkish relations, nor the notion of Greco-Turkish 
relations as a package of disputes (can be accepted). (Keep) the package far away 
from us. We do not accept (a) package and we do not collect it, no matter whom 
it is coming from”423.
With regard to EU-Turkey relations, the US had indeed made explicit its support 
for Turkey’s inclusion in the process of enlargement. As Director for European 
Affairs at the National Security Council Philip Gordon put it, US pressure was “a 
persistent thorn in Europeans’ side until removed in Helsinki”424. Similarly, when 
asked whether the impression that the Luxembourg decision was going to be 
revised was the result of US pressure, Deputy Foreign Minister Papandreou 
replied: “Yes, absolutely. This is absolutely certain because Europeans believe 
that Luxembourg is over, that is to say that there is a clear framework and that
421 “US reiterates view that Imia should be put to international arbitration”, Greek Embassy in 
Washington Press Office News Archive, 25 September 1997, available at 
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Washington Press Office News Archive, 25 September 1997, available at 
http://www.greekembassy.org/embassv/content/en/Article.aspx?
office=3&folder=261 &article=2098. accessed on 20 November 2007. This view was reiterated in 
December 1997; see “US reiterates stance favoring The Hague for solution to territorial 
differences”, Greek Embassy in Washington Press Office News Archive, 5 December 1997, 
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beyond that it is a matter for Turkey itself to take the necessary steps and come 
close to Europe”425.
The details of US President Clinton’s phone call that Prime Minister Simitis 
disclosed during the press conference after the Cardiff European Council summit 
made the divergence between Greek and US policy on EU-Turkey relations 
particularly visible. The US wanted Greece to allow the EU to acknowledge 
Turkey as a candidate country, while Greece remained unwilling to do so. The 
fact that the Greek government insisted on its veto shows that US activity did not 
translate into influence. Despite the direct involvement of US President Clinton, 
which was seen as highly inappropriate in Greece prompting US Ambassador 
Nicholas Bums to clarify that Clinton’s phone call had been misinterpreted426, the 
position of the Greek government remained unchanged. The incident confirms 
the unresponsive style of Prime Minister Simitis. As he put it during the press 
conference, “when the President of the US calls the Prime Minister, caution is 
necessary, but we think that we are right”427.
Finally, the divergence between Greek and US positions should not be 
overstated. Clinton did not simply ask Simitis to make a concession. He indicated 
that if the Greek government allowed progress in EU-Turkey relations, the US 
would subsequently put pressure on Turkey in return. Shortly before the 
Luxembourg European Council summit, British Prime Minister Blair had 
similarly suggested that Greece should accept Turkey’s participation in the 
European Conference and that Turkey would subsequently comply with the 
conditions that Greece had set. Simitis explained to Clinton, as he had explained 
to Blair, that he did not think it likely that Turkey would respond to such gestures 
or pressure, especially not when the Turkish government was facing an election.
Even after the Cardiff summit, the Greek government did not consider it 
necessary to pursue a balancing act against US support for Turkey. When it was 
pointed out to Deputy Foreign Minister Papandreou that US President Clinton 
had advocated in favour of Turkey’s candidacy, he argued that Greece had to
425 George A. Papandreou interview with Phevos Karzis, Flash 9,61, 21 May 1998
426 Stagos A., “Nicholas Bums: You Misinterpreted the Phone Call”, To Vima, 21 June 1998
427 Adam, “Clinton Stuck...”, op. cit.
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continue to try and elicit the support of the US. “This is not the first time”, he 
argued, “that the Americans did this. Mr. Clinton had spoken with Mr. Kohl 
during a recent meeting he had with him and the new UN ambassador Mr. 
Holbrooke had repeatedly stressed the Europeans’ mistake in Luxembourg (these 
were his exact words). (Both) the Foreign Ministry (and) I...had repeatedly 
criticised those statements, saying that they do not help Turkey understand that 
Europe is seriously setting these conditions so that she can move herself closer to 
the EU. I think that these are wrong tactics, which do not help Turkey.. .but also 
undermine a systematic policy that the EU is trying to develop”428. “US 
positions”, he concluded, “are known and we (often) disagree with these 
positions. This does not mean, however, that we do not have contacts with 
everyone and that we do not ask (them) to promote our positions and I would say 
the opposite, Greece is obliged -  this is the Foreign Ministry’s responsibility -  to 
discuss with everyone and promote her positions with everyone, whatever their 
position is”429. In fact, it was reported in the press that shortly before the Helsinki 
summit Foreign Minister Papandreou asked US Secretary of State Albright to try 
and convince Greece’s EU counterparts to accept Greece’s positions. Finally, 
even though US policy makers were primarily concerned with Turkey’s inclusion 
in the process of enlargement and not the Copenhagen criteria or the additional 
conditions that Greece wished to introduce, the US put considerable pressure on 
Turkey to accept the agreement reached in Helsinki that had incorporated Greek 
conditions430.
As was mentioned above, Pangalos has argued that Papandreou’s initiatives were 
taken for the purpose of satisfying American requests and constituted deviations 
from PASOK’s foreign policy positions. Pangalos’ assessment of the 
government’s policy is not entirely accurate. While bilateral negotiations on low- 
politics issues have never featured prominently in Greek policy towards Turkey, 
they were not unprecedented. PASOK governments under Andreas Papandreou 
had pursued such negotiations in the early 1980s, despite the fact that they
428 George A. Papandreou interview with Phoebos Karzis, Flash 9,61, 19 June 1998
429 Ibid.
430 Interviews with high-ranking Greek government official, 2 April 2008, advisor to Foreign 
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remained unwilling to negotiate with Turkey over territorial issues431. 
Furthermore, bilateral negotiations on low-politics issues in 1999 were neither 
the outcome of American mediation, nor that of a Greek initiative. They were 
based on a proposal by Turkish Foreign Minister Cem for cooperation in the 
fight against terrorism, which Greek Foreign Minister Papandreou had proposed 
should be extended to other low-politics issues as well. Finally, the content of the 
negotiations was different from the issues that the US had raised, as they 
included neither bilateral territorial disputes, nor EU-Turkey relations432.
It follows from the above that Greek foreign policy makers were primarily 
concerned with the implications of Turkey’s policy towards Greece, not US 
support for Turkey. In contrast to what the balancing thesis predicts, however, 
there is little evidence that the policy problem was defined as a guns-or-butter 
dilemma. While the implications of increasing defence expenditure constituted a 
cause for concern within the government, this was mostly a concern of the 
Finance Ministry rather than the Foreign Ministry433. In fact, few foreign policy 
makers identified the economic implications of Greek policy towards Turkey as a 
significant aspect of the problem434, while most did not identify them as a reason 
why foreign policy change should be pursued435. Finally, policy makers who 
worked closely with Simitis point out that his commitment to the pursuit of 
communitisation was such that he would have pursued it even if Greece could 
easily afford to allocate considerable amounts of resources to building up its 
military capabilities436.
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Finally, in contrast to what the socialisation thesis predicts, Greek foreign policy 
makers did not begin to identify Turkish violations of substantive EU foreign 
policy norms as a problem for the first time during the period under 
investigation. Greece had criticised the Turkish regime long before the Helsinki 
strategy was formulated437. Turkey’s weak democratic regime and human rights 
violations, however, were seen as further reasons why Turkey should not be 
allowed to develop its relations with the EC/EU further. It is instructive to note 
that during the June 1995 Cannes European Council, French President Jacques 
Chirac proposed that the Turkish Prime Minister should be invited to attend the 
Madrid summit in December 1995 and Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez 
supported the proposal. Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, however, 
categorically rejected it citing not only Turkish policy towards Greece and 
Cyprus, but also human rights violations438. Consequently, the understanding of 
this particular aspect of the problem that Turkey posed remained constant and 
therefore it cannot explain change in Greek policy439.
Conclusions
The evidence showed that Simitis had defined the policy problem in an 
idiosyncratic manner that deviated from the norm prior to his election as Prime 
Minister. According to Simitis, Turkey’s aggressive behaviour towards Greece 
had indeed caused problems in Greco-Turkish relations, yet the fact that those 
problems remained unresolved was partly the result of the lack of an effective 
Greek strategy. Not only had Simitis identified policy failure prior to his election 
as Prime Minister, but he had also selected the strategy that he believed Greece 
ought to pursue. Simitis’ internal, pre-conceived notion of communitisation 
comprised the transformation of Greco-Turkish relations into EU-Turkey 
relations in the sense of the establishment of EU rules for Turkey’s behaviour 
towards Greece. Simitis remained unequivocally committed to the pursuit of 
communitisation during the period under investigation and in fact he intended to
437 Valinakis, op. cit. p. 256
438 For Papandreou’s statements see Athens News Agency Bulletin, No 624,28 June 1995
439 As will be shown in the following chapters, Greek foreign policy makers did not become 
convinced that this course of action constituted an inappropriate response to this problem.
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reduce what he perceived as an excessive responsiveness of Greek policy to 
external developments.
In contrast to what the Europeanisation thesis predicts, the Imia/Kardak crisis did 
not prompt a search for a new policy towards Turkey. In fact, Simitis had 
selected communitisation as his preferred policy prior to the establishment of 
enlargement conditionality at the EU level. Consequently, the latter could not 
have affected his considerations and his decision to pursue communitisation 
cannot be attributed to an assessment of EU level developments. In contrast to 
what the socialisation thesis predicts, Greek foreign policy makers did not begin 
to identify Turkish violations of substantive EU foreign policy norms as a 
problem for the first time during the period under investigation. In contrast to 
what the balancing thesis predicts, the policy previously pursued was not 
considered an effective policy, which could not accommodate economic policy 
goals. Despite the unparalleled US position in the international system during the 
period under investigation, American diplomatic activity did not translate into 
influence.
While Papandreou firmly supported the communitisation of Greco-Turkish 
relations, Pangalos appeared more reluctant. While he did not object to 
communitisation in principle, he was unwilling to make concessions in order to 
achieve it. Nonetheless, Pangalos’ views as a constraining factor have been 
overstated. As will be shown in the next chapter, Greece did make concessions 
while Pangalos was Foreign Minister and it was approximately four months after 
Pangalos’ resignation that the Helsinki strategy -  the final phase of 
communitisation -  was formulated.
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Chapter 6: Framing Alternatives 
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to establish the alternative courses of action Greek 
foreign policy makers considered. According to the balancing thesis, Greek 
foreign policy makers distinguished between a policy based on increased defence 
expenditure that would allow Greece to build up its military capabilities (internal 
balancing) and a policy based on EU support for its positions on Greco-Turkish 
relations (external balancing). Both explanations that conceptualise change in 
Greek policy towards Turkey as the outcome of Europeanisation predict that 
Greek foreign policy makers distinguished between the policy previously 
pursued, which was based on preventing progress in EU-Turkey relations until 
Turkey had complied with Greek demands, and EU enlargement conditionality, 
which was based on granting applicant states candidate country status prior to 
compliance with EU conditions and promising payment of the reward of 
accession once the conditions had been met. In contrast, the leadership style 
thesis predicts that Greek foreign policy makers distinguished between the policy 
previously pursued and Prime Minister Simitis’ preferred course of action, that is 
to say allowing progress in EU-Turkey relations only within a framework of EU 
rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece and regardless of whether Turkey 
would be offered EU rewards.
The evidence is consistent with that presented in the previous chapter. The Prime 
Minister’s notion of “communitisation” framed the alternatives Greek foreign 
policy makers considered. Based on this notion, Greece pursued and secured four 
EU decisions that allowed EU-Turkey relations to develop further and 
established EU rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece despite the fact that 
Turkey had not complied with Greek demands: the 15 July 1996 EU statement, 
the member-states’ common position for the 29 April 1997 EU-Turkey 
Association Council, the December 1997 Luxembourg European Council 
decision and the December 1999 Helsinki European Council decision.
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In contrast to what both explanations that conceptualise change in Greek policy 
towards Turkey as the outcome of Europeanisation predict, the first two of these 
decisions did not offer Turkey a reward payable upon compliance with Greek 
demands and while the third did offer a reward (participation in the European 
Conference), the latter was different from and much less significant than the 
reward of accession. Similarly, Greek foreign policy makers did not identify EU 
enlargement conditionality as a relevant EU practice that was different from 
Greek policy and that might be more appropriate or more effective. In contrast to 
what the balancing thesis predicts, the first three of the above decisions were 
pursued and secured at a time when reducing defence expenditure was 
considered unthinkable. Similarly, Greek foreign policy makers -  including those 
few who identified the economic costs of Greek policy towards Turkey as a 
significant aspect of the problem that Turkey posed -  did not consider the 
Helsinki strategy an alternative to defence expenditure and therefore the Helsinki 
strategy could not address the guns-or-butter dilemma. More significantly, the 
Helsinki strategy was formulated in June 1999, when it was believed that the 
success of macroeconomic stabilisation had rendered Greece’s accession to EMU 
fairly certain. As Simitis believed that successful economic policies increase 
bargaining power in the EU, it was decided that Greece was in a powerful 
bargaining position that would allow it to pursue the culmination of the policy 
that it had been pursuing since 1996.
As the leadership style thesis predicts, as soon as Greece successfully pursued 
the communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations at the level of the European 
Council in December 1997, it became most unwilling to consider any revision of 
the framework for EU-Turkey relations constructed in Luxembourg. The 
Helsinki strategy was only formulated in June 1999 when it became clear that the 
communitisation that Greece had achieved in Luxembourg could not produce the 
desired results. Despite that fact and as the leadership style thesis predicts, 
Simitis was willing to pursue the communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations 
further, in the sense of pursuing the establishment of additional EU rules for 
Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece.
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The early stages of communitisation
As was shown in the previous chapter, Simitis believed that the reason why 
Greco-Turkish relations had failed to improve was the lack of an effective Greek 
policy and in particular a strategy that would pursue the transformation of Greco- 
Turkish relations into EU-Turkish relations. Such a strategy would by definition 
require Greece to allow Turkey to maintain some sort of relations with the EU. 
Inevitably, Simitis’ understanding of the policy problem raised the question of 
whether it would be best for Greece if Turkey were included in the integration 
process440. In contrast to the logic the policy previously pursued was based on, 
Simitis believed that it would be best for Greece if  Turkey were allowed to 
developed its relations with the EU. Indeed, while discussing Greece’s 
alternatives with reference to Turkey’s relations with the Community in 1993, 
Simitis indicated that isolating Turkey might not be the most effective option. 
“Greece”, he argued, “must decide whether it accepts Turkey’s closer 
cooperation and communication with European organisations or not. [This] 
connection will mean compliance with the principles and rules of these 
organisations as compensation. It should decide whether such a strategy is more 
effective for the prospect of peace and security than that of isolation or 
attempting to isolate Turkey from European developments”441.
A further implication of Simitis’ preference for the transformation of Greco- 
Turkish relations into EU-Turkey relations was the increased relevance and 
significance that the preferences of Greece’s EU partners assumed. During the 
period when Greek governments did not wish to allow progress in EU-Turkey 
relations, the preferences of Greece’s EU partners on the precise nature of the 
latter were largely irrelevant, as the decision-making rule of unanimity and the 
right to veto progress in EU-Turkey relations allowed Greek governments to 
disregard them. Communitisation, however, required the precise nature of EU- 
Turkey relations -  into which Greco-Turkish relations were going to be 
incorporated -  to be compatible with the preferences of Greece’s EU partners442.
440 Interview with advisor to Prime Minister Simitis, 21 March 2008
441 Simitis, “Relations...”, op. cit. p. 161
442 This implication of Simitis’ notion of communitisation is particularly relevant today, as the 
preferences of Greece’s EU partners on EU-Turkey relations appear to have changed. This issue
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In the aftermath of the Imia/Kardak crisis, the alternatives available to the Greek 
government appeared limited. According to the Greek government’s 
interpretation of the crisis, Turkey intended to cause limited armed conflict in the 
Aegean, which in turn would trigger an international intervention that would 
result in Greece being forced to accept negotiations on the issues that Turkey had 
raised regarding the Aegean. Greece remained unwilling to accept such 
negotiations and preferred a judicial settlement instead. As the EU-Turkey 
Customs Union Agreement had already entered into force, the Greek government 
decided to exercise its right to veto the only remaining aspect of EU-Turkey 
relations, the release of EU financial assistance to Turkey and the meeting of the 
EU-Turkey Association Council443. The exercise of the right to veto progress in 
EU-Turkey relations would provide the Greek government with the time 
necessary for the pursuit of the transformation of Greco-Turkish relations into 
EU-Turkey relations. From that point onwards, Greek policy can be seen as a 
consistent attempt to break from the practice of vetoing progress in EU-Turkey 
relations and pursue communitisation. Indeed, the implementation of Simitis’ 
preferred policy began immediately, as the Greek government attempted to have 
a statement that identified the issue of the islets as one that concerned the EU 
adopted by the Council. As was mentioned above, the British government 
eventually vetoed the adoption of the statement. At the same time, the prevalent 
interpretation of the crisis coupled with Simitis’ belief that Greek policy towards 
Turkey had previously been excessively reactive led to a calculated moderation 
in Greece’s response, which in turn prompted criticism.
Simitis assumed an active role in the implementation of communitisation. He 
started touring EU member-states’ capitals (February-April 1996) in an attempt 
to convince his counterparts that the problem Greece was facing should concern 
the EU. The arguments he made during his visits to EU capitals were quite 
instructive. In contrast to what both explanations that conceptualise change in
is discussed more extensively in chapter 8.
443 As a Brussels-based Greek diplomat pointed out to the author (18 April 2008), had the 
decision of the European Parliament on the EU-Turkey Customs Union not been delayed until 
December 1995, the regulation on EU financial assistance to Turkey would have already been 
passed and not even this option would have been available.
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Greek policy towards Turkey as the outcome of Europeanisation predict, Simitis 
did not seem to acknowledge an established EU practice that might be more 
effective or more appropriate than Greek policy. On the contrary, he was 
stressing the need for EU rules to be established. After a meeting with Belgian 
Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene in February 1996, he stated: “There should be 
a common policy of Europe towards the policy of third countries”444. He 
mentioned in his memoirs that he stressed the exact same point to Prime Minister 
John Major during his visit to London: it was imperative that the EU formulated 
certain common rules on relations with third countries445. Stressing the need for 
such rules indicates that the Prime Minister identified no relevant established EU 
practice. He did not acknowledge enlargement conditionality as a relevant EU 
practice even when he was specifically discussing Turkey’s prospects of 
accession. During the European Council summit in Florence, he remarked: “The 
European Union is obliged to formulate a common policy in order to deal with 
the dangers one of its member-states is facing, the borders of which are being 
threatened by another country, which aspires to follow a European route and 
upgrade its relations with the European Union by a Customs Union today and by 
becoming a member tomorrow”446. The situation is described quite accurately, 
yet, in contrast to what both explanations that conceptualise change in Greek 
policy towards Turkey as the outcome of Europeanisation predict, enlargement 
conditionality is not identified as a relevant EU practice.
Whilst pursuing the communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations, the Greek 
government suggested the so-called “step-by-step approach” to Turkey. 
According to the first step, Turkey should abandon its claim on the Imia islets or 
submit the issue to the ICJ. If Turkey took this first step, Greece would allow the 
release of EU financial assistance to Turkey. The proposal proved quite 
controversial. Greece was offering Turkey an option (submission of the issue to 
the ICJ), which was considered a deviation from traditional Greek policy towards 
Turkey447. Greek foreign policy makers argued that offering Turkey this option
444 G. Karelias -  P. Pantelis, “Santer: Turkey Is Untrustworthy’, Eleftherotypia, 22 February 1996
445 Simitis,Policy..., op. cit. pp. 83-4
446 “They Listened.. .but Major Did Not”, Eleftherotypia, 22 June 1996
447 According to Petros Molyviatis, “it is as if you were telling someone who is claiming your 
house that I will pay you if you go to court in order to take my house”; Petros Molyviatis, Speech 
in Parliament, 29 January 1999
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was the only way to address the matter, unless Greece became willing to accept 
bilateral negotiations. It was believed that the latter should be avoided because 
Turkey had previously raised an increasing number of issues during bilateral 
negotiations in the second half of the 1970s in what was perceived in Greece as 
an attempt to maximise its gains from a redistribution of control over the 
Aegean448.
It soon became clear that the step-by-step approach was of secondary 
significance compared with communitisation. In July 1996, the Greek veto of EU 
financial assistance to Turkey within the context of Euro-Mediterranean 
cooperation was lifted in exchange for the 15 July 1996 EU statement. The Greek 
veto was lifted despite the fact that Turkey had not taken the first step prescribed 
by the step-by-step approach. On the contrary, it had even raised the issue of 
sovereignty over Gavdos -  a small Greek island to the south of Crete -  within the 
context of NATO. As the leadership style thesis predicts, Greece was willing to 
lift its veto because EU rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece were 
established at the EU level as Simitis’ notion of communitisation prescribed. 
Indeed, the EU expressed the Greek view that territorial disputes should be 
submitted to the ICJ and the Council requested the Presidency to invite Turkey to 
indicate whether it committed itself to a judicial settlement of the dispute. In 
contrast to what the Europeanisation thesis predicts, this particular decision that 
Greece secured offered Turkey no reward and therefore no incentive to comply 
with Greek demands. On the contrary a reward was being paid to Turkey and 
therefore this particular decision is not consistent with the Europeanisation 
thesis.
Simitis appeared to be assuming a more uncompromising stance during the 
September 1996 election campaign. “We should be cautious”, he said, “and try to 
develop diplomatic initiatives that put Turkey in the comer and we have
448 Christos Rozakis, Speech in Parliament, 6 December 1996. It should be noted that despite the 
fact that this first step regarding the Imia islets was considered a precondition for any policy of 
improvement of Greco-Turkish relations, Greece subsequently proposed bilateral negotiations on 
low-politics issues in June 1999 despite the fact that Turkey had not taken this step. According to 
Foreign Minister Papandreou, this change of tactics became possible when Turkey ceased to 
insist on negotiations over all issues; see George A. Papandreou interview with Costas Iordanidis, 
Kathimerini, 5 July 1999
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managed that”449. As was mentioned above, he also made an unusually strongly 
phrased statement regarding the Greek military response in case of a Turkish 
attack. These statements should be understood within the context of two factors: 
the domestic critique of the government’s policy as one that lacked determination 
and the perceived escalation of Turkish territorial claims. Simitis’ statements 
served as a deterrent by stressing the costs that Turkey would suffer if it decided 
to attack Greece and also as an attempt to dilute the impression that the 
government lacked resolve.
In the aftermath of the election and while Foreign Minister Pangalos was stating 
that the government was not considering any differentiation in its policy and that 
it was waiting for a response from Turkey, Simitis was preparing the next step of 
communitisation450. The Greek government consented to a meeting of the EU- 
Turkey Association Council, despite the fact that Turkey had not offered the 
commitment that the 15 July 1996 EU statement required. Having secured an EU 
statement that identified submission to the ICJ as the appropriate method to 
resolve territorial disputes -  which was reiterated in the member-states’ common 
position for the meeting of the Association Council -  the Greek government was 
willing to involve the EU further, as Simitis’ notion of communitisation 
prescribed. It was decided that the Presidency would facilitate the efforts of 
individuals appointed by the two governments to write a report with procedural 
recommendations regarding the resolution of Greco-Turkish problems. In 
contrast to what both explanations that conceptualise change in Greek policy 
towards Turkey as the outcome of Europeanisation predict and as was the case 
with the 15 July 1996 EU statement, this decision offered Turkey no reward -  
and therefore no incentive to comply with Greek demands -  either. During a 
debate in Parliament a few days after the meeting of the Association Council, 
Deputy Foreign Minister Papandreou defended the idea that Greece could engage 
in dialogue with Turkey without negotiating its sovereign rights. This purpose 
was served by meetings between Greek and Turkish officials -  especially within 
the context of the EU -  and the initiative of the Dutch Presidency within the
449 P. Sokos, “Simitis Raises The Danger of the Right”, Eleftherotypia, 10 September 1996
450 “They Agreed on Everything, They Did Not Cover Rozakis”, Eleftherotypia, 9 November 
1996
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context of which only procedural issues and not the substance of Greco-Turkish 
problems would be discussed451.
In an article published in June 1997, Deputy Foreign Minister Papandreou 
discussed Greece’s alternatives extensively: “We have the responsibility and the 
obligation to answer the question of whether we accept being from now on 
passive by-standers in developments in the relationship between Europe and 
Turkey and simply resort from time to time to an outburst of vetoes (which are 
usually overcome in a multitude of ways) or we want to be present everywhere 
and co-shape this relationship”452. Papandreou’s language echoes Simitis’ idea 
about the necessity of Greece’s “presence” on the international scene and, 
especially, in the EU, which was necessary in order to achieve the transformation 
of Greco-Turkish problems into a problem between the EU and Turkey. Indeed, 
Papandreou made this explicit, when he argued in favour of the meetings 
between Greek foreign policy makers and their Turkish counterparts and the 
reiteration of Greek positions at the EU level. “I think”, he concluded, “that what 
we should stress is that at the moment we have managed to give through the 
European Union a different dimension to Greco-Turkish problems because 
Greek problems are in the end Euro-Turkish problems and I  think that this is a 
big success”453. This policy was distinguished from “the miserable contentment 
of self-inflicted isolationism that castrates our ability to historically shape 
developments in the EU”454.
Simitis’ discussion of Greece’s alternatives is quite instructive. During a speech 
in Parliament in November 1997, he reiterated his opposition to the view that 
Greece was a status quo power that should pursue a defensive policy: “In foreign 
policy, dear colleagues, there are usually two options. The first option is that of 
motionlessness, the detachment from developments...the attitude of proud 
isolation, which is also presented as a safe option because superficially it does 
not impose any cost on those who forgo any action”455. Simitis’ critical tone
451 George A. Papandreou, Speech in Parliament, 15 May 1997
452 G. A. Papandreou, “Greece, Europe and Turkey”, To Vima, 1 June 1997
453 George A. Papandreou, Speech in Parliament, 15 May 1997, emphasis added
454 Papandreou, “Greece, Europe...”, op. cit.
455 Costas Simitis, Speech in Parliament, 6 November 1997
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becomes clear, when he shifts to past tense. “At best, capabilities have been 
conceded, which are not being taken advantage of, opportunities have been 
missed, as others take the initiative. This proud isolation, this motionlessness is 
always paid with the retreat of national interests under circumstances of 
significant developments and results in defeats”. “We have chosen”, he 
continued, “the only road that produces results in foreign policy, the aggressive 
initiative, motion and not motionlessness...If you move and have presence, you 
matter, they take you into consideration, you are not being bypassed, you are not 
being ignored”456. Simitis concluded that his government’s pro-active policy had 
resulted in the 15 July 1996 EU statement and the member-states’ common 
position for the 29 April 1997 EU-Turkey Association Council, which had 
strengthened Greece’s position and that Turkey’s behaviour was the result of its 
inability to influence the EU.
In accordance with his expressly stated preference for a pro-active policy, Simitis 
pursued communitisation further during the Luxembourg European Council 
summit in December 1997. The decision made in Luxembourg can be 
conceptualised as an early incorporation of the EU practice of reinforcement by 
reward into Greek policy towards Turkey. A reward was offered (participation in 
the European Conference) and conditions (acceptance of the resolution of 
outstanding disputes before the ICJ and respect for the right of other countries to 
accede to the EU) were outlined; upon compliance the reward would be paid, 
otherwise it would be withheld.
In his memoirs, the Prime Minister confirmed that communitisation took 
precedence over other initiatives that the Greek government pursued. He argued 
that his attempts to achieve rapprochement in a “traditional” fashion “could not 
under any circumstances resolve (Greco-Turkish) problems” 457. Whilst 
discussing the Madrid Declaration, he argued that little became of it, since both 
Greece and Turkey “continued to insist on their positions”, as his meeting with 
Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz in Crete confirmed. Rapprochement 
would be possible “only when the resolution of (Greco-Turkish) problems had
456 Ibid.
457 Simitis,Policy..., op. cit. p. 88
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become compulsory for Turkey in order to achieve its broader goal, progress in 
its accession process”458. Yet the Prime Minister only discussed the conditions 
that Turkey would have to meet, not the offer of the reward of accession. He 
pointed out that the Presidency Conclusions of the Luxembourg summit marked 
the first time that the European Council was acknowledging submission to the 
ICJ as a possible way to resolve Greco-Turkish problems and that they 
transformed the “Greco-Turkish crisis into a Euro-Turkish dispute”459. He did not 
even mention that the European Council decided to offer Turkey participation in 
the European Conference. The decision was not understood as one whereby 
Greece was for the first time allowing the EU to offer Turkey a reward
(participation in the European Conference), but as the culmination of the
communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations, as rules for Turkey’s behaviour 
towards Greece were established at the level of Heads of State and Government 
for the first time460.
It is instructive to note the discrepancy between the Prime Minister’s
understanding of the role of conditionality and that of the Commission. During
the negotiations, the Prime Minister had tried to find support for Greece’s 
positions in the section of the Commission’s Agenda 2000 that discussed border 
disputes. According to the latter, “all candidate countries should therefore, before 
accession negotiations are completed, commit themselves unconditionally to 
compulsory jurisdiction, including advance ruling of the International Court of 
Justice in any present or future disputes of this nature”461. During a press 
conference in London in November 1999, the Prime Minister explicitly referred 
to Hungary and Slovakia -  the dispute between which over the dam on the 
Danube had been submitted to the ICJ and cited by the Commission in its 
communication -  and asked: “why should not Turkey do the same?”462 A few 
days later, he reiterated this position during a speech in Parliament: “In the 
Commission’s communication for the ‘Agenda 2000’ it is mentioned that 
countries that want to participate in the European Union should state that they
458 Ibid. p. 89
459 Ibid. p. 90
460 Interview with high-ranking Greek government official, 2 April 2008
461 European Commission, Agenda 2000 Communication: For a Stronger and Wider Union, 15 
July 1997, p. 68
462 “Simitis: Turkey Is Also Thinking about Acceding”, Eleftherotypia, 29 November 1997
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accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in the Hague. We 
believe that this should also be a pre-condition for participation in the European 
Conference in the case of Turkey”463. Yet the Commission’s understanding of the 
role of conditionality was rather different. The Commission pointed out that 
“enlargement should not mean importing border conflicts” and that the prospect 
of accession constituted a “powerful incentive” for the settlement of disputes464. 
In contrast, the Prime Minister did not discuss the decision of the Luxembourg 
European Council in terms of incentives. In fact, participation in the European 
Conference without candidate country status was not a powerful incentive for 
Turkey. According to the Prime Minister, the significance of the decision lay in 
the fact the EU was getting involved in Greco-Turkish relations and Greco- 
Turkish problems were being transformed into Euro-Turkish problems, which 
was precisely what his vision for foreign policy reform prescribed.
The culmination of communitisation
The evidence shows that Greek foreign policy makers considered the decision 
made at the Luxembourg European Council summit a great success of their 
policy towards Turkey. At the start of the period under investigation, Prime 
Minister Simitis was repeatedly stressing the need for a set of common EU rules 
on Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece. As the decision made in Luxembourg 
had established such rules, the Greek government became most unwilling to 
consider alternatives that would modify the framework agreed upon in 
Luxembourg. When asked what Greece’s objections to Turkey’s accession to the 
EU were in March 1998, Deputy Foreign Minister Papandreou replied: “I would 
like to point out that it is not unilateral Greek objections to Turkey’s participation 
in the EU, but on the contrary the EU itself and the fifteen member-states have 
jointly formulated a framework of principles and conditions, on the fulfillment of 
which the enhancement of relations between Turkey and the EU and I would also 
say her future accession depends”465. This view was reiterated shortly before the 
Cardiff European Council summit, when Papandreou made explicit that the
463 Costas Simitis, Speech in Parliament, 9 December 1997
464 European Commission, Agenda 2000..., op. cit. p. 67
465 George A. Papandreou interview, Lidove Noviny, 1 March 1998, emphasis added
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Luxembourg decision was not going to be modified and that Turkey was not 
ready to be upgraded to candidate country status. “Regarding Turkey, I can tell 
you very clearly that the Luxembourg decisions will not be reversed or distorted. 
The Luxembourg decisions were decisions of the “fifteen” ...I think that the 
message is clear, not the Greek, but the European message to Turkey that she is 
not ready at the moment to be given the candidacy”466.
It should be pointed out that in Luxembourg Greek foreign policy makers were 
not trying to keep Turkey away from the EU; they were simply trying to show it 
the way. During a speech in June 1998, Deputy Foreign Minister Papandreou 
recalled the “battle” Prime Minister Simitis had fought in Luxembourg in an 
attempt to formulate the conditions countries that wished to join the EU would 
have to meet and stated: “So today we say that there is a road to Europe fo r  
Turkey. But with conditions...We say yes to that Turkey, which respects its 
neighbours, sovereign rights, the international legal order.. .which has the 
political courage to resolve justly, in accordance with UN resolutions, the Cyprus 
problem, but.. .Turkey.. .should know that there will be no road to the EU if these 
conditions are not fulfilled. And this is not only a Greek position any more. The 
significant success o f this policy is that it is European”467. It has been argued that 
the Commission held a similar view of the decision made in Luxembourg. The 
latter was seen in Brussels as a “launching pad” for Turkey’s accession rather 
than a “slammed door”468.
As the explanation based on Simitis’ leadership style predicts, Greece became 
most reluctant to consider alternatives to the status quo, once the 
communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations was achieved at the highest political 
level in Luxembourg. In the face of Turkish military pressure, EU attempts to 
grant Turkey candidate country status and release financial assistance to Turkey 
and US interventions in favour of Turkey, the Greek government invariably 
continued to defend the Luxembourg decision. Whilst discussing the briefing of 
EU member-states’ ambassadors in Athens regarding Turkish violations of Greek
466 George A. Papandreou, Press Conference, Athens, 12 June 1998, emphasis added
467 George A. Papandreou, Speech at the opening of the “Andreas G. Papandreou” Exhibition, 
Thessaloniki, 25 June 1998, emphasis added.
468 D. Barchard, “Turkey and the European Union”, Centre for European Reform, July 1998, p. 2
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airspace, government spokesman Reppas stated: “We are pointing out that 
Turkey’s stance does not only concern Greece, but also the EU, since the EU 
with its decisions has defined the framework, within which, with Turkey’s 
compliance with specific terms and conditions, Euro-Turkish relations can be 
developed”469. Similarly, when commenting on reports in the press, according to 
which British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook had told Commissioner Hans van 
den Broek that it was appalling that some rocks in the Mediterranean had brought 
the EU to a standstill, Reppas stated: “These reports implicitly recognise the 
powerful position of the Greek government, which for an issue that some third 
parties consider small and insignificant is fighting this battle successfully, since 
we have managed (to make) this issue a criterion for Euro-Turkish relations”470.
As the Luxembourg decision had been received negatively -  to say the least -  in 
Turkey, EU member-states and the Commission attempted to release EU 
financial assistance to Turkey in an attempt to reverse the deterioration of EU- 
Turkey relations. The Greek government dismissed the proposals, arguing that 
EU-Turkey relations had already been appropriately defined. According to 
Deputy Foreign Minister Papandreou471: “There are -  admittedly -  on certain 
issues (such as the financial protocol) different opinions on how to handle the 
matter tactically. Many of our partners believe that it is our contractual obligation 
to release the funds, despite Turkey’s behaviour. They are stressing that this 
will.. .contribute to (Turkey’s) participation in programmes that will ‘open up her 
eyes’ regarding her obligations towards Europe and towards Greece in particular. 
I think that they are too optimistic and of course they are not experiencing 
Turkey’s daily military pressure”. Papandreou conceded that some of Greece’s 
EU partners felt that Greece was “abusing its (right to) veto” with regard to EU 
financial assistance to Turkey. “This, however, is happening because.. .they do 
not believe that they can give Turkey anything more given the situation there 
today (i.e. human rights, Kurds, Cyprus) and they are seeking something to move 
forward in case they can entice Turkey with a good will gesture”. According to 
Papandreou, however, that was not necessary because Turkey had already been 
offered “a specific road to Europe”.
469 “First Release for 14 Ambassadors”, Eleftherotypia, 17 January 1998
470 “New Turkish Aggressiveness With Fire”, Eleftherotypia, 27 January 1998
471 George A. Papandreou interview with Titos Kontopoulos, To Ethnos, 31 May 1998
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Even Foreign Minister Pangalos, who had never explicitly committed himself to 
Simitis’ preferred course of action, insisted on practical measures that would 
keep Greco-Turkish relations firmly placed within the context of EU-Turkey 
relations without requiring further concessions. When certain member-states and 
the Commission started to prioritise the release of EU financial assistance to 
Turkey, Pangalos insisted that the EU-Turkey Association Council should 
discuss both economic and political aspects of EU-Turkey relations, including 
Greco-Turkish relations472. Similarly, Deputy Foreign Minister Papandreou 
argued that Turkey could not have an exclusively “technical relationship” with 
the EU473 and that the political dialogue between Turkey and the EU should cover 
“all the issues that have been raised at various times, such as the Kurdish 
problem, (the) Cyprus (problem) and (the issue of) referring disputes to the 
International Court of Justice in The Hague”474.
While Greece had successfully pursued the communitisation of Greco-Turkish 
relations, the latter did not have the desired effect. On the contrary, both EU- 
Turkey relations and Greco-Turkish relations deteriorated further. In fact, six 
months after the Luxembourg decision, which was greeted as a great success, 
Deputy Foreign Minister Papandreou argued that he was not particularly 
optimistic regarding Greco-Turkish relations and that he did not believe that 
Greece and Turkey were at that point any closer to a resolution of their problems 
than they had been two or three years earlier475. This unintended development 
created the additional problem of EU member-states and US pressure on Greece. 
On the one hand, Turkey’s response to the Luxembourg decision was quite 
detrimental to the Greek policy of communitisation. As the decision made in 
Luxembourg constituted a “clear victory” for Greece, the EU could no longer be 
considered a “neutral party”476. Turkey interpreted the decision made in
472 K. Adam, ‘“Grey Zones’ In...Environmental Cloak”, Eleftherotypia, 28 April 1998
473 George A. Papandreou, Press Conference, Athens, 1 October 1998
474 “EU Foreign Ministers Express Solidarity to Greece over Turkish Claims”, Greek Embassy in 
Washington Press Office News Archive, 15 March 1999, available at 
http://www.greekembassv.org/embassy/Content/en/Article.aspx?
office=3&folder=283&article=4159&hilite=turkey&hilite=&hilite=candidate&hilite=candidacv. 
accessed on 11 January 2008
475 George A. Papandreou interview to Titos Kontopoulos, To Ethnos, 31 May 1998
476 B. A. Yesilada, “The Worsening of EU-Turkey Relations”, SA1S Review, 19: 1, 1999, pp. 151- 
2
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Luxembourg as evidence that confirmed its “profound suspicion of Western 
Europe”477. Not only did Turkey not comply with the conditions the European 
Council had set, but it also decided to suspend its political relations with the EU. 
Foreign Minister Pangalos identified the reversal of communitisation as Turkey’s 
objective. “The objective of Turkey’s foreign policy”, he argued during a speech 
in Parliament in January 1999, “is for Greco-Turkish disputes not to be an issue 
in Europe. She wants Greco-Turkish disputes to be one issue and Turkey’s 
relationship with Europe to be another”478.
On the other hand, Turkish policy appeared to be quite effective, despite 
Pangalos’ assertion that “the European Union, of course, and not just we, but also 
the big countries, do not want to concede this original and unprecedented 
association status to Turkey”479. France continued to press the matter, British 
Prime Minister Blair indicated that the decision made in Luxembourg had 
resulted in a misunderstanding, US President Clinton personally intervened 
during the Cardiff summit and at least since the election of a new government in 
September 1998 Germany appeared more willing to accept the Turkish 
candidacy, which it in fact proposed while it was holding the presidency of the 
Council during the first half of 1999. In Simitis and Papandreou’s terms a 
“virtual candidacy” for Turkey was proposed, that is to say a less restrictive and 
demanding framework for EU-Turkey relations480. Greece was most unwilling to 
accept such an arrangement because the latter would not allow it to preserve the 
EU rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece that Simitis’ notion of 
communitisation required. The member-states that were proposing a virtual 
candidacy for Turkey were undermining the binding character of the rules that 
Greece had managed to establish in Luxembourg. Papandreou made this explicit 
when he discussed the implications of US attempts to have the Luxembourg 
decision modified during the Cardiff summit. The conviction that the 
Luxembourg decision had transformed Greco-Turkish relations into EU-Turkey
477 P. Robins, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War, Hurst & 
Company, London, 2003, pp. 100-12; For history as a determinant of Turkish foreign policy see 
also M. Aydin, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Framework and Traditional 
Inputs”, Middle Eastern Studies, 35: 4, 1999
478 Theodore Pangalos, Speech in Parliament, 29 January 1999
479 Ibid.
480 Interviews with Greek Foreign Ministry official, 19 May 2008, advisors to Foreign Minister 
Papandreou, 27 March 2008 and 12 May 2008
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relations was such that he referred to the costs that US policy imposed on the EU. 
“Asking for Turkey to join the EU”, he argued, “the US can make her proposal 
or exert her pressure because it is not going to cost the US anything. For Europe, 
however, which has proceeded in a deepening of institutions, the issues of human 
rights, of democratic procedures, of good neighbourliness, of Cyprus and several 
others such as Turkey’s economic problem will cost very much and they are very 
big issues for one to be able to speak easily and without consideration of a 
candidacy for Turkey”481.
The situation the Prime Minister was facing appears to have been quite 
impossible. As one commentator put it: “If he voted for Turkish candidacy but 
with onerous conditions that could be interpreted by Ankara as being more than 
the conditions placed upon other candidate countries, he would risk Turkish 
rejection and a possible backlash. But he would also face a similar backlash from 
Turkey if he decided not to lift the veto. Meanwhile, if he was seen to be too 
lenient on Turkey, he would come under heavy criticism at home. This could 
even lead to electoral defeat. It appeared as if, no matter what route he chose to 
take, he would face an extraordinarily high political cost”482.
Neither Turkey’s response to the Luxembourg decision, nor EU member-states 
and US pressure on Greece, however, challenged the logic Greek policy was 
based on. The undesirable effect of the Luxembourg decision did not challenge 
Simitis’ commitment to the EU as the “default arena” for Greek policy towards 
Turkey, where EU rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece should be 
established. The fact that Greece continued to pursue the communitisation of 
Greco-Turkish relations in the aftermath of the Luxembourg decision shows that 
Greek policy towards Turkey was primarily determined by this internal logic and 
not by contextual variables.
When asked to comment on the Helsinki summit during the press conference 
after the Cologne summit, Prime Minister Simitis stated: “There is a decision 
(according to which) the whole issue of enlargement will be discussed in
481 George A. Papandreou interview with Phevos Karzis, Flash 9,61, 19 June 1998
482 Ker-Lindsay, Crisis and Conciliation..., op. cit. pp. 95-6
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Helsinki. And relations (between) Greece-Turkey are part of the issue of 
enlargement”483. The Helsinki strategy was formulated in June 1999 shortly after 
the Cologne European Council summit484. The problem was that, despite the fact 
that Greece had succeeded in pursuing the communitisation of Greco-Turkish 
relations, thus producing an acquis of EU rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards 
Greece, and also in resisting efforts to modify this acquis, Turkey had not 
changed its policy and thus the framework did not suffice to resolve Greco- 
Turkish problems in a manner consistent with the Greek government’s 
preferences. An alternative was sought that would constitute the culmination o f  
the policy o f communitisation in the sense of establishing additional EU rules for 
Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece, including a specific timeframe for Turkey’s 
compliance and provisions regarding the course of action that the EU would take 
in case of non-compliance. Candidate country status for Turkey could be 
exchanged for an EU decision that would incorporate the conditions previously 
set out and an additional provision, according to which unless Greco-Turkish 
problems were resolved within a specific timeframe, the matter would have to be 
submitted to the ICJ, thus creating an even more restrictive framework485.
In sharp contrast to what the balancing thesis predicts, at that stage it was 
believed that even though the official decision had not been made, it was fairly 
clear that the policy of macroeconomic stabilisation had been successful and that 
Greece would be able to join EMU486. As was shown in the previous chapter, 
Simitis believed that a successful economic policy was a source of bargaining 
power in the EU. In this sense, the success of macroeconomic stabilisation had 
improved Greece’s bargaining position and it had made it possible for the 
government to extract from its partners the concessions that the further 
communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations required. Simitis explained this 
shortly after the Helsinki summit: “The economic record we achieved during all 
these years was significant for our external relations; for the outcome in Helsinki
483 Simitis, Press Conference, Cologne European Council summit, op. cit.
484 Simitis, Policy..., op. cit. p. 91; Interviews with high-ranking Greek government official, 2 
April 2008, advisors to the Prime Minister, 21 March 2008 and 14 July 2008; see also George A. 
Papandreou interview with Dimitris Konstantakopoulos, O Cosmos tou Ependyti, 22 July 2006
485 Interview with high-ranking Greek government official, 02 April 2008
486 Interviews with advisor to Prime Minister Simitis, 21 March 2008 and high-ranking Greek 
government official, 02 April 2008
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and the support of our fourteen partners”487. The outcome of the Berlin European 
Council negotiations over the Community Support Framework 2000-2006 was 
considered an indication of Greece’s improved bargaining position488. 
Furthermore, Greece could benefit from the intensity of other EU member-states’ 
preferences. In the aftermath of the Cologne European Council summit, Greek 
foreign policy makers discerned an increase in the intensity of their EU 
counterparts’ preference for upgrading Turkey to candidate country status489. As 
relative bargaining power is inversely proportionate to preference intensity, this 
development had also improved Greece’s bargaining position. Finally, Greek 
foreign policy makers often point out that considerable effort was required in 
order to convince both Turkey and EU member-states of the sincerity of Greece’s 
intentions. A substantial as opposed to a virtual candidacy would also serve this 
purpose.
Shortly afterwards, the Greek government indicated that it would be willing to 
consent to the Turkish candidacy provided that it was a substantial one490. 
Despite the fact that the Greek government had repeatedly asked Turkey to 
facilitate Greek support for the Turkish candidacy by taking steps towards 
compliance with the conditions the EU had previously set out, the Greek 
government had also made explicit that any such response from Turkey would 
not be sufficient for Greece to support the Turkish candidacy. The EU would 
have to agree on a framework, according to which Turkey would have to comply 
with EU conditions within a specific timeframe. When it was pointed out to 
Foreign Minister Papandreou in October 1999 that it was unclear whether Greece 
was asking something from Turkey or from its partners or nothing at all, he 
replied: “I think (that), always under certain conditions I should stress, which we 
are currently negotiating, (it) is...(in) the national interest.. .to place (Turkey) on
487 Constantine Simitis, Speech in Parliament, 21 December 1999
488 Simitis, Policy..., op. cit. p. 91; Interview with high-ranking Greek government official, 2 
April 2008
489 Interviews with advisor to Prime Minister Simitis, 14 July 2008 and Greek Foreign Ministry 
official, 19 May 2008
490 It is often pointed out (interviews with member of the Cabinet, 7 May 2008, high-ranking 
Greek government official, 2 April 2008 and high-ranking Foreign Ministry official, 15 May 
2008) that once the Helsinki strategy was formulated, preparations for the Helsinki summit were 
extensive. As an advisor to Prime Minister Simitis pointed out to the author (14 July 2008), 
Foreign Minister Papandreou pursued the implementation of the Helsinki strategy most 
competently.
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a specific road that has specific steps that she must take, specific frameworks 
within which she must move, specific conditions that she must meet.. .in order to 
move from one step to the next. This framework is not going to be a framework 
that only Greece will adopt, but (one that) the fifteen countries will adopt 
together and together the fifteen we will move in unison”m . “What we are 
saying”, he remarked a few days before the summit, “is that if you, our partners, 
want Turkey to be a candidate, this means that the EU is assuming obligations, is 
assuming responsibilities and it must commit (itself) to dealing with the real 
issues that exist. Greco-Turkish (problems) are not bilateral problems, they are 
problems that will be related to a member-state of the EU and a candidate 
country. Therefore, should relations between these two countries not be governed 
by European principles, such as...use of the ICJ for the issue of the continental 
shelf? If our partners agree on these issues...we will be positive. If they simply 
want to give Turkey a virtual, not substantial candidacy, we will be negative... 
During these past few months, Greece has built half, perhaps more than half, the 
bridge to cross this river. Now it is their turn to build the other half of this bridge 
so that we can cross the issue of the candidacy together”492.
Despite the fact that Prime Minister Simitis made explicit his intention to avoid 
public statements regarding the details of the government’s positions493, he 
discussed the matter extensively after a meeting with Finnish Prime Minister 
Paavo Lipponen a few days before the summit. He reiterated his view that 
isolating Turkey from the EU was not in Greece’s best interest. As Simitis had 
indicated as early as in 1993, it would be more effective for Greece to allow 
Turkey’s participation in the integration process because that would lead to 
compliance with the rules and principles of the EU. “We do not believe”, he 
argued, “that isolating Turkey.. .refusing to (allow Turkey to) participate in a 
process that leads to compliance with the very rules that we seek to govern our
491 George A. Papandreou interview with Pavlos Tsimas, Flash 9,61, 27 October 1999, emphasis 
added
492 George A. Papandreou interview with Yannis Roubatis, Flash 9,61, 7 December 1999, 
emphasis added; see also George A. Papandreou interview with Jan Skoda, Pravda, 4 October 
1999
493 E. D. Karanasopoulou, “Tampere Lit Fires”, Ta Nea, 16 October 1999; Y. Pantelakis, “Yes, 
but...on Turkey”, Eleftherotypia, 16 October 1999
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relations is in Greece’s interest regarding her relation with Turkey”494. Despite 
references to the positive impact that existing rules would have, Simitis made 
explicit that further rules would have to be established that would make Turkey’s 
obligations and the role of the EU in case of non-compliance explicit. “Turkey’s 
participation in the processes of European unification, however, will lead to 
problems, tensions and will not allow the realisation of the goal for which 
participation is sought, if there are no clear positions on pending problems. Clear 
positions on what the rules of the game are regarding issues, which have arisen in 
the past or may arise in the future. Clear positions on the behaviour of all parties 
involved, so that we will be led to solutions -  if there are problems -  and not to 
deadlocks...Greece does not want to face challenges of its sovereign rights, 
without having made explicit and accepted by everyone what the most effective 
way to resolve the challenges is”495. On the same day, government spokesman 
Reppas made this explicit: “We do not expect (anything) in return from Turkey. 
We have made this clear”496. The stance of the Greek government remained 
unchanged even after Turkish Foreign Minister Cem stated that Turkey was 
committed to harmonising its conduct with Agenda 2000 rules regarding the 
settlement of territorial disputes. The Turkish government was offering a verbal 
commitment to the principle of the judicial settlement of disputes. Only hours 
later, Greek Foreign Minister Papandreou greeted Cem’s statement as a 
“significant commitment”, yet he insisted that it should be incorporated in the 
Helsinki summit’s Presidency Conclusions497.
Finally, despite the fact that Commission President Romano Prodi was publicly 
stating in October 1999 that Turkey was a candidate country498, the Greek
494 Costas Simitis and Paavo Lipponen, Joint statements, Athens, 2 December 1999, available at 
http://www.pasok.gr/oldwebsite/gr/nea/021299simlip.html. accessed on 7 February 2008
495 Ibid., emphasis added
496 Briefing of political editors and members of the foreign press by the Minister for Press and 
Mass Media and Government Spokesman Dimitris Reppas, Athens, 2 December 1999
497 K. Adam, “Cem’s Pass for Lifting the Veto”, Eleftherotypia, 8 December 1999; “Athens 
Welcomes Cem Statements Regarding EU Rules”, Greek Embassy in Washington Press Office 
News Archive, 8 December 1999, available at 
http://www.greekembassy.org/embassy/content/en/Article.aspx? 
office=3&folder=278&article=3562. accessed on 14 January 2008; see also J. Reuter,
“Reshaping Greek-Turkish Relations: Developments Before and After the EU Summit in 
Helsinki”, ELIAMEP Working Papers, No. 1, 2000, p. 12
498 R. Prodi, Speech to the European Institute, Washington, USA, 27 October 1999, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=SPEECH/99/220&format=HTML&aged=l&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. This
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government made it clear that vetoing the Turkish candidacy was still an 
alternative, which Greece would have to select, if the EU refused to establish 
additional rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece499. At the end of October, 
Foreign Minister Papandreou denied “in the most emphatic fashion” reports on 
Turkish television network CNN-Turk, according to which he had announced 
Greece’s unconditional support for the Turkish candidacy500. At the end of 
November, he stated: “We have a tough negotiation before us in Helsinki. The 
negotiation is not finished. Therefore, our position on whether we will say yes or 
no to the Turkish candidacy is not given, it is open and of course it will be 
determined by the final draft, the final positions and commitments o f the EU  on a 
series of issues that pertain to the nature and the texture of the Turkish 
candidacy, but also to securing significant Greek interests”501. A few days later, 
Papandreou also made clear that the Greek government would defer the decision 
until later if it had to. “There are other Presidencies in the EU”, he stated, “and 
therefore opportunities to find a better solution”502. In an article published a few 
days before the Helsinki summit, Papandreou reiterated the government’s 
position. “Both Greco-Turkish relations and the Cyprus problem”, he argued,
was not the only case of discrepancies between the Greek government’s policy and the 
Commission’s approach. Differences of approach remained even after the Helsinki decision was 
made. The Commission was reportedly unwilling to incorporate the provisions of the agreement 
reached in Helsinki into its proposal for Turkey’s Accession Partnership prompting Greek 
Commissioner Anna Diamantopoulou to request revisions of Enlargement Commissioner Gunter 
Verheugen’s initial proposal; see K. Moschonas, “Additions for Greece-Cyprus with Verheugen 
Being Annoyed”, Eleftherotypia, 9 November 2000. Whilst commenting on this development 
Pangalos stated: “...the ill will the Commission and especially...President Prodi exhibited is of 
great significance. So instead of using the EU to put pressure on Turkey we are once again in a 
position where all our partners in the Community are opponents and I wonder what is the 
difference between this situation and the situation that existed when I was pursuing the old policy 
as they say towards Turkey, except for the fact of course that at the moment we have given them 
the title of (a) candidate country”; see Theodore Pangalos interview with N. Meletis -  P. 
Tsoutsias, Ethnos, 19 November 2000. More recently, Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn 
expressed “difficulty” in understanding why the judicial settlement of disputes was preferable to 
bilateral negotiations and he argued that the Commission believed that bilateral disputes should 
be settled bilaterally; see Olli Rehn interview with EurActiv, 21 November 2008, available at 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/commissioner-rehn-am-iust-factory-manager/article- 
177381.
499 Interviews with Greek government official, 5 May 2008, advisor to Foreign Minister 
Papandreou, 12 May 2008 and Greek Foreign Ministry officials, 19 May 2008 and 27 May 2008
500 “Papandreou Emphatically Refutes CNN-Turk”, Eleftherotypia, 26 October 1999
501 “George Toughens”, Eleftherotypia, 24 November 1999; “G. Papandreou: No Decision As Yet 
over Possible Turkish EU Candidacy”, Greek Embassy in Washington Press Office News 
Archive, 24 November 1999, available at 
http://www.greekembassv.org/embassv/content/en/Article.aspx?
office=3&folder=285&article=4470. accessed on 14 January 2008, emphasis added
502 “George Papandreou: ‘If We Veto, It Will Be Our Partners Fault’”, Eleftherotypia, 28 
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“are part o f the broader framework o f Euro-Turkish relations. It is our success 
that these issues have returned to their ‘natural river bed’, which is the 
European Union. Consequently, it is not just us, but it is the Union itself that is 
asking for substantial and in depth progress on Turkey’s part”. “And we believe”, 
he continued, “that Turkey’s candidacy should be linked with a ‘road map’, the 
partnership, to the content of which Turkey will have to respond from its 
candidacy to the beginning of substantial accession negotiations. This 
‘framework’ means the assumption of most substantial real obligations by 
Turkey, the non-fulfillment of which will stop the European prospects of the 
neighbouring country...The assessment according to which we are making 
unilateral concessions is erroneous”503. Similarly, Simitis argued that if Greece’s 
positions on Turkey’s obligations and the role of the EU were not accepted, 
Greece would have to veto the Turkish candidacy. “If we do not manage to 
create such a framework, then we will project our refusal in Helsinki”504.
Simitis’ assessment of the Helsinki European Council decision leaves no doubt 
regarding the alternatives he considered. The Helsinki strategy was an alternative 
to Greek attempts to prevent progress in EU-Turkey relations. “The European 
Union”, Simitis wrote in his memoirs, “had to be involved in the resolution of 
pending Greco-Turkish (problems) as a directly interested (party), making easier 
in this way, amongst other things, the consistent implementation of the 
agreements. In other words, the ‘communitisation’ o f Greco-Turkish relations 
could serve as a credible and, mainly, effective substitute fo r  constant vetoes 
against Turkey, which, in any case, had exhausted all its potential...what Greece 
had not managed to achieve by exercising its right to veto, was achieved now 
through the ‘communitisation ’ o f Greco-Turkish relations”505.
In contrast to what both explanations that conceptualise the formulation of the 
Helsinki strategy as the outcome of Europeanisation predict, Greek foreign 
policy makers did not consider EU enlargement conditionality as a relevant 
established EU practice that might serve as a more effective or more appropriate
503 G. A. Papandreou, “Our Position on ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ to Turkey”, To Vima, 5 December 1999, 
emphasis added
504 Simitis - Lipponen, op. cit.
505 Simitis,Policy..., op. cit. pp. 92, 99, emphasis added
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alternative to the policy previously pursued506. In fact, the discrepancy between 
EU enlargement conditionality and the way in which Greece had been applying 
conditionality was pointed out to Foreign Minister Papandreou during an 
interview in August 1999. As Papandreou was discussing the conditions that 
Turkey would have to meet, the interviewer asked: “According to Community 
logic, however, a response on these issues is a condition for accession and not a 
condition for giving a country the candidacy -  is it not?” Strikingly enough, 
Papandreou replied that Greek policy was not different from EU policy and 
referred to the case of Slovakia. “I agree”, he replied, “we are saying that during 
its pre-accession course Turkey must meet these conditions -  we are not saying 
anything different. As in the case of Slovakia, some time ago the issue (with 
different parameters of course) of delaying the opening of her accession 
negotiations was raised because of the problem she had with her Hungarian 
minority and the deficit it showed in the field of democratic reforms, we are 
saying that similar principles should apply to the case of Turkey. There cannot be 
double standards”507. Slovakia, however, was already a candidate country 
regardless of the fact that the opening of its accession negotiations had not been 
decided during the Luxembourg summit.
In contrast to what the balancing thesis predicts, Greek policy on EU-Turkey 
relations was not considered an alternative to defence expenditure that would 
improve Greece’s military capabilities. During an interview with BBC radio, 
Foreign Minister Pangalos made explicit that the EU could not offer its members 
the benefits of a military alliance. In fact, the prospects of external balancing 
against Turkey appeared bleak for Greece. “There is no protection”, he argued, 
“in the sense of a military alliance. The EU is not (like) NATO and even NATO 
has a very doubtful approach on problems existing between its member- 
states”508. Similarly, Foreign Minister Papandreou made explicit that Greek 
policy on EU-Turkey relations was not an alternative to the improvement of
506 Interviews with high-ranking Greek government official, 2 April 2008, high-ranking Foreign 
Ministry officials, 15 May 2008 and 27 May 2008, advisor to Prime Minister Simitis, 14 July 
2008, advisor to Foreign Minister Papandreou, 12 May 2008
507 George A. Papandreou interview with Christina Poulidou, Avyi, 29 August 1999
508 “Pangalos Speaks on BBC Programme”, Greek Embassy in Washington Press Office News 
Archive, 13 June 1998, available at
http://www.greekembassy.org/embassy/content/en/Article.aspx? 
office=3&folder=269&article=2723. accessed on 6 January 2008
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Greek military capabilities and that the two should be pursued in parallel. “First 
of all”, he explained, “I believe that there are two things that we should do in 
parallel with regard to Turkey. For as long as Turkey is what she is today, not a 
democratic country, a semi-military regime with expansionary intentions, we 
must have our defence absolutely secured and our readiness to face possible 
military challenges. On the other hand, we must take advantage of Turkey’s 
European course creatively”509. Indeed, Greek foreign policy makers -  including 
those who identified the economic implications of Greek policy towards Turkey 
as a significant aspect of the problem -  made explicit that the Helsinki strategy 
did not constitute an alternative to defence expenditure510.
Conclusions
The evidence showed that Prime Minister Simitis’ preference for the 
communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations determined the alternative courses of 
action Greek foreign policy makers considered. While initially the Imia/Kardak 
crisis prompted the Greek government to veto EU financial assistance to Turkey 
and a meeting of the EU-Turkey Association Council, the communitisation of 
Greco-Turkish relations was pursued immediately after the crisis. While initially 
a British veto prevented the adoption of a statement that identified Greco-Turkish 
problems as problems that concerned the EU, the Greek government managed to 
have such a statement adopted a few months later in July 1996. In return, the 
Greek government lifted its veto of EU financial assistance to Turkey within the 
context of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, despite the fact that Turkey had not 
completed the first step of the step-by-step approach, which had been presented 
by the Greek government as a pre-condition for lifting its veto. The content of 
the statement was reiterated in the member-states’ common position for the 29 
April 1997 meeting of the EU-Turkey Association Council and more 
significantly in the Presidency Conclusions of the Luxembourg European 
Council summit in December 1997.
509 George A. Papandreou interview with Eirini D. Karanasopoulou, Ta Nea, 8 March 1999
510 Interviews with Greek Foreign Ministry official, 15 May 2008 and Greek diplomat, 21 May 
2008
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The outcome of the Luxembourg summit was considered a great success for 
Greek policy towards Turkey as it had successfully communitised Greco-Turkish 
relations at the highest political level. As the explanation based on Simitis’ 
leadership style predicts, Greece became most unwilling to consider any revision 
of the decision made in Luxembourg, despite the fact that the latter had not had 
the intended effect. Not only had the communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations 
failed to bring Greece and Turkey closer to a resolution of Greco-Turkish 
problems, but also Turkey had suspended political dialogue with the EU and 
threatened to withdraw its application for EU membership.
Nonetheless, Simitis’ commitment to communitisation remained unchallenged. 
When Greece decided to consider a revision of the Luxembourg decision, it was 
only to pursue the further communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations. In June 
1999, Greek foreign policy makers concluded that the framework for EU-Turkey 
relations that communitisation had resulted in was insufficient. In Helsinki, 
Greece would allow the EU to grant Turkey candidate country status provided 
that the conditions introduced in Luxembourg would be reiterated and additional 
rules would be established, according to which Turkey would have to comply 
with the conditions within a specific timeframe. The formulation of the Helsinki 
strategy was seen as the culmination of the policy of communitisation in the 
sense that it established additional EU rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards 
Greece, thus involving the EU further as Simitis’ vision prescribed. In contrast to 
what both explanations that conceptualise change in Greek policy towards 
Turkey as the outcome of Europeanisation predict, Greek foreign policy makers 
did not identify enlargement conditionality as an established EU practice that 
might serve as a more effective or more appropriate alternative to the policy 
previously pursued. In contrast to what the balancing thesis predicts, the Helsinki 
strategy was not considered an alternative to defence expenditure. In fact, when 
the Helsinki strategy was formulated, it was believed that Greece’s accession to 
EMU had already been secured.
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Chapter 7: Assessing Alternatives 
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to establish how Greek foreign policy makers 
assessed the alternative courses of action they considered. According to the 
socialisation thesis, Greek foreign policy makers did not calculate the costs and 
benefits of these alternatives. The Helsinki strategy was selected because it was 
considered the appropriate course of action for an EU member-state given the 
situation. In contrast, the remaining three explanations predict cost-benefit 
calculations. According to the balancing thesis, the Helsinki strategy was 
selected for its economic benefits, as it would allow the government to pursue 
both foreign and economic policy goals successfully. In contrast, both the 
Europeanisation thesis and the leadership style thesis predict that Greek foreign 
policy makers concluded that the policy previously pursued could not achieve its 
objectives and ought to be discontinued. The Europeanisation thesis predicts that 
the Helsinki strategy was selected because it would offer Turkey the reward of 
accession, which would serve as an incentive that would render Turkey’s 
compliance with Greek demands more likely. In contrast, the leadership style 
thesis predicts that the Helsinki strategy was selected because it would establish 
additional EU rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece and it would thus 
attribute the role of guarantor of Turkey’s compliance to the EU.
The evidence is consistent with that presented in the preceding chapters. In 
contrast to what the socialisation thesis predicts, Greek foreign policy makers did 
calculate the costs and benefits of the alternative courses of action they 
considered and they selected the Helsinki strategy because of the role it would 
attribute to the EU, as the leadership style thesis predicts. Indeed, the period 
under investigation is marked by an increasing and unprecedented involvement 
of the EU in Greco-Turkish relations. This stems directly from Simitis’ notion of 
“communitisation”. According to the latter, if Greece could manage to have rules 
for Turkey’s behaviour towards it established at the EU level, the EU itself 
would see to it that its rules were observed.
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While there is evidence that the Helsinki strategy was considered to offer Turkey 
an incentive to comply with Greek demands, this was a secondary consideration. 
In contrast to what the Europeanisation thesis predicts, Greece was most 
unwilling to consider granting Turkey candidate country status without 
additional EU rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards it despite the fact that such 
an arrangement would offer Turkey greater incentive to comply with Greek 
demands. Similarly, the additional rules that Greece managed to establish 
included provisions regarding the course of action that the EU would take in case 
of non-compliance, that is to say in case the incentive did not suffice. Attributing 
the role of a guarantor of the resolution of Greco-Turkish problems to the EU 
was considered a more significant benefit than the offer of an incentive to 
Turkey. Finally, this secondary consideration was not the result of an assessment 
of the discrepancy between Greek policy and EU enlargement conditionality and 
therefore it cannot be attributed to EU-level dynamics.
The evidence shows that the balancing thesis constitutes an even weaker 
explanation. The economic costs of Greek policy towards Turkey was only one 
of the reasons why Greek foreign policy makers wished to resolve Greco-Turkish 
problems, not the reason why the Helsinki strategy was selected to resolve them. 
In fact, the Helsinki strategy was formulated at a time when it was believed that 
the success of the government’s economic policy had increased Greece’s 
bargaining power in the EU and it had therefore made it possible for Greece to 
pursue the establishment of additional EU rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards 
it. Finally, the evidence of these cost-benefit calculations effectively refutes the 
explanation based on socialisation. There is no evidence that Greek foreign 
policy makers became convinced of the inappropriateness of the policy 
previously pursued. On the contrary, they systematically argued that it was their 
EU partners and the Commission that had on certain occasions behaved 
inappropriately.
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The benefits of communitisation
As was shown in the preceding chapters, Simitis believed that Greece lacked an 
effective policy towards Turkey and that it should allow Turkey to develop its 
relations with the EU further in exchange for the establishment of EU rules for 
Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece. The main benefit of this communitisation of 
Greco-Turkish relations for Greece was the role that the EU would assume511. 
Simitis believed that Turkey’s policy towards Greece was not only outdated, but 
also incompatible with the logic of integration. “(It) overlooked the 
developments and the dominant ideologies in Europe during the past fifty years 
and referred back to understandings of foreign policy on the eve of World War 
II”512. If Greece could transform Greco-Turkish relations into EU-Turkey 
relations, the discrepancy would become apparent and the EU would not merely 
adopt Greece’s positions, but it would also pursue changes in Turkey’s policy 
towards Greece. If rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece were established 
at the EU level, the EU would have to ensure that its own rules were observed.
As was mentioned above, Simitis firmly supported further integration and a 
political union based on a federal model. Developing the EU’s international role 
further would be an essential element of the political union Simitis envisioned 
and the EU’s role in Greco-Turkish relations was seen as part of the EU’s 
broader international role. In this sense, a strategy that actively “promoted” 
European integration (in the field of foreign policy) could replace Greece’s 
“defensive” policy towards Turkey513. “As we all know”, Simitis argued shortly 
before the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference, “the European Union, 
despite attempts from time to time, despite expressed desires, has not managed to 
develop a common foreign policy. This deficit was obvious during all recent 
crises, for instance in Yugoslavia and the Middle East. But also, as far as our 
issues are concerned, the European Union was either absent or simply had a 
symbolic presence. And it is not right (for the European Union) to have a 
symbolic presence, where other countries are actively involved. That is why
511 Simitis, Policy..., op. cit. p. 99; Rozakis, op. cit. p. 161; Interview with advisor to Prime 
Minister Simitis, 14 July 2008.
512 Simitis, Policy..., op. cit. p. 75
513 Simitis, “Relations...”, op. cit. p. 163
163
Greece supports the need for a common policy in these fields. And it submitted a 
series of ideas in order to enhance the international role of the Union. The 
proposals we have submitted include the protection of the inviolability of the 
territorial integrity and the borders of the Union, the principles of peaceful 
settlement of disputes, respect for international law and political solidarity 
amongst the member-states of the Union. That which we seek is... a sense in the 
European Union that it constitutes a whole, that this whole has borders, that the 
member-states have the obligation of political solidarity to each other, that it is 
necessary that they all together pursue respect for international law, pursue the 
peaceful settlement o f  disputes and intervene for these purposes”514. Simitis’ 
assessment of the EU foreign policy record shows that he acknowledged that the 
Union had enjoyed limited success as an international actor. As the leadership 
style thesis predicts, however, this information did not lead him to question the 
benefits of conducting Greek policy towards Turkey through the EU.
Several Greek foreign policy makers have identified the provisions of the 
Helsinki decision regarding Cyprus’ accession to the EU regardless of the 
resolution of the Cyprus problem as a benefit of great significance515. This aspect 
of the Helsinki strategy was not particularly controversial. In fact, Greece had 
made concessions in order to secure progress in Cyprus’ accession process prior 
to Simitis’ Premiership. In 1995, the Greek government exchanged its consent to 
the EU-Turkey Customs Union for an EU commitment regarding the opening of 
Cyprus’ accession negotiations. Similarly, the main opposition party conceded 
that the relevant provisions of the agreement reached in Helsinki were beneficial 
for Greece and Cyprus516.
The provisions of the agreement regarding Greco-Turkish relations were far 
more controversial. During a debate in Parliament a few days after the Helsinki 
summit, Simitis argued that the decision that Greece had secured constituted both 
a great success for and a vindication of his government’s foreign policy. In 
contrast, the leader of the main opposition party reiterated the view that the
514 Constantine Simitis, Speech in Parliament, 9 December 1996, emphasis added; see also 
Simitis, “Eleven Goals...”, op. cit. esp. p. 135
515 Simitis,Policy..., op. cit. pp. 99-101
516 Constantine Karamanlis, Speech in Parliament, 15 December 1999
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government’s foreign policy constituted little more that a series of fiascos and 
stated: “ ...if  this is how you were vindicated in Helsinki as well, God help us! 
God knows what ills await us (as a result of) your consecutive vindications!”517 
In sharp contrast to the assertion that a “widely shared consensus” has been 
reached regarding fundamental foreign policy issues518, the fact that the 
opposition remained skeptical of the government’s policy even in the aftermath 
of the Helsinki decision shows that the logic that the Helsinki strategy was based 
on was not invariably shared and therefore it reinforces the causal significance of 
Simitis’ beliefs, as theorised by the leadership style thesis.
The Prime Minister’s assessment of the outcome of the negotiations leaves no 
doubt regarding his calculations. The decision made in Helsinki constituted the 
culmination of communitisation: in Helsinki, the transformation of Greco- 
Turkish relations into EU-Turkey relations was completed. The main benefit of 
the agreement was the role that the EU would assume in case Turkey did not 
comply with the conditions that Greece had introduced. Whilst discussing the 
benefits of the Helsinki decision for Greece during the Parliamentary debate 
mentioned above, Simitis reiterated the significance of the rules that Greece had 
managed to establish, which he had argued as early as in 1992519: “The rules of 
the game are clear to all. There is only one way: the peaceful settlement of the 
disputes and their submission to the International Court of Justice in The Hague. 
Endless dialogue, arbitration, reference to third (parties) in order to resolve the 
disputes are not included in the rules of the game. Each candidate country is 
obliged to act within a reasonable time. If it does not do so by 2004, the Union 
can also intervene, (it can) even suggest that a reasonable time has elapsed (and) 
that it is necessary to submit the dispute a candidate country (is involved in) to 
the (International) Court of Justice”520. Simitis confirmed this in his memoirs. 
“The European Union”, he wrote, “was being transformed into an agent 
(responsible for) monitoring progress in the resolution (of Greco-Turkish 
problems) and, in the final analysis, into its guarantor...from now on the Union
517 Ibid.
518 Couloumbis -  Dalis, op. cit. p. 84
519 C. Simitis, “Balkans 2000: Facets of National Strategy”, Kathimerini, 10 May 1992 reprinted 
in C. Simitis, Nationalistic Populism or National Strategy? (in Greek), Athens, Gnosi, 1992, p. 
107
520 Constantine Simitis, Speech in Parliament, 15 December 1999, emphasis added
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itself would be the one that would have to monitor Turkey’s European course and 
place obstacles every time it realised or was indicated to it by a concerned 
country that it was not fulfilling its obligations”521.
Shortly after the conservatives won the 2004 general election, Simitis expressed 
his concern regarding the new government’s alteration of his policy towards 
Turkey and reiterated his views regarding the benefits of the Helsinki decision 
for Greece. “Greece’s strategy... (aimed) to render the resolution of the problems 
in the region a function of enlargement and the future course of the European 
Union. (To make) the European Union seek their resolution. (To make) the 
European Union consider them obstacles that must be overcome and work 
herself to overcome them. That strategy was absolutely successful...Greece 
managed to change things. Greece managed to integrate her pursuits within a 
broader European Union policy. Because it implemented a strategy different 
from that of bilateral discussion and confrontation, a European strategy”522.
Indeed, earlier EU decisions had acknowledged submission of territorial disputes 
to the ICJ as the appropriate method of settlement. The 15 July 1996 declaration 
stated that territorial disputes should be submitted to the ICJ. Furthermore, the 
Council requested the Presidency to invite Turkey to indicate whether it 
committed itself to this principle. It remained unclear however what the EU’s 
response would be if Turkey declined to respond or if  its response were 
unsatisfactory. Similarly, the member-states’ common position for the 29 April 
1997 meeting of the EU-Turkey Association Council did not indicate what the 
next step would be if the committee of wise men did not manage to make joint 
recommendations or if its recommendations were not accepted by Turkey.
The Luxembourg decision addressed this shortcoming to a certain extent. The 
decision stated that members of the European conference must share a 
commitment to the settlement of territorial disputes by peaceful means, in 
particular through the jurisdiction of the ICJ, that states that subscribed to this 
principle would be invited to participate in the European Conference and that
521 Simitis,Policy..., op. cit. pp. 99, 101
522 C. Simitis, “The End of a Strategy”, Ta Nea, 23 April 2004, emphasis added
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initially the offer would be addressed to a group of countries that included 
Turkey. The implication was clear. If Turkey declined to commit itself to a 
judicial settlement of the disputes, it would not participate in the European 
Conference. In that case, however, Greco-Turkish problems would remain 
unresolved and Greece would still lack the means to change Turkey’s policy.
The Helsinki strategy was formulated in order to address this shortcoming. 
According to the Presidency Conclusions, by the end of 2004 the European 
Council would review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes “in order 
to promote their settlement through the International Court of Justice”. Not only 
would the EU monitor Turkey’s compliance and consider the implications of 
non-compliance for Turkey’s progress towards accession, but it would also 
“promote” the judicial settlement of outstanding disputes. As was mentioned 
above, the type of conditionality that the EU applies within the context of 
enlargement does not entail EU interventions either coercive or supportive. 
Despite the fact that it was never made explicit how exactly the European 
Council would perform this function, this particular provision of the agreement 
attributed to the EU a role considerably more pro-active than that enlargement 
conditionality usually entails precisely as Simitis’ notion of communitisation 
prescribed523.
523 It has been suggested that the phrase “at the latest by the end of 2004” did not establish a 
deadline for compliance with the principle of the judicial settlement of disputes, but merely the 
point in time at which the European Council would “review the situation relating to any 
outstanding disputes”. This particular interpretation of the Presidency Conclusions is based on the 
usage of commas in the text and a letter that Finnish Prime Minister Lipponen sent his Turkish 
counterpart. Indeed, whilst presenting the outcome of the summit to the EP, Lipponen argued that 
the European Council would merely “re-examine the situation again” by the end of 2004, but he 
also stated that the European Council would “then...strive to promote their settlement in the 
International Court of Justice”. At any rate, the Greek government never accepted this 
interpretation of the Presidency Conclusions. It might be suggested that this particular 
interpretation is not entirely plausible. The European Council reviews candidate countries’ 
progress towards accession annually. In fact, the European Commission had submitted to the 
European Council two reports on Turkey’s progress prior to the Helsinki summit despite the fact 
that Turkey was not a candidate at that time. Both reports discussed Greco-Turkish relations and 
the Cyprus problem. In this sense, it is difficult to see what purpose the phrase “at the latest by 
the end of 2004” served, if it did not establish a deadline for compliance, as the European Council 
would have reviewed the situation annually even if  this particular phrase had not been inserted 
into the Presidency Conclusions. For the Greek government’s interpretation see Constantine 
Simitis, Speech in Parliament, 15 December 1999; for the usage of commas in the text of the 
Presidency Conclusions see “Finnish Olives”, The Times, 15 December 1999; for Lipponen’s 
letter see “Tense Hours Precede Ecevit Taking his Place for EU ‘Family Snapshot’”, Turkish 
Probe, 20 December 1999; for Lipponen’s speech in the EP see P. Lipponen, The Finnish 
Presidency Mid the Outcome of the European Council Meeting in Helsinki, Speech in the 
European Parliament, 14 December 1999, available at
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Foreign Minister Papandreou also emphasised the role of the EU as a benefit of 
the Helsinki strategy. When it was pointed out to Papandreou in August 1999 
that, while he was speaking of a historic opportunity for the improvement of 
Greco-Turkish relations, his approach to the issue of the Turkish candidacy 
appeared halfhearted, he responded: “But our approach is positive and I believe 
that most of us have realised that Turkey’s European course is in Greece’s 
interest, that it is in Greece’s interest to assign to the European Union the 
responsibility o f a systematic surveillance, monitoring and assessment o f  
Turkey”524. During an interview with Greek daily “Ta Nea” in September 1999, 
Foreign Minister Papandreou made explicit that if Turkey was asked to meet the 
conditions that the EU had outlined in previous European Council decisions and 
the EU was charged with monitoring Turkey’s compliance, upgrading Turkey to 
candidate country status would serve Greek interests best. In contrast to what the 
Europeanisation thesis predicts, when the interviewer pointed out that the 
government was considering consenting to upgrading Turkey without having 
received anything in return, Papandreou did not argue that offering Turkey 
membership of the EU would constitute a greater incentive for Turkey to comply 
with Greek demands compared with the offer to participate in the European 
Conference, which Turkey had rejected. Instead, he distinguished between a 
policy that would lead to the EU’s involvement and one that would not. “Is it in 
Greece’s interest for Turkey to be a candidate for European Union membership, 
to move and be assessed on the basis of the principles of democracy and good 
neighbourliness? And therefore for the European Union to exercise constant 
surveillance as is the case with other candidate countries and for Turkey itself to 
have to fulfill its obligations in all fields? Or is it in Greece’s interest for Turkey 
to be left out of such a process?” 525
It is often pointed out that the transformation of Greco-Turkish relations into EU- 
Turkish relations and the inclusion of Turkey in the integration process would
http://presidency.fmland.fi/netcomin/News/showarticle2392_1326.html
524 George A. Papandreou interview with Christina Poulidou, Avyi, 29 August 1999, emphasis 
added
525 George A. Papandreou interview with Notis Papadopoulos, Ta Nea, 27 September 1999, 
emphasis added
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lead Turkey to abandon the outdated practice of using or threatening to use force 
and accept the modem practice of settling disputes in accordance with 
international law, which was associated with the EU526. This is often referred to 
as “the Europeanisation of Turkey” and was indeed considered one of the 
benefits of the Helsinki decision for Greece. According to Simitis: “The clearing 
of the European road for Turkey was allowed. This development will have 
positive effects for the region in the long run, as the neighbouring country, 
during the phase of both its candidacy and especially its full accession, will be 
gradually adjusting to the requirements of the Union. There is no doubt that these 
adjustments require systematic effort and time, as there is no doubt that whatever 
efforts (are made) will meet resistance, but the European choice constitutes 
almost a one way street for the neighbouring (country) and she is obliged to 
follow it”527. The process of Europeanisation, in the sense of adjustment to EU 
requirements, would limit the role of the military in the policy-making process 
and lead Turkey to abandon (the threat of) the use of force, which was 
considered incompatible with the very logic of integration, and pursue the 
peaceful settlement of disputes.
As has been pointed out, some believe that progress in EU-Turkey relations is 
unlikely to result in successful democratisation and that even if the latter were 
achieved Turkish policy would remain aggressive and therefore Greco-Turkish 
problems would remain unresolved. On the contrary, progress in EU-Turkey 
relations -  which Greek concessions have made possible -  is more likely to 
embolden Turkey and result in further aggression. Consequently, “even modest 
progress of the EU-Turkey relations should be resisted” as part of an attempt to 
prevent an increase in Turkey’s relative power528.
This particular critique of communitisation indicates a limited understanding of 
the logic underlying Simitis’ preferred policy. It should be pointed out that the
526 Interviews with advisor to Prime Minister Simitis, 26 March 2008 and high-ranking Greek 
government official, 2 April 2008; see also K. Ifantis, “Searching for Options: Balancing 
Strategies and Systemic Polarity” in K. Arvanitopoulos -  M. Koppa (eds), 30 Years o f Greek 
Foreign Policy 1974-2004 (in Greek), Athens, A. A. Livani, 2005, p. 437 and P. C. Ioakimidis, 
Greece’s Position in the International, European and Regional System: Historical 
Conceptualisations and Contemporary Reality (in Greek), Athens, Themelio, 2007, pp. 37-8
527 Simitis,Policy..., op. cit. p. 100
528 For these beliefs and a critique see Ifantis, “Greece’s Turkish Dilemmas...”, op. cit. p. 390
169
Europeanisation of Turkey as a benefit of the Helsinki decision was a secondary 
consideration. First, Greek foreign policy makers were aware of the fact that it 
was not certain at all that this benefit would materialise because it was clear that 
the pursuit of membership and the process of Europeanisation were not 
unchallenged in Turkey. Second, it was clear that the Europeanisation of Turkey 
would require a considerable period of time. By contrast, the agreement that the 
Greek government secured provided that the European Council would assess 
progress in the resolution of outstanding disputes by the end of 2004. Finally and 
most significantly, it was not certain that the Europeanisation of Turkey would 
result in the resolution of Greco-Turkish problems, if the provisions that Greece 
had proposed were not incorporated in the Helsinki decision. While attributing 
Turkish aggression to the role of the military in the Turkish policy-making 
process was consistent with various statements and reports by military officials, 
it remained unclear whether a Turkish government free from the influence of the 
military would adopt significantly different positions529. According to 
Undersecretary Rozakis: “ ...on the other side of the Aegean there is a 
government in which the precise balance of power we ignore. We ignore 
specifically who really decides on foreign policy issues. And no matter how 
strange this seems, we are not the only ones who ignore this. There are other 
countries too that ignore this and wonder and investigate at this moment what are 
those main forces that formulate policy530.” At any rate, the role of the military in 
Turkish politics would be addressed within the context of the Copenhagen 
criteria, not the additional conditions that Greece wished to introduce. 
Consequently, if aggression were the result of the role of the military and the 
latter were limited as a result of compliance with the Copenhagen criteria, 
Greece would benefit from the fact that Turkey would refrain from using force or 
threatening to use force, yet differences of approach to the resolution of Greco- 
Turkish problems might remain. This is precisely why Greece would not 
consider a “virtual candidacy” for Turkey. The latter would not allow Greece to 
construct a framework for EU-Turkey relations, where the rules for the resolution
529 As an advisor to Prime Minister Simitis pointed out to the author (14 July 2008), Greek 
foreign policy makers did not believe that the military was exclusively responsible for Turkey’s 
aggressive policy towards Greece, as it was the Turkish Parliament that passed a resolution (8 
June 1995), which declared that an expansion of Greek territorial waters would constitute a casus 
belli and authorised the Turkish government to use military instruments.
530 Christos Rozakis, Speech in Parliament, 6 December 1996
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of Greco-Turkish problems and the role for the EU that Simitis had envisioned 
would be incorporated.
Finally, it should also be noted that both Simitis and Papandreou believed that 
the framework for EU-Turkey relations that Greece had proposed was beneficial 
to all parties involved: Greece, Turkey and the EU531. In fact, when he was asked 
whether Greece could say that it had won during the press conference after the 
first day of the Helsinki summit, Simitis responded: “Excuse me, but this is a 
way to perceive the problem that does not correspond with the way I see things. 
If I were to use this word, I would use it.. .with regard to our effort for peace, 
friendship and cooperation. With regard to our effort to persuade that Greece is a 
country that wants broader cooperation in this region. This is the message of this 
decision. We never support the view ‘up with Greece, down with the rest’. We 
are together with everyone else in the same course for prosperity, growth and 
cooperation”532.
Doing the right thing
As was shown in the previous chapter, Greek foreign policy makers did not 
identify a discrepancy between Greek policy towards Turkey and established EU 
practice. Consequently and in contrast to what the socialisation thesis predicts, 
there is no indication that they became convinced of the inappropriateness of 
Greek policy within the context of the EU. The evidence shows that Greek 
foreign policy makers were particularly concerned with the costs and benefits of 
the alternatives they were considering. While Greek policy was not considered to 
contradict established EU practice, the preferences of the Greek government 
were considered to diverge from those of its EU partners. The debate regarding 
the role of the EU was structured by the belief that Greco-Turkish relations 
should be “communitised” and thus it revolved around what Greek foreign policy
531 Interview with high-ranking Greek government official, 2 April 2008
532 Constantine Simitis, Press Conference, Helsinki European Council, 10 December 1999; See 
also Constantine Simitis and Paavo Lipponen, Joint statements, Athens, 2 December 1999, 
available at http://www.pasok.gr/oldwebsite/gr/nea/021299simlip.html. accessed on 7 February 
2008, which were made before the summit.
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makers expected of their EU partners. In fact, it was argued that it was Greece’s 
EU partners that had on certain occasions behaved inappropriately.
First, Greek foreign policy makers believed that certain EU member-states were 
successfully presenting the lack of progress in EU-Turkey relations as the result 
of Greece’s stance, while in fact they remained unwilling to accept substantial 
progress. Deputy Foreign Minister Papandreou argued that they were insincere 
and that they lacked commitment to EU norms, such as respect for human rights 
and democratic political institutions. In an article published in June 1997, he 
argued that Foreign Minister Pangalos’ statement regarding Turkey’s place in 
Europe had made “some of our partners start ‘worrying’, realising that Greece 
can no longer be used as a scapegoat and an alibi of any type for Euro-Turkish 
relations” and that “the public relations game between Europe and Turkey which 
was full of talk and rhetorical schemata for domestic consumption was over”533. 
Papandreou reiterated this position in the aftermath of the Luxembourg European 
Council. While discussing Turkey’s reaction to the decision made in 
Luxembourg, he argued that the EU was not without blame. “EU circles”, he 
argued, “and especially some of our partners, were using an easy double-faced 
policy towards Turkey. While they were speaking as if she were their favourite 
child, they were essentially keeping her away from Europe. In relations between 
our partners and Turkey lip service was being paid to human rights and 
democratic procedures. They were always speaking of Turkey’s geo-strategic 
importance for Europe. Words of flattery were a cheap means of gaining 
sympathies which Ankara was taking advantage of in its domestic political game. 
And several had also found an easy alibi: Greece.”534 The benefit for Greece, he 
concluded, was that the practice described above “was defeated in Luxembourg”.
Similarly, in his letter to Commission President Santer, Prime Minister Simitis 
argued that the Commission’s intention to submit two proposals for regulations 
regarding EU financial assistance to Turkey based on different treaty articles 
“offended every sense of logic and legality”535. Finally, in a dossier on EU- 
Turkey relations submitted to member-states’ Foreign Ministers and the
533 Papandreou, “Greece, Europe and Turkey”, op. cit.
534 George A. Papandreou, “After Luxembourg”, To Vima, 21 December 1997
535 Marakis, “Simitis-Santer...”, op. cit.
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Commission, the Greek government argued that any change in the conditions for 
the improvement of EU-Turkey relations set out in previous EU decisions that 
could be interpreted as a relaxation of the EU’s commitment to the principles 
included in those decisions would undermine the EU’s credibility536.
In the aftermath of the Luxembourg European Council summit, this problem 
assumed a different form. Certain EU member-states proposed what Simitis and 
Papandreou referred to as a “virtual candidacy” for Turkey. As the leadership 
style thesis predicts, Greece was unwilling to consider this alternative because it 
would fail to establish rules that would attribute a role in Greco-Turkish relations 
to the EU. Foreign Minister Papandreou systematically argued that if  Greece’s 
EU partners were to refuse this role, there would be no agreement in Helsinki 
and they would be to blame. “In this vision, of course, Turkey has a place, i f  our 
partners agree that they are ready to assume their responsibilities. If Europe is 
ready to face on the basis of its own European principles the great issues in the 
region: (the) Cyprus (problem), Greco-Turkish relations, the issues of 
democracy. I f  Europe is indeed ready to assume its responsibilities, Greece will 
be able to say yes so that candidate country status can be given to Turkey. If she 
is not, she will be responsible for the deadlock we will be facing”537.
Second, Greek foreign policy makers believed that it was inappropriate for other 
EU member-states to raise the issue of the Cyprus problem in an attempt to set its 
resolution as a precondition for Cyprus’ accession to the EU because such a 
linkage had not been established when the opening of accession negotiations 
with Cyprus had been decided. While discussing Cyprus’ prospects of accession 
to the EU, Foreign Minister Pangalos stated: “Unfortunately, two countries that 
play a leading role in the European Union, Germany and Great Britain, are now 
attempting to overlook the agreement regarding the opening of accession 
negotiations between Cyprus and the European Union six months after the end of 
the (Amsterdam) Intergovernmental Conference. This is an attitude that opposes 
any sense of political morality, a despicable behaviour”538. Simitis also argued 
that certain member-states appeared unwilling to implement the decision on
536 Adam, “We Will Take.. op. cit.
537 C. Korai, “George: Europe Will Be Responsible if ...”, Eleftherotypia, 6 December 1999
538 “Despicable Behaviour of Germany-Britain”, Eleftherotypia, 5 April 1997
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Cyprus’ accession. According to the Greek Prime Minister, the resolution of the 
Cyprus problem could not be linked with Cyprus’ accession because the issue 
had not been raised when the decision to open accession negotiations with 
Cyprus was made, despite the fact that the Cyprus problem was already twenty 
years old539.
Foreign Minister Pangalos was particularly critical of French President Chirac’s 
stance. After a meeting of the Council of Ministers at the end of April 1998, 
Pangalos argued that certain EU leaders were behaving as if they were taking 
part in a Turkish “beauty contest” and he referred to Chirac as the “star” of the 
latter540. The following day Pangalos argued that the French stance constituted an 
“exception” amongst member-states, which was “inexplicable”. “Some (of our 
partners)”, he stated, “have enormous interests, some (of our partners) have 
formulated a strategy, within which Turkey has such a place that allies and 
friends of centuries, such as France and Greece, are literally thrown away with 
utter indifference to the consequences of the behaviour of the current rulers of 
France”. He also argued that France was the only member-state that had “dared” 
to link EU-Turkey relations with the accession of Cyprus541. Commenting on the 
issue, government spokesman Reppas stated: “ ...(Minister for European Affairs) 
Mr. Moscovici states that Greece’s stance is incomprehensible, when it blocks 
the financial regulation. Now, an average mind can easily grasp what is 
incomprehensible. That is whether that, which Greece as (a) policy, expresses 
and implements or the position of those, who from time to time ignore in an 
opportunistic fashion that Turkey is claiming Greek territory, questioning Greek 
sovereignty over small inhabited islands, where there is economic activity, where 
there are schools, churches, public services, only to serve her own interests is 
incomprehensible”542.
539 “Simitis’ Displeasure with Partners”, Eleftherotypia, 15 January 1999; “Simitis Criticises 
Some EU States over Stance on Cyprus’ EU Accession”, Greek Embassy in Washington Press 
Office News Archive, 15 January 1999, available at 
http://www.greekembassy.org/embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?
office=3&folder=280&article=3778. accessed on 17 January 2008
540 “French Protest for her ‘Star’ President”, Eleftherotypia, 30 April 1998
541 Theodore Pangalos interview to Kyra Adam, op. cit.
542 “French Protest...”, op. cit.
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Finally, the most striking piece of evidence is the inconsistency between the 
Greek government’s stance on the Turkish and the Cypriot candidacy543. 
According to the socialisation thesis, adherence to internalised behavioural rules 
should be expected to be consistent across issues and over time. While Greece 
insisted that Greco-Turkish disputes should be submitted to the ICJ and settled 
within a specific timeframe prior to the opening of accession negotiations with 
Turkey, it also insisted on an explicit commitment that Cyprus would join the EU 
regardless of the resolution of the Cyprus problem.
The offer of membership as an incentive for compliance
While it is clear that change in Greek policy towards Turkey was not driven by
considerations of what constitutes appropriate behaviour for EU member-states,
there is evidence that Greek foreign policy makers calculated that the Helsinki
strategy would offer Turkey greater incentive to comply with Greek demands.
Nonetheless, this was a secondary consideration. Greece had made explicit that
it preferred an agreement that would grant Turkey candidate country status and
introduce additional EU rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece to the
status quo. The status quo, however, remained preferable to an agreement that
would grant Turkey candidate country status without establishing additional
rules. The status quo was preferable to such an agreement, despite the fact that
the latter would offer Turkey greater incentive to comply with Greek demands.
The consistently categorical refusal to consider this alternative indicates that the
greater incentive for Turkey to comply with Greek demands was not considered
to be the main benefit of the Helsinki strategy and it is therefore inconsistent
with the Europeanisation thesis. Indeed, Greek foreign policy makers -  including
those who identified the greater incentive for Turkey to comply with Greek
demands as a benefit of the Helsinki strategy -  make explicit that without
additional EU rules that would establish a deadline for Turkey’s compliance and
the course of action that the EU would take in case of non-compliance there was
no guarantee that Greco-Turkish problems would be resolved in a manner
543 See also H. Sjursen -  K. E. Smith, “Justifying EU Foreign Policy: The Logics Underpinning 
EU Enlargement” in Tonra B. -  T. Christiansen (eds), Rethinking European Union Foreign 
Policy, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2004, pp. 137-9
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consistent with Greek preferences and therefore the role of the EU was a more 
important benefit than the incentive for Turkey to pursue policy change544. 
Finally and in contrast to what the Europeanisation thesis predicts, this 
calculation was not the result of an assessment of EU-level dynamics. As was 
shown in the previous chapter, Greek foreign policy makers did not identify 
enlargement conditionality as a relevant established EU practice. Consequently, 
the calculation of the greater incentive for Turkey to comply with Greek 
demands as a benefit of the Helsinki strategy was not the result of an 
examination of Greek policy towards Turkey and EU enlargement conditionality 
as alternatives.
Process tracing the evidence made it possible to identify Greek foreign policy 
makers’ calculations that are not predicted by the explanations formulated and 
tested here. As was mentioned above, this is an advantage inherent in this 
method. Simitis has argued that the Helsinki decision relieved Greece from the 
burden of being the only member-state that objected to the Turkish candidacy545. 
This calculation is not to suggest, however, that the preferences of Greece’s 
partners were the cause of change in Greek policy. Greek foreign policy makers 
have consistently argued that disagreements as such should not necessarily be 
avoided and they have made explicit that exercising the right to abstain from or 
veto an EU decision does not constitute inappropriate behaviour. When a reporter 
pointed out that Greece had objected to the German Presidency’s draft that 
identified Turkey as a candidate country and abstained from the vote on Solana’s 
appointment as High Representative for the CFSP and asked whether Greece was 
-  yet again -  appearing to be the enfant terrible of the EU during a press 
conference after the Cologne European Council summit, Simitis responded: 
“Why do you see it that way? We expressed our opinion.. .sometimes we say yes, 
sometimes we say no, sometimes we abstain, depending on what is in Greece’s 
interest.. .and to refer back to your expression, I would like to tell you that we are 
neither a good child, nor a bad child. We are people with knowledge”546.
544 Interviews with Greek Foreign Ministry official, 19 May 2008 and advisor to Foreign Minister 
Papandreou, 12 May 2008
545 Simitis,Policy..., op. cit. p. 101
546 C. Simitis, Press Conference, Cologne European Council summit, op. cit.
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Both Papandreou and Pangalos have expressed similar views. According to 
Pangalos: “Vetoing funding is the right of a country to deny a Community 
policy, even alone, if it thinks that it has interests of great significance. Greece is 
not the only country that is isolated on an issue. There are Community policies of 
great extent and great significance, which did not move forward for decades 
because one country found that it should not let them move forward”547. “We 
have an inferiority complex here”, he continued, “(according to which) we are 
doing something that is isolating us, we should be with the others, we should not 
differentiate ourselves”548. When Papandreou was asked whether Greece’s 
policy towards Turkey was dictated by Greece’s fear of being isolated within the 
EU, he replied: “That does not concern us”549. Especially not when it was 
believed that Greece’s EU partners and EU institutions were behaving 
inappropriately.
Furthermore, it is clear that Greece’s stance was not considered unsustainable. 
As was shown in the previous chapter, Greek foreign policy makers had 
repeatedly made explicit that exercising the right to veto the Turkish candidacy 
was a viable option that Greece would have to take if its positions were not 
accepted in Helsinki. Simitis was unwilling to bear the burden of confrontation 
with Greece’s partners over an arrangement that had proved ineffective. As the 
leadership style thesis predicts, however, he also remained unwilling to abandon 
his preferred strategy in the face of the unfavourable stance of his counterparts.
Finally, Simitis’ considerations regarding the timing of the decision confirm this 
view. Simitis wished to ensure that the decision on the Turkish candidacy and the 
decision on Greece’s accession to EMU would not be made at the same time 
because he wished to avoid the possibility of a linkage between the two issues550. 
This was precisely because Greece did not concede to its partners and differences 
of opinion still remained. In fact, the distance between the position of Greece and
547 Theodore Pangalos, Speech in Parliament, 29 January 1999
548 Ibid.
549 George A. Papandreou interview with Louis Prados, El Pais, 3 October 1999
550 Interview with high-ranking Greek government official, 2 April 2008; N. Marakis, “Two and a 
Half Lines for Helsinki”, op cit; N. Marakis, “Who Says ‘Yes’ and Who Says ‘No’ to Turkey’s 
Accession to the EU”, To Vima, 28 November 1999; A. Papahelas, “13 Questions -  Answers: 
Myths and Truths about the Summit”, To Vima, 5 December 1999; N. Marakis, “The Party of the 
Veto”, To Vima, 5 December 1999
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that of the rest of the member-states grew greater when the Helsinki strategy was 
formulated. Whereas previously the rest of the member-states wished to grant 
Turkey candidate country status in a symbolic manner and Greece insisted on the 
conditions that it had managed to establish in Luxembourg, with the Helsinki 
strategy Greece sought to establish even more restrictive conditions. In fact, 
when Simitis presented the Helsinki strategy to the inner Cabinet, a member of 
the latter told him that it was “impossible for him to succeed”551. Consequently, it 
was understood that the pursuit of the Helsinki strategy would require 
confrontation. Despite the fact that the divergence between the positions of 
Greece and those of its partners had grown greater, Greece could still secure the 
agreement it preferred by threatening to veto any agreement that would not 
include the provisions it had proposed. Being aware of the difficulty of the 
negotiations, Simitis did not wish to offer his counterparts the opportunity to 
express a threat to exclude Greece from EMU -  a threat that was not available 
within the context of negotiations on enlargement -  in an attempt to counter 
Greece’s threat to veto the Turkish candidacy552.
The economic benefits of foreign policy change
While Greek foreign policy makers were concerned with the costs and benefits of 
the alternatives they considered and they were particularly aware of the 
economic costs of their policy, they were willing to accept these costs. In fact it 
would appear that it was not foreign policy that ought to accommodate fiscal 
policy, as the balancing thesis predicts, but vice versa. While discussing public 
finances, Simitis explained that Greece needed to overcome structural 
weaknesses without overlooking the necessities of national defence. “We need to 
combine these two goals”, he said, “and their combination goes through the 
answer to the problem of public finances”553. In the face of criticism of the 
government’s economic policy in early 1997, Prime Minister Simitis argued that 
high defence expenditure constituted a constraining factor, yet such expenditure
551 Simitis,Policy..., op. cit. p. 96
552 For these threats see Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe..., op. cit. esp. pp. 63-5; G. Schneider 
-  L. E. Cederman, “The Change of Tide in Political Cooperation: A Limited Information Model 
of European Integration”, International Organization, 48: 4, 1994, esp. pp. 636-7
553 Costas Simitis, Reading of the government’s programmatic statements in Parliament, 10 
October 1996
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was considered necessary at that time554. The implications of Greek policy 
towards Turkey for the government’s economic policy were scarcely discussed 
after the armaments programme was adopted and there was no indication that the 
government was considering changes in its policy towards Turkey that would 
make cutting defence spending possible.
Similarly, Foreign Minister Pangalos did not consider cutting defence spending 
possible, perhaps not even desirable either, and this is despite the fact that he 
acknowledged the implications of Greek policy towards Turkey for the Greek 
economy. During an interview in May 1996 he stated: “Defence spending of 
such magnitude does not allow for economic growth...on the other hand, such 
circumstances rule out any thought of cutting defence spending. I would say it is 
necessary to find new resources for armaments”. “I am not suggesting that we 
should become just like Israel”, he continued, “but we should be headed in that 
direction...In order to exercise diplomacy, I need military power”555. After a 
meeting with Defence Minister Tsohatzopoulos in November 1996 he stated: 
“Greece has not been armed sufficiently until now. When one makes such 
moves, one can use them in order to exercise influence in one’s international 
relations. Other countries do so systematically. We should do so too. There is 
total coincidence of opinion between the two ministers on this”556. Even Finance 
Minister Yannos Papantoniou, when asked about the economic implications of 
defence policy, stated that he considered a “strong defence” and a “strong 
economy” to be “inter-related concepts” and that speeding up macroeconomic 
stabilisation was necessary in order to find new resources to finance the 
armaments programme557.
On one occasion, however, the Prime Minister indicated that foreign policy 
should change so as to give the country greater power and make cutting defence 
spending possible. After a meeting of the Cabinet in November 1996 he stated: 
“The armaments programme constitutes a great burden. Therefore we are obliged
554 G. Karelias, “There Is Only One Way...”, Eleftherotypia, 12 February 1997
555 Theodore Pangalos interview, Eleftherotypia, 19 May 1996
556 “They Agreed on Everything...”, op. cit.
557 “And Yet Armaments Were Discussed”, Eleftherotypia, 19 June 1996; “The Under-privileged 
at 6 Feet”, Eleftherotypia, 20 November 1996
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to...consider our foreign policy, in order to gain greater strength on the 
international scene, in order to be able to change, perhaps, in the future these 
expenses, which are imposed on us by circumstances and the need to defend our 
national rights”558. On the other hand, Simitis does not appear to consider the role 
of the EU as a substitute for military capabilities. During his speech at PASOK’s 
1996 conference he stated: “We have developed a multi-faceted diplomatic 
campaign...in all international organisations (informing our partners of) the 
character of the Turkish threat and the dangers of de-stabilisation that Ankara 
creates in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean. We have international law 
on our side. Yet international relations do not always and automatically move in 
the trajectory of law. Law must be accompanied by power. And this is what we 
are doing. We have no illusions regarding the limits of our interventions in 
international organisations. Neither should it escape us that even our partners in 
the European Union seem to be understating the dangers of Turkish 
aggressiveness”559.
At any rate, no course of action that would qualify as an attempt to reconfigure 
internal and external balancing was taken by the government at that time. On the 
contrary, the Prime Minister tried to elicit understanding from Greece’s EU 
partners regarding Greek fiscal difficulties. In a letter addressed to his EU 
counterparts ahead of the Dublin European Council summit, he argued that the 
EU needed to show the “necessary sensitivity and solidarity our people expect” 
with regard to issues that were of concern to Greece. He was referring to Greco- 
Turkish relations. “Unfortunately”, he wrote, “Greece is facing great difficulties 
in meeting certain demands of the integration process. One of the main reasons 
for these difficulties is the continued aggressive behaviour of neighbouring 
Turkey, which remains a source of instability in the broader region and (a) threat 
of the sovereign rights of Greece. This situation affects Greece’s position and 
choices on a series of other issues. For instance, our obligation to adopt a new 
armaments programme that constitutes an additional annual burden, which is 
over 1% of our country’s GDP in the medium term and renders the timely 
meeting of the Maastricht criteria almost unfeasible560”. During a speech in
558 “Measures: For the Sake of Unification”, Eleftherotypia, 20 November 1996
559 “Speech Against Centralisation...”, op. cit.
560 “Support Us Or We Are Missing Maastricht”, Eleftherotypia, 4 December 1996
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Parliament, he confirmed that Greece was seeking provisions that would allow a 
state to deviate from the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact under special 
circumstances, including cases of increased defence spending561.
Furthermore, it was argued that the evolution of the EU was going to remedy the 
problem. During a debate in Parliament, Finance Minister Papantoniou defended 
the government’s economic policy as one that was going to achieve EMU entry. 
The latter was going to benefit Greece not only in economic terms, but also in 
terms of its security. “Of course”, he stated, “I am omitting the crucial factor of 
our national security, that it is good for Greece to belong to a family. It is not 
good to be all alone in this difficult international surrounding, in which we live, 
with Turkey, which is a constant and most serious threat, with a northern 
horizon, which is never clear. It is good for reasons of national security, for 
reasons of cutting defence spending, to accede to this broader family, which may 
evolve, and it will evolve, into a defence and more substantial political union, 
which in the long run, not immediately of course, will give an answer to the 
major, the crucial, the enormous problem of national security, which we are 
facing. Therefore, the issue of economic success has a broader political and 
national significance”562. It was believed that economic policy would not simply 
accommodate, but substantially benefit foreign policy. These benefits, however, 
would only materialise in the long run and the relevant predictions regarding the 
evolution of the EU have thus far proved inaccurate.
In contrast to what the balancing thesis predicts, the Helsinki strategy was not 
conceived as an external balancing strategy that was selected because it was less 
costly than an internal balancing strategy. As was shown in the previous chapter, 
the Helsinki strategy was not considered an alternative to defence expenditure 
that would allow Greece to build up its military capabilities. Since the Helsinki 
strategy and defence expenditure were to be pursued in parallel, the Helsinki 
strategy did not constitute a solution to a guns-or-butter dilemma. Consequently, 
the calculation of the economic costs of the policy previously pursued towards 
Turkey does not constitute a convincing explanation of the formulation of the
561 Costas Simitis, Speech in Parliament, 9 December 1996
562 Yannos Papantoniou, Speech in Parliament, 19 May 1997
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Helsinki strategy. The calculation of these costs can at best be considered as one 
of various reasons why the improvement of Greco-Turkish relations and the 
resolution of Greco-Turkish problems were considered beneficial. In other 
words, Greece was not pursuing a costly policy; it was facing a costly problem. 
The balancing thesis fails to address the question of why the Helsinki strategy 
was selected in an attempt to resolve the costly problem that Turkey posed. In 
fact, when asked about the possibility of reducing defence expenditure after the 
Helsinki summit, Foreign Minister Papandreou argued that it was too soon. It 
was a “long-term thought” and it depended on the evolution of Greco-Turkish 
relations563. This view was confirmed by government spokesman Reppas a month 
later564. Similarly, former Finance and Defence Minister Papantoniou argued in 
2004 that reducing defence expenditure during the period 2000-2004 became 
possible because Greece had already acquired large and costly weapon systems 
and the government had managed to reduce functioning expenditure. As 
Papandreou had pointed out, further reduction depended on the evolution of 
Greco-Turkish relations565.
Finally, this explanation of change in Greek policy towards Turkey contradicts 
Simitis’ understanding of the relationship between economic and foreign policy. 
According to Simitis, successful economic governance domestically is the most 
significant determinant of bargaining power internationally566. Greek policy 
towards Turkey did not need to change so that economic policy goals could be 
achieved. On the contrary, a successful economic policy had empowered Greece 
and enabled Simitis to pursue communitisation. In that sense, the Helsinki 
decision reflected the success of macroeconomic stabilisation. “(The fact that) 
the economy and the process of accession (to EMU were) on course rendered 
Helsinki possible, that is to say the acknowledgement by the European Union 
that the issues with Turkey are not only bilateral but in essence they concern the
563 George A. Papandreou interview with Spyros Sourmelidis, Hmerisia, 24 December 1999
564 Briefing of political editors and members of the foreign press by the Minister for Press and 
Mass Media and Government Spokesman Dimitris Reppas, Athens, 21 January 2000
565 Y. Papantoniou, “The Modernisation of the Armed Forces and the Implementation of the 
Armaments Programmes”, 1 May 2004, available at http://www.papantoniou-
vannos. gr/gr/press_print.php?item=4. accessed on 30 April 2008
566 Simitis, “Towards...”, op. cit. pp. 13-16
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Union”567. In Simitis’ view, it was not economic weakness that necessitated the 
formulation of the Helsinki strategy; it was the powerful bargaining position that 
economic success had resulted in that made the formulation of the strategy 
possible.
Conclusions
The evidence showed that the role that the Helsinki decision attributed to the EU 
was considered the main benefit of the Helsinki strategy. This follows directly 
from Simitis’ notion of “communitisation”. If Greece could manage to convince 
its EU partners that Greco-Turkish problems were in fact EU problems and 
establish certain rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece as part of EU 
policy towards Turkey, the EU itself would be responsible for ensuring Turkey’s 
compliance with those rules. Indeed, the Helsinki decision set a timeframe for 
Turkey’s compliance, as by the end of 2004 the European Council would review 
the situation in order to promote the settlement of outstanding disputes by the 
ICJ. While there is evidence that the Helsinki strategy was considered to offer 
Turkey a greater incentive for compliance than the policy previously pursued, 
this calculation was not the outcome of an assessment of the discrepancy 
between Greek and EU policy and, thus, it cannot be attributed to EU-level 
dynamics. More significantly, the role that the Helsinki decision assigned to the 
EU was considered a more significant benefit for Greece than the incentive that 
the decision offered Turkey.
While Greek foreign policy makers were particularly concerned with the costs 
and benefits of the alternative courses of action they considered, economic costs 
and benefits do not appear to have featured prominently in their calculations. The 
financial burden of Greek policy towards Turkey was one of the reasons why 
Greek foreign policy makers wished to resolve Greco-Turkish problems, not the 
reason why the Helsinki strategy was selected to resolve them. Consequently,
567 Simitis, Policy.. op. cit. p. 39; Constantine Simitis, Speech in Parliament, 21 December 
1999; Constantine Simitis, Press Conference, Athens, 30 March 2000
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while the balancing thesis draws attention to a certainly relevant calculation, it 
fails to address the main research question of this project.
In contrast to what the socialisation thesis predicts, Greek foreign policy makers 
did not become convinced that the policy previously pursued was inappropriate 
within the context of the EU. In fact they systematically argued that Greece’s EU 
partners and the Commission had behaved inappropriately on several occasions. 
They raised the issue of the settlement of the Cyprus question as a pre-condition 
for Cyprus’ accession to the EU after the decision on the opening of accession 
negotiations with Cyprus had been made, they were willing to overlook Turkey’s 
democratic deficit and human rights violations and they were insincere regarding 
the content of the Turkish candidacy they appeared eager to promote. Finally, 
even the Commission attempted to circumvent the Greek veto on the regulation 
on financial assistance to Turkey by proposing a regulation based on a treaty 
article that allowed qualified majority voting.
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Chapter 8: Conclusions 
The Helsinki strategy as the communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations
The empirical puzzle that was presented in the first chapter of this thesis 
continues to constitute a real-world problem with considerable implications. 
While opposition to Turkish accession amongst the public -  according to the 
most recent Eurobarometer data, public opinion in the EU remains at best split 
over Turkey’s prospects of accession to the EU568 -  has highlighted the 
possibility that the ratification process of Turkey’s Accession Treaty will face 
obstacles -  especially in those member-states where a referendum will be held on 
the matter -  the negotiations amongst national governments that will precede the 
ratification process will be of at least equal significance and the Greek 
government will undoubtedly be a key actor. Predicting Greece’s stance on the 
conclusion of Turkey’s accession negotiations requires the identification of the 
causes that underlay the decision to grant Turkey candidate country status in the 
first place.
Empirical testing of alternative explanations of change in Greek policy towards 
Turkey that incorporated all the explanatory variables discussed in the literature 
showed that a domestic source of foreign policy change -  former Prime Minister 
Simitis’ unequivocal commitment to what he referred to as the 
“communitisation” of Greco-Turkish relations -  was of greater causal 
significance than the structural incentives associated with Greece’s relative 
power position, the economic implications of Greek policy towards Turkey, an 
external shock that demonstrated policy failure or the establishment of relevant 
EU foreign policy practices. The evidence showed that the leadership style thesis 
constitutes a parsimonious explanation of all three dimensions (the definition of 
the policy problem, the alternative courses of action considered and the
568 When asked “would you be in favour or against Turkey becoming a part of the European 
Union in the future”, thirty-one percent (31%) of those surveyed responded that they would be in 
favour, while fifty-five percent (55%) responded that they would be against. When asked “when 
Turkey complies with all the conditions set by the European Union, would you be strongly in 
favour, fairly in favour, fairly opposed or strongly opposed to the accession of Turkey in the 
European Union”, forty-five percent (45%) of those surveyed responded that they would be 
strongly or fairly in favour and an identical proportion responded that they would be strongly of 
fairly against. See European Commission, Eurobarometer: Public Opinion in the European 
Union, Report Number 69,2008
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assessment of the latter) of all four decisions (the 15 July 1996 EU statement, the 
member-states’ common position for the 29 April 1997 EU-Turkey Association 
Council, the Luxembourg European Council decision and the Helsinki European 
Council decision) that the Greek government pursued within the context of the 
EU throughout the period under investigation.
Simitis was reportedly enthused after the end of the Helsinki summit and 
congratulated by his counterparts on his negotiating skills569. A few months later, 
Simitis identified the moment when Greece’s positions were accepted by its 
partners in Helsinki as the happiest of his first term in office570. It was also 
reported in the press that the Prime Minister considered the Helsinki decision a 
“personal vindication”. As some of his advisors indicated, he had been arguing 
the need for a different policy towards Turkey for almost a decade, at a time 
when such views were considered “heretical”, he began to pursue this policy as 
soon as he was elected Prime Minister and he persisted in the face of criticism 
and calls to veto the Turkish candidacy so that PASOK could win the next 
election571. By the end of 2002, Simitis conceded that during his first term in 
office it was generally believed that Greece was teetering on the brink of 
destruction, his government was accused of constantly yielding in favour of 
Turkey and very few believed in a strategy that would not be bilateral in nature, 
but would integrate Greece’s problems into a European framework instead572.
Indeed, the evidence showed that Simitis selected the European Community as 
the default venue for Greek policy towards Turkey in the early 1990s. He 
believed that Greece lacked an effective strategy that could be pursued 
systematically and he argued that it would be best if Greece allowed Turkey to 
develop its relations with the Community further provided that problems in 
Greco-Turkish relations would be acknowledged as problems that concerned the 
Community and the latter would formulate rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards 
Greece. The beginning of Simitis’ Premiership, however, coincided with the
569 S. Liarelis, “Election against New Backdrop”, Eleftherotypia, 12 December 1999
570 Constantine Simitis interview with G. Karelias -  S. Liarelis, Eleftherotypia, 2 April 2000
5711. K. Pretenderis, “Mr. C. Simitis’ 100 Days”, To Vima, 12 December 1999, emphasis added
572 Constantine Simitis, Speech during the presentation of the three-volume work: “For a 
Powerful Greece in Europe and in the World”, Athens, 16 October 2002
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Imia/Kardak crisis. While such external shocks are considered powerful factors 
that drive policy change in the literature, the 1996 crisis performed no such 
function. The ideas that Greek policy towards Turkey was based on were not 
discredited, support for policy change did not emerge and therefore no window 
of opportunity for Simitis to pursue a policy closer to his own preferences was 
opened. The dominant view was that the government’s management of the crisis 
had led the country to a humiliating defeat. The government was in fact accused 
of treason. The government’s immediate response was to veto further progress in 
Turkey’s relations with the EU. Simitis’ views regarding the necessity of 
communitisation, however, remained unchallenged. In fact, he interpreted the 
crisis as evidence that confirmed his beliefs regarding the necessity of his 
preferred course of action. The period between the Imia/Kardak crisis and the 
Helsinki summit (January 1996 - December 1999) was one of systematic efforts 
to break from the situation that the crisis had created and realise Simitis’ vision 
for foreign policy reform.
Indeed only weeks after his election as Prime Minister, the government tried to 
have a statement adopted by the Council of Ministers that identified Greco- 
Turkish problems as problems that concerned the EU. While the Greek 
government was initially unsuccessful, Simitis continued to tour EU member- 
states’ capitals in an attempt to convince his counterparts of the necessity of EU 
rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece and a few months later, in July 
1996 Greece managed to have such a statement adopted. Not only was the EU 
expressing Greece’s views, but it was also assuming a role in Greco-Turkish 
relations as the Council was requesting the Presidency to invite Turkey to 
confirm that it was committed to the principles mentioned in the statement, 
which included the principle of judicial settlement of disputes. In exchange 
Greece lifted its veto of EU financial assistance to Turkey within the context of 
Euro-Mediterranean cooperation despite the fact that Turkey had not taken the 
steps that Greece had defined as preconditions for lifting its veto. Having 
established the principle of judicial settlement of disputes at the EU level, the 
Greek government wished to involve the EU further. Indeed, the EU assumed a 
more pro-active role in April 1997, when it was agreed that the Dutch Presidency 
would accommodate exchanges between two groups of experts appointed by the
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two countries and instructed to make suggestions regarding procedural aspects of 
the resolution of Greco-Turkish problems. While little became of this, the EU’s 
involvement in Greco-Turkish relations was unprecedented. Finally, in 
December 1997 Greece managed to secure a decision that communitised Greco- 
Turkish relations at the highest political level, that is to say at the level of the 
European Council. Turkey had still not met the conditions that Greece had 
imposed, yet Greece allowed the EU to invite Turkey to participate in the 
European Conference. As Turkey had indicated prior to the Luxembourg summit, 
the offer was unsatisfactory, yet the decision marked the first time that Greece 
was offering Turkey a reward that was not explicitly provided for by the 
Association Agreement, adding substance to the often proclaimed support for 
Turkey’s European vocation.
The eighteen months between the Luxembourg summit and the Cologne summit 
constitute one of the most instructive phases of the period under investigation. As 
it was believed that the communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations had been 
achieved in Luxembourg, the Greek government was adamant that the decision 
made in Luxembourg should not be revised. It persisted in the face of Turkish 
military pressure in the form of military exercises in the Aegean and violations of 
Greek airspace, EU member-states’ pressure and US pressure that culminated in 
a late night telephone call Clinton made to Simitis during the Cardiff summit in 
order to convince him to accept the proposals of the British Presidency. Turkey’s 
response appears to have been most pertinent. Greece was attempting to integrate 
Greco-Turkish relations into EU-Turkey relations and Turkey was suspending its 
relations with the EU. At that stage, communitisation did not have the intended 
effect. Nonetheless, when Greece became willing to move beyond the agreement 
reached in Luxembourg, it was only to pursue the communitisation of Greco- 
Turkish relations further. It was decided that the conditions set out in 
Luxembourg would have to be reiterated and additional rules for Turkey’s 
behaviour towards Greece would have to be established: a specific timeframe for 
Turkey’s compliance and provisions regarding the course of action that the EU 
would take in case of non-compliance. The Helsinki strategy constituted the 
culmination of Simitis’ attempts to communitise Greco-Turkish relations. The 
formulation of the strategy reflected Greek foreign policy makers’ assessment of
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Greece’s relative bargaining power. On the one hand, it was believed that a 
successful policy of macroeconomic stabilisation had rendered EMU entry fairly 
certain and it had thus improved Greece’s bargaining position. On the other hand, 
Greek foreign policy makers had discerned an increase in the intensity of their 
EU partners’ preference for upgrading Turkey to candidate country status. As 
bargaining power is inversely proportionate to preference intensity, Greek 
foreign policy makers concluded that it would be possible to extract from their 
EU partners the additional concessions that the further communitisation of 
Greco-Turkish relations required. It is interesting to note that while it might 
appear as though Greece’s bargaining position moved closer to that of its EU 
partners when the Helsinki strategy was formulated, it in fact moved further 
apart. While the other member-states wished to grant Turkey candidate country 
status within the context of an agreement that would be less demanding than the 
one reached in Luxembourg, with the Helsinki strategy Greece was proposing an 
even more restrictive framework for Turkey’s relations with the EU.
Simitis’ belief in the necessity of communitisation also had implications for the 
way in which Greece exercised its right to veto. Transforming Greco-Turkish 
relations into EU-Turkey relations by definition required Greece to allow Turkey 
to maintain some sort of relations with the EU. According to the Helsinki 
strategy, the framework for these relations should include the conditions that 
Greece had previously introduced, a deadline for Turkey’s compliance and 
provisions regarding the course of action that the EU would take in case of non- 
compliance. The latter constituted red lines; if crossed Greece would have to veto 
the Turkish candidacy. Consequently, the threat to veto was expressed in order to 
ensure that EU-Turkey relations would progress within a framework of EU rules 
for Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece, whereas previously the threat to veto 
was expressed in order to prevent progress in EU-Turkey relations. Exercising 
the right to veto in this fashion appears to be more effective. As Finnish 
President Taija Halonen recently argued: “(The veto may be used) when you 
really need it and you have a plan what to do after that. Because saying no, you 
do not stop the process. You just take time out”573.
573 Quoted in J. Tallberg, “Bargaining Power in the European Council”, Journal o f Common 
Market Studies, 46: 3, 2008, p. 695, emphasis added
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Simitis’ preference for the communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations is the 
only factor that convincingly explains all the decisions that the Greek 
government pursued within the context of the EU, which otherwise exhibit 
considerable variation. Indeed, while the decisions made in Helsinki and 
Luxembourg offered Turkey rewards -  accession to the EU and participation in 
the European Conference respectively -  the 15 July 1996 and 29 April 1997 
agreements did not. The former granted Turkey a reward that had previously 
been withheld -  EU financial assistance within the context of Euro- 
Mediterranean cooperation -  and the latter merely allowed a meeting of the EU- 
Turkey Association Council. While only the decisions made in Helsinki and 
Luxembourg are consistent with the logic of reinforcement by reward, all four 
decisions are consistent with the logic of communitisation.
The logic underlying the strategy of communitisation was fairly straightforward. 
If Greece could have rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards it established at the 
EU level, the EU would see to it that Turkey observed its rules. Simitis’ policy 
towards Turkey was a two-stage policy. During the first stage, Greece was to 
pursue the communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations. During the second stage, 
Greece was to pursue the resolution of Greco-Turkish problems. According to 
Simitis, the role that the EU would assume in Greco-Turkish relations would 
constitute a part of the EU’s broader international role. Despite the fact that EU 
foreign policy has enjoyed limited success since its inception, Simitis remains 
adamant that the EU’s involvement is necessary even in bilateral and regional 
problems. Whilst commenting on the Lisbon Treaty he argued: “True, many 
ordinary Europeans do not think that Europe should play an important part in 
global developments. They believe that foreign policy should be handled by their 
national governments. This view is outdated. Even in bilateral or regional crises, 
viable solutions are possible only at the supranational level,”574 In fact, Simitis 
was arguing the necessity of the communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations in 
the early 1990s, when it was evident that the Community was an ineffective 
international actor and the very notion of a European foreign policy was being 
brought into “disrepute” due to the recognition of the former Yugoslav Republics
574 C. Simitis, “The Rebirth of European Integration”, Guardian, 23 June 2008, emphasis added
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fiasco, which coincided with the transition from EPC to CFSP. Clearly, the 
necessity of communitisation is not the conclusion anyone would have reached 
after assessing the empirical record of European foreign policy in the early 
1990s.
It should be pointed out that while what has been referred to as the 
“Europeanisation of Turkey” has been discussed as a benefit of the Helsinki 
decision for Greece, this was a secondary consideration. Greek foreign policy 
makers indeed believed that if Greece allowed EU-Turkey relations to progress, 
Turkey would become Europeanised in the sense that it would abandon the 
practice of using or threatening to use force. As the Imia/Kardak crisis had yet 
again brought Greece and Turkey very close to armed conflict only a few years 
earlier, this particular benefit was of course considerable. Greek foreign policy 
makers, however, were also very much aware of the possibility that this benefit 
would not materialise. It was understood that both the pursuit of membership and 
the process of Europeanisation would prove divisive in Turkey. More 
significantly, even if both Turkey’s European orientation and the 
Europeanisation of Turkey could be taken for granted, the latter would not 
transpire overnight; it would require a considerable period of time. In contrast, 
the Helsinki decision required the resolution of Greco-Turkish problems by the 
end of 2004 at the latest. Finally, unless the conditions and the deadline that 
Greece had proposed were incorporated into the agreement, there was no 
guarantee that Greco-Turkish problems would be addressed and resolved in a 
manner consistent with Greek preferences. This is precisely why Greece would 
not consider granting Turkey candidate country status without additional EU 
rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards it.
This last point stems directly from Simitis’ notion of communitisation. The 
benefit of the transformation of Greco-Turkish relations into EU-Turkey 
relations was the role of guarantor of the resolution of Greco-Turkish problems 
that the EU would assume. The agreement reached in Helsinki did indeed 
attribute such a role to the EU. The Presidency Conclusions of the Helsinki 
summit clearly stated that if any dispute any candidate country was involved in 
remained pending by the end of 2004, the European Council would review the
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situation “in order to promote their settlement through the International Court of 
Justice”. It remained unclear, however, how exactly the European Council would 
perform that role. While the fact that the 2004 deadline was allowed to expire has 
turned this into a matter of conjecture, it might be suggested that the calculation 
of the role that the Helsinki strategy attributed to the EU in Greco-Turkish 
relations as the main benefit of the strategy was a manifestation of what Hill has 
termed the “capability-expectations gap”, in the sense that the EU’s role in the 
process of enlargement is considerably less interventionist than that implied by 
the Presidency Conclusions of the Helsinki summit.
The evidence showed that the alternative explanations of change in Greek policy 
towards Turkey are fairly unconvincing. In sharp contrast to the assertions of a 
group of leading Greek scholars in the fields of International Relations and 
European Studies, who have argued that foreign policy is the most successful, if 
not the only area of Europeanisation in Greece, this thesis showed that change in 
Greek policy towards Turkey was not the outcome of Europeanisation. The 
discrepancy between the assertions of leading experts and the evidence becomes 
rather striking in light of the fact that Greco-Turkish relations constitute such a 
large part of Greece’s external relations. If Greek foreign policy has been 
Europeanised, but Greek policy towards Turkey has not, it is difficult to see what 
part of Greek foreign policy has been Europeanised.
As was mentioned above, Simitis had selected communitisation as the best policy 
for Greece and the European Community as the default venue for Greek policy 
towards Turkey prior to the establishment o f enlargement conditionality. 
Consequently, the establishment of this EU foreign policy practice could not 
have influenced his calculations. Furthermore, Greek foreign policy makers did 
not consider enlargement conditionality as a relevant established EU foreign 
policy practice that was different from traditional Greek policy towards Turkey 
and might be more effective or more appropriate. Consequently and in contrast to 
what both explanations that conceptualise change in Greek policy towards 
Turkey as the outcome of Europeanisation predict, Greek foreign policy makers 
did not incorporate a practice previously established at the EU level into their 
policy towards Turkey, but rather formulated EU policy on the matter. Indeed,
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one of the very first things that Simitis did during his interactions with his peers 
was to argue the need for EU rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece. 
Enlargement conditionality was not identified as a more effective way to achieve 
fixed policy goals. The understanding of the policy problem and policy goals had 
been fundamentally altered. There is some evidence that Greek foreign policy 
makers calculated that the Helsinki strategy would offer Turkey greater incentive 
to comply with Greek demands, a calculation which is consistent with the 
Europeanisation thesis. This, however, was a secondary consideration. Greece 
was most unwilling to consider granting Turkey candidate country status without 
additional EU rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece, even though such an 
agreement would offer Turkey greater incentive to comply with Greek demands. 
The consistently categorical refusal to consider this alternative is not consistent 
with the Europeanisation thesis. Furthermore, the role of the EU as a guarantor 
of the resolution of Greco-Turkish problems -  which Simitis’ notion of 
communitisation prescribed -  was considered a more important benefit than the 
incentive the decision offered Turkey and it was believed to be necessary 
precisely in case the incentive did not suffice to induce Turkey’s compliance. 
Finally, there is no evidence that the policy previously pursued was considered 
inappropriate. In fact, Greek foreign policy makers systematically argued that 
their EU partners and the Commission had behaved inappropriately on several 
occasions.
It should also be noted that Greek foreign policy makers did not attempt to 
legitimise foreign policy change by arguing that Greece was under the obligation 
to converge with its EU partners575. It is not particularly surprising that Greek 
foreign policy makers made no such attempts. Having been accused of having 
committed acts of treason and of constantly yielding to external pressure, Greek
575 It has been argued that this is one of the advantages cooperation in the field of foreign policy 
affords participating states. According to Nuttall, “some participants proffered their international 
obligation to achieve convergent policies as cover for effecting a change in national policy which 
otherwise might have met with too much domestic opposition”. See Nuttall, op. cit. p. 15. Nuttall, 
however, contradicts himself on this point when he argues that “when domestic pressures became 
too strong they invariably prevailed over the cohesion demanded by EPC”. See Nuttall, op. cit. p. 
129. At any rate, it has been suggested that when national policy makers legitimise policy change 
in such a fashion, it is possible to conceptualise policy change as the outcome of Europeanisation. 
See K. Featherstone, “‘Varieties of Capitalism’ and the Greek Case: Explaining the Constraints 
on Domestic Reform?”, Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe, GreeSE 
Paper No. 11, February 2008, pp. 34-5
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foreign policy makers should not have been expected to make such an argument. 
In fact, this was not an available option, since it is most likely that it would have 
had the opposite effect.
As was mentioned above, it has been argued that the Helsinki strategy is 
consistent with “Europeanisation” in the sense of “uploading”576. In contrast to 
what has been suggested in the literature, uploading per se is not identified here 
with Europeanisation. Uploading only describes an empirically observable type 
of (foreign) policy action. It does not indicate what the process that produced this 
action was. As was mentioned above, uploading might be an outcome of 
Europeanisation. This is the case only when the establishment of EU practices 
leads national foreign policy makers to calculate that a collective decision on an 
issue that they had previously handled unilaterally might serve their interests best 
or when EU level interactions convince national foreign policy makers that 
collective decision-making on such an issue is appropriate. In both cases, 
developments that take place within the context of the EU cause uploading and 
therefore the latter is consistent with Europeanisation.
In contrast, the evidence showed that the Helsinki strategy was not “originated 
by EU dynamics”577. It was the outcome of a process of leader-driven foreign 
policy change. The task Simitis was determined to complete was pre-conceived 
in the sense that it had been defined prior to his election as Prime Minister and 
his participation in EU-level interactions throughout the period under 
investigation did not alter it. Similarly, leading European foreign policy analysts 
suggest that at the time Simitis defined this task European foreign policy 
dynamics offered little evidence that it was necessary. As has been pointed out, it 
should not be assumed that Europeanisation will result in convergence and 
homogeneity because domestic actors “refract, translate and edit” 
Europeanisation578. It is equally important to point out that processes of change 
may originate from domestic actors, who offer their own vision for the
576 Economides, op. cit. pp. 481-2
577 For the phrase see Radaelli, “The Europeanisation of. . op. cit. p. 50
578 K. Featherstone -  C. M. Radaelli, “A Conversant Research Agenda” in K. Featherstone -  C. 
M. Radaelli (eds), The Politics of Europeanisation, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 
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redirection of national foreign policy without trying to mold EU-generated 
processes. This particular process of foreign policy change can be identified and 
explained by existing theories that emphasise the causal significance of key 
foreign policy makers and their leadership style. In qualitative research, 
inadequate conceptual analysis results in measurement error579. When conceptual 
analysis fails to distinguish between Europeanisation and alternative processes of 
(foreign) policy change that are not generated by EU dynamics, the causal 
significance of the EU is overestimated and the emergence of Europeanisation as 
a new “research agenda”580 is inhibited.
Similar errors occur when uploading is identified with Europeanisation in the 
field of regulatory and budgetary policies. It has been argued that national 
executives in highly industrialised EU member-states -  Germany, the 
Netherlands, Denmark, Austria, Sweden and Finland -  upload their preferences 
onto the EU level, pursue collective decision-making and minimise the costs of 
regulatory legislation581. While this pursuit of uploading is interchangeably 
referred to as a dimension of Europeanisation, a response to Europeanisation and 
an aspect of the “European policy process”, it is shown that it was not originated 
by EU dynamics. In fact, the explanation of the pursuit of uploading (the 
economic -  primarily commercial -  interests of domestic industries, societal 
demands for environmental protection and the interdependence that 
environmental pollution creates cause national policy makers to upload) is 
remarkably consistent with liberal international relations theory, which 
emphasises the social identities and economic interests of powerful domestic 
groups as the sources of state preferences and patterns of interdependent state 
preferences as the determinant of state behaviour582. Analyses of Europeanisation 
that explicitly draw this parallel, distort the literature to such an extent that 
Moravcsik’s liberal intergovemmentalism is reviewed as part of a “school of 
thought on Europeanisation”583.
579 Mahoney -  Goertz, op. cit. pp. 244-5
580 For the term see Featherstone -  Radaelli, op. cit.
581 T. A. Borzel, “Pace-Setting, Foot-Dragging, and Fence-Sitting: Member State Responses to 
Europeanisation”, Journal o f Common Market Studies, 40: 2, 2002
582 Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously...”, op. cit.
583 Wong, The Europeanisation o f French Foreign Policy..., op. cit. p. 7
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Similarly, uploading has been identified with Europeanisation in studies that 
discuss national governments’ attempts to influence area designation within the 
context of EU cohesion and competition policy and variation in their success 
across decision-making procedures584. It remains at best unclear what the added 
value of conceptualising national governments’ attempts to maximise the 
attainment of their preferences and the empowering and/or constraining effects of 
the institutional setting as Europeanisation is, when rational choice 
institutionalist analyses would have been able to identify and explain this 
process585. This conceptualisation of Europeanisation renders the concept 
redundant because it merely labels processes identified and explained by existing 
theories Europeanisation.
The balancing thesis constitutes an even weaker explanation. The 
conceptualisation of the Helsinki strategy as external balancing is not quite 
accurate. The Helsinki decision was not the equivalent of alliance formation. It 
would not have been possible for Greece to invoke the Helsinki decision and 
request the use of means available to other EU member-states in order to balance 
against Turkey. More significantly, there is no evidence that Greek foreign 
policy makers conceived the Helsinki strategy as an external balancing strategy. 
While the Imia/Kardak crisis was perceived as a shock that necessitated military 
preparedness, which in turn would entail considerable economic costs, neither 
the Helsinki strategy, nor the policy of communitisation would address that 
problem directly because the Helsinki strategy was not considered an alternative 
to defence expenditure.
The reduction of defence expenditure depended on the evolution of Greco- 
Turkish relations and it could only be achieved once Greco-Turkish problems 
had been resolved and Turkey had ceased to constitute a threat to Greek security. 
This is in fact consistent with balancing against the threat theory. If  Greco- 
Turkish relations improved, the perception of a Turkish threat to Greek security
584 C. Mendez -  F. Wishlade -  D. Yuill, “Conditioning and Fine-Tuning Europeanisation: 
Negotiating Regional Policy Maps under the EU’s Competition and Cohesion Policies”, Journal 
of Common Market Studies, 44: 3, 2006
585 G. Tsebelis -  G. Garrett, “The Institutional Foundations o f Intergovemmentalism and 
Supranationalism in the European Union“, International Organization, 55: 2, 2001
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would diminish. As the perception of threat is one of the elements that define 
threatening power, balancing (either internal or external) should be expected to 
become less intense. As the Helsinki strategy was not intended to substitute for 
military capabilities, additional available resources were not considered to be the 
benefit of the Helsinki decision. EMU entry was achieved prior to any reduction 
in defence expenditure and the Helsinki decision did not affect defence 
expenditure that had already been agreed upon. Finally, this explanation of 
change in Greek policy towards Turkey contradicts Simitis’ understanding of the 
relationship between economic and foreign policy. According to Simitis, the 
success of Greek foreign policy in Helsinki reflected the success of his 
government’s economic policy. Ultimately, the Helsinki strategy was more 
ambitious than a balancing-against-the-threat strategy. It was believed that it 
could resolve Greco-Turkish problems, thus eliminating the Turkish threat.
Interestingly enough, while Greek foreign policy makers were concerned with 
what was perceived as increased Turkish aggression, US support for Turkey 
played a remarkably limited role in Greek foreign policy makers’ considerations. 
It has been suggested that when the Greek government applied for membership 
of the European Communities it intended amongst other things to reduce 
Greece’s dependence on the US. If future research were to assess whether this 
strategy has been effective the evidence from the study of Greek policy towards 
Turkey during the period covered by this thesis would indicate that it has indeed 
been most effective with regard to Greco-Turkish relations with the exception of 
crisis management. The evidence shows that the formulation of Greek policy was 
indeed quite independent of US policy during the period under investigation. As 
was mentioned above, Greek policy remained unchanged even when US 
President Clinton personally intervened during the June 1998 Cardiff European 
Council summit. US mediation during the 1996 Imia/Kardak crisis, however, 
was the only factor that prevented armed conflict, while the EU was -  in Simitis’ 
words -  “remarkably absent”.
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Beyond the Helsinki strategy
When the Helsinki strategy was formulated, no decision was made regarding the 
precise course of action that Greece would take once Greco-Turkish relations had 
been successfully communitised586. Consequently, a considerable period of time 
elapsed between the Helsinki summit and the launch of the process that was 
intended to result in the resolution of Greco-Turkish problems. The European 
Commission noted this in its progress reports. Initially, “little progress”587 was 
achieved with regard to the settlement of disputes and the adoption of confidence 
building measures was only considered a development that “should create a 
climate conducive to progress”588. This confirms the significance of Simitis’ 
vision for foreign policy reform. Greece began to pursue the strategy of 
communitisation, the necessity of which Simitis had consistently advocated, 
within a matter of weeks after his election as Prime Minister. As Simitis had 
indicated little regarding post-communitisation Greek policy towards Turkey, it 
took Greece over two years to begin to actively pursue the resolution of Greco- 
Turkish problems within the context of the Helsinki decision.
What has followed the Helsinki summit confirms the significance of the strategy 
for Greek foreign policy, as public debate regarding Greco-Turkish relations has 
revolved around the Helsinki decision. In 2004, the newly elected conservative 
government modified Greek policy towards Turkey. The 2004 deadline for the 
settlement of disputes that candidate countries were involved in was allowed to 
expire. This decision proved quite controversial. The socialists argued that the 
Helsinki strategy had been abandoned and that Greco-Turkish problems had yet 
again become bilateral problems. The conservatives argued that the Helsinki 
strategy had in fact been improved and that Greco-Turkish relations had been so 
clearly transformed into EU-Turkey relations for the first time589. It would be
586 Interview with advisor to Prime Minister Simitis, 14 July 2008
587 European Commission, Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession, 8 November 
2000, p. 67
588 European Commission, Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession, 13 
November 2001, p. 31
589 For Prime Minister Karamanlis’ assessment of the decision to open accession negotiations 
with Turkey as an improvement of the Helsinki decision see Costas Karamanlis, Press 
Conference, Brussels, 17 December 2004, available at http://www.primeminister.gr/index.php? 
option=com content&task=view&id=3486. accessed on 17 February 2008. Foreign Minister 
Bakoyanni went so far as to argued that Greco-Turkish issues were transformed into Euro-
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more accurate to argue that, while the logic of “communitisation” that Simitis 
introduced was not abandoned, the main element of the Helsinki strategy was. 
Indeed, the Helsinki strategy had produced a lock-in effect, thus binding the new 
government590. Candidate country status could not be rescinded, especially not a 
few months before the opening of accession negotiations was going to be debated 
in the EU. The 2004 deadline, however, was the element that distinguished the 
Helsinki strategy from the earlier stages of communitisation. During a speech in 
Parliament a few months after the December 2004 European Council, Simitis 
argued: “During the recent summit in Brussels, the government achieved 
absolutely nothing substantial for the protection of Greek interests, despite what 
it claims. On the contrary, it achieved something negative. It accepted no time 
limit to Turkey’s obligation to fulfill its obligations towards Greece in 
accordance with the principles of international law, it revoked the relevant 
provision of (the) Helsinki (agreement) and it rendered Greco-Turkish issues 
bilateral once again, (while) after the Helsinki agreements they were Euro- 
Turkish (issues)”591. Similarly, in an implicit critique of the government’s policy, 
Rozakis has pointed out that Greece “cannot expect the pulverisation of all 
(Turkish) claims” as a result of Turkey’s accession process and therefore it 
should avoid foreign policy “inertia”592.
PASOK under Papandreou (he succeeded Simitis in the leadership of the party in 
2004) has argued the need for a “new Helsinki”, which was explicitly mentioned 
in the party’s manifesto published in 2007593. Simitis, however, has made a 
different suggestion594. According to the former Prime Minister, Greece should 
not commit itself to a specific outcome of Turkey’s accession negotiations and in
Turkish issues for the first time during the period 2004-2006; see Dora Bakoyanni, Speech at the 
Permanent Parliamentary Committee for National Defence and Foreign Affairs, 4 April 2006, 
available at http://www.dorabak.gr/default.asp?pid=39&rID=807&la=l. accessed on 17 February 
2008
590 Foreign Minister Molyviatis appeared to regret this binding effected, when he stated that the 
government had managed to change certain elements of the Helsinki decision, yet such 
agreements could not be changed in their entirety. Petros Molyviatis, Press Conference, 18 
December 2004
591 Costas Simitis, Speech in Parliamentary, 21 December 2004
592 C. Rozakis, “Greco-Turkish Problems: Political or Legal Solution?”, To Vima, 9 July 2006
593 See George A. Papandreou, Speech at the socialist party’s Parliamentary Group, 7 June 2006, 
available at http://www.pasok.gr/portal/gr/0/35314/7/7/l/showdoc.html. accessed on 17 February 
2006 and PASOK, Programmatic Framework: Just Society, Strong Greece, May 2007, p. 117
594 See C. Simitis, “Why We Should Change Policy”, To Vima, 17 February 2008
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particular it should not insist on Turkey’s accession, if the majority of EU 
member-states prefer a special relationship between Turkey and the EU. Simitis 
has pointed out that public opinion in the EU is most skeptical of Turkey’s 
accession and he has argued that when Turkey becomes more populous than any 
other member-state, it will be difficult for the EU to ignore issues of particular 
concern for Turkey. As far as Greco-Turkish problems are concerned, even if 
Turkey were to eventually accede to the EU, it is unlikely that it would be willing 
to comply with the conditions that Greece has introduced and other EU member- 
states would be reluctant to press the matter. Since Greece missed the 
opportunity afforded by the Helsinki decision, it should negotiate with those 
member-states that propose a special relationship between the EU and Turkey 
ways in which Greco-Turkish problems could be resolved within the context of 
such a special relationship.
At first sight it would appear that Simitis has abandoned the policy that he so 
persistently pursued during his Premiership. Simitis’ suggestion, however, 
directly follows from the logic of communitisation. As was mentioned above, the 
communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations required Greece to take its EU 
partners’ preferences into consideration, thus resulting in a certain loss of 
autonomy. Indeed, Simitis invariably pursued the communitisation of Greco- 
Turkish relations regardless of whether the issue at hand was the Turkish 
candidacy for EU membership (December 1999), Turkey’s participation in the 
European Conference (December 1997), EU financial assistance to Turkey (July 
1996) or a meeting of the EU-Turkey Association Council (April 1997). If 
Greece does not prefer EU-Turkey relations to progress, it can afford to disregard 
the preferences of its partners. If it wants them to progress in a specific fashion, 
that is to say if it wants to establish EU rules for Turkey’s behaviour towards 
Greece, it will have to take its partners’ preferences into consideration. 
Interestingly enough, Greece is no longer the most recalcitrant member-state, yet 
it is still the one whose preferences are closest to the status quo in the sense that 
it continues to support the EU’s offer of accession. If the reluctance to admit 
Turkey to the EU were translated into a proposal to formally withdraw the offer 
of accession and replace it with the offer of a special relationship, Greece would 
be able to demand an arrangement similar to that which Simitis has suggested in
200
return. If Turkey responds to such an offer in a manner similar to that in which 
she responded to the offer to participate in the European Conference, 
communitisation is unlikely to accommodate a resolution of Greco-Turkish 
problems. If the offer of EU membership is not formally withdrawn, timing will 
acquire greater significance. Even if accession negotiations are successfully 
concluded, it is unlikely that Turkey’s Accession Treaty will be ratified by all EU 
member-states. It would appear that in that case the resolution of Greco-Turkish 
problems would only be possible prior to the process of ratification.
Beyond Greco-Turkish relations
As has been pointed out, structural explanations have been traditionally 
prominent in the study of Greek foreign policy, while explanations that attribute 
causal significance to domestic sources of foreign policy have been lacking595. It 
would appear that the literature suffers from the “widespread belief that 
balancing is a universal empirical law”596. Greece is expected to pursue balancing 
against Turkey. Various Greek foreign policy initiatives as diverse as the 
decision to apply for membership of the European Communities and the decision 
to grant Turkey candidate country status have been conceptualised either 
explicitly or implicitly as forms of “balancing”597. One analyst went so far as to 
criticise the Greek International Relations community for its inability to make 
specific proposals on the exact content of Greece’s “balancing strategy” vis-a-vis 
Turkey 598. Recent empirical studies of impressive breadth, however, have shown 
that even though balancing does occur it is not nearly as common as it is 
presumed to be and that there is only evidence from most-likely cases that 
supports arguments, which predict that balancing occurs only under fairly 
restrictive conditions599.
595 Tsakonas, “Theory and Practice...”, op. cit. p. 435, note 8
596 W. C. Wohlforth -  R. Little -  S. J. Kaufman -  D. Kang -  C. A. Jones -  V. Tin-Bor Hui -  A. 
Eckstein -  D. Deudney -  W. L. Brenner, “Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History”, 
European Journal o f International Relations, 13: 2, 2007, p. 156
597 Couloumbis -  Dalis, op. cit. p. 80; Ifantis, “Whither Turkey...”, op. cit. p. 122
598 Tsakonas, “Theory and Practice...”, op. cit. p. 430
599 Wohlforth et al., op cit; J. S. Levy -  W. R. Thompson, “Hegemonic Threats and Great Power 
Balancing in Europe, 1495-1999”, Security Studies, 14: 1, 2005
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Tsakonas’ formulation of a multi-causal explanation of change in Greek policy 
towards Turkey that incorporated both Greece’s relative power position and the 
economic costs of Greek policy constitutes a welcome attempt to open the “black 
box”. The weakness of this attempt lies in the fact that it remains incomplete. 
While this explanation refrains from attributing causal significance exclusively to 
structural variables and takes unit-level variables into account, it fails to consider 
the “specific and concrete information about the decision-makers”, which 
explanations of specific foreign policy decisions require600. Indeed, it is only 
assumed that all Greek foreign policy makers identified the combination of 
imperatives described by the analyst and responded to them. The detailed 
empirical investigation of actors’ preferences and calculations pursued here 
produced evidence that suggests otherwise.
The evidence confirms the centrality of the Prime Minister’s role in the Greek 
political system in general and the Greek foreign policy making process in 
particular601. Despite reforms of the Greek Foreign Ministry’s structure602, access 
to the foreign policy making process remained severely limited during the period 
under investigation. As Simitis made explicit, the Helsinki strategy was 
formulated by the Prime Minister himself, Foreign Minister Papandreou, Deputy 
Foreign Minister Kranidiotis, Head of the Prime Minister’s Office Nicholas 
Themelis and Christos Rozakis, who held no official post at that time. The 
strategy was merely “presented” to the Cabinet603. Consequently, the number of 
participating actors was limited, participating actors’ preferences were individual 
rather than organisational and there were no institutional advantages for any of 
the actors involved inherent in the policy making process604. The latter was in
600 V. M. Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory, Lanham, 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2007, p. 6
601 Ioakimidis, “The Foreign Policy Making Model in Greece...”, op cit; A. Makridimitris, 
“Public Administration in the Political System: The Government, the Prime Minister, the 
Ministers, the Ministries” in P. Spiliotopoulos -  A. Makridimitris (eds), Public Administration in 
Greece (in Greek), Athens -  Komotini, Ant. N. Sakoulas, 2001, esp. pp. 28-32; A. Makridimitris, 
Administration and Society: Public Administration in Greece (in Greek), Athens, Themelio, 
1999, esp. pp. 31-8; T. Stoforopoulos -  A. Makridimitris, The Greek Foreign Policy System: The 
Institutional Aspect (in Greek), Athens, Sideris, 1997, p. 46
602 Ioakimidis, “The Foreign Policy Making Model in Greece ...”, op. cit. pp. 126-8; K. Zoras, 
“Innovations in the Foreign Ministry”, To Vima, 3 May 1998
603 Simitis,Policy..., op. cit. pp. 93, 96
604 For the significance of these variables in bureaucratic politics models of foreign policy 
analysis see G. T. Allison -  M. H. Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some 
Implications”, World Politics, 24, Supplement: Theory and Policy in International Relations,
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fact very similar to that of the periods between 1974-1981 and 1981-1989, when 
Prime Ministers Karamanlis and Papandreou respectively were the key foreign 
policy makers assisted by Foreign Ministers and advisors, who were often loyal 
personal friends605. Given the fairly well established significance of the role of 
the Prime Minister in the foreign policy making process, it is rather striking that 
the literature has failed to investigate the nature and causal significance of 
Simitis’ preferences beyond the mere acknowledgement of the fact that he was 
pro-integration.
In a rare attempt to assess the implications of the Greek foreign policy making 
process, Ioakimidis has suggested that the latter renders the causal significance of 
key foreign policy makers and public opinion crucial606. This particular approach 
contradicts both (structural) realist and constructivist explanations that emphasise 
states’ relative power positions and international socialisation respectively. This 
approach is consistent with liberal international relations theory. While the thrust 
of the latter suggests that the interests and identities of powerful domestic groups 
are the main determinant of the substantive content of foreign policy, it has also 
been pointed out that when the costs and benefits of alternative foreign policy 
options for powerful domestic groups are either diffuse or uncertain607 the 
personal commitments of leading politicians and mass public opinion become 
causally significant608.
As was shown here, however, public opinion was not causally significant in this 
particular case. On the contrary, it was an obstacle to foreign policy reform that 
had to be overcome. The evidence confirms the view that the earthquakes in 
Turkey and Greece in August and September 1999 respectively had little to do 
with the formulation of Greek policy towards Turkey609. The Helsinki strategy 
was formulated prior to the earthquakes. Whatever the impact the latter had on 
public opinion it neither prevented criticism of the government’s policy, nor did
1972
605 Ioakimidis, “The Foreign Policy Making Model in Greece . . op. cit. pp. 111-115
606 Ibid. esp. pp. 95-8
607 As was mentioned above, the understanding of Greco-Turkish relations as a “national issue” 
implies that alternative policy options affect the nation as a whole in a uniform fashion.
608 Moravcsik, “Preferences and Power in the European Community...”, pp. 483-496 and esp. 
494-6
609 Ker-Lindsay, Crisis and Conciliation..., op. cit. p. 118
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it limit the political risk that Simitis took. In fact, not only was government 
policy not following public opinion, but it also had a significant impact on it. The 
highest levels of support for the prospect of Turkey’s accession to the EU 
amongst the Greek public were recorded during the period immediately after the 
Helsinki summit. It would appear that the decision that the Greek government 
secured in Helsinki was more convincing than the earthquakes in demonstrating 
that it was worth supporting Turkey’s prospects of accession. Nonetheless, the 
increase in support was short-lived and at no point in time was it offered by the 
majority of the Greek public. According to a Eurobarometer survey conducted 
during April and May 2000, while thirty-nine percent (39%) of those surveyed 
stated that they would be in favour of Turkey becoming a part of the EU, fifty- 
three percent (53%) remained opposed610. Finally, Simitis’ assessment of the 
implications of the earthquakes for Greco-Turkish relations was quite 
characteristic of his leadership style. He was most reluctant to concede that a 
natural disaster -  a variable beyond his control -  could systematically affect his 
government’s policy. In sharp contrast to Papandreou’s assessment, Simitis made 
explicit that understanding the situation that the earthquakes had created as an 
opportunity for the improvement of Greco-Turkish relations would “cheapen” 
the policy that had been consistently pursued until that time and he even argued 
that it was necessary to clearly distinguish between the exercise of foreign policy 
and the humanitarian response to the earthquakes611.
The predictions of Ioakimidis’ model have been only partly confirmed because 
the model assumes that foreign policy makers invariably seek to maximise their 
chance of being reelected, which in turn renders public opinion the primary 
source of foreign policy. While the assumption is plausible, it needs to be 
qualified. Both the theoretical analysis of leadership styles and the empirical 
evidence from this particular case suggest that given the absence of bureaucratic 
politics the causal significance of public opinion will be inversely proportionate
610 European Commission, Eurobarometer: Public Opinion in the European Union, Report 
Number 53, 2000
611 Similarly, the Helsinki strategy was formulated independently o f bilateral negotiations on low- 
politics issues and the former clearly constituted the centerpiece of Greek policy towards Turkey. 
The evidence contradicts the view that “the process of rapprochement...resulted in the 
confirmation of Turkey’s EU candidacy at the December 1999 Helsinki European Council”; see 
Ker-Lindsay, Crisis and Conciliation..., op. cit. p. 8
204
to key foreign policy makers’ responsiveness to the policy context. As Simitis’ 
leadership style was based on an unequivocal commitment to a distinctive, 
internal, preconceived idea (the communitisation of Greco-Turkish relations) -  
that remained unchallenged by external constraints or disconfirming evidence -  
the causal significance of public opinion diminished.
Change in Greek policy towards Turkey was not a response to an event, but the 
result of a foreign policy maker “seeing something that he wanted to change and 
moving”612. While foreign policy analysts have argued that the former is a more 
common occurrence613, the latter is not unprecedented in Greek foreign policy. 
When PASOK won a general election for the first time in 1981, Greek policy 
towards Turkey was modified, as the newly elected government refused to 
negotiate with Turkey over territorial issues. Simitis’ leadership style, however, 
appears to have been quite different from that of his predecessor. It has often 
been pointed out that Simitis lacked Andreas Papandreou’s charisma in the 
Weberian sense614. While Weberian leadership types are based on the sources of 
a leader’s legitimacy615, the leadership styles discussed in the foreign policy 
analysis literature are based on the individual characteristics of leaders. The 
evidence shows that there are further differences between Simitis and 
Papandreou’s leadership styles. Andreas Papandreou’s leadership style is 
described as “flexible” and “pliable”616. Indeed, the frequent shifts in 
Papandreou’s preferences -  and consequently in PASOK’s positions -  indicate 
considerable responsiveness to the policy context. In fact, it has been argued that 
the shifts in Papandreou’s foreign policy positions between 1974 and 1981 
“came in clear response to Greek public opinion”617. Furthermore, Papandreou’s
612 Allison -  Halperin, op. cit. p. 50
613 Ibid.
614 Featherstone -  Kazamias, op. cit.
6,5 A. R. Willner -  D. Willner, “The Rise and Role of Charismatic Leaders”, Annals o f the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 358: 1, 1965
616 Couloumbis has discussed the leadership style of two of the most prominent Greek Prime 
Ministers of the twentieth century, namely Constantine Karamanlis and Andreas Papandreou; 
while his discussion constitutes a fairly accurate description of their respective leadership styles, 
it is not informed by the relevant arguments put forward by foreign policy analysts. See T. 
Couloumbis, “Andreas Papandreou: Style and Substance of Leadership” in T. C. Kariotis (ed), 
The Greek Socialist Experiment: Papandreou’s Greece 1981-1989, New York, Pella, 1992 and 
T. Couloumbis, “Karamanlis and Papandreou: Style and Substance of Leadership” in S. 
Papaspiliopoulos (ed), PASOK: Conquest and Exercise o f Power (in Greek), Athens, Sideris, 
1996
617 J. C. Loulis, “Papandreou’s Foreign Policy”, Foreign Affairs, 63: 2, 1984/1985: Winter, p. 379
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considerable responsiveness to the policy context is particularly evident in what 
has been referred to as the “transformation” of PASOK’s foreign policy positions 
shortly after its first electoral victory in 1981618. In contrast, Simitis’ preferences 
on foreign policy exhibit considerable continuity both before and after his 
election as Prime Minister. Instead of Papandreou’s flexibility and 
responsiveness to the policy context, Simitis demonstrated considerable rigidity 
and an unequivocal commitment to the notion of communitisation. In this sense, 
Simitis’ leadership style is similar to that of Karamanlis. As has been pointed 
out, the latter was so “unyieldingly committed” to Greece’s accession to the 
European Communities and he pursued it with such “vigor and 
singlemindedness” that some of his advisors indicated that it had turned into an 
“obsession”619. It follows from the above that a useful starting point of studies of 
change in Greek foreign policy is the Prime Minister’s preferences and his 
leadership style and in particular the extent to which she is committed to a 
specific type of foreign policy reform.
Beyond Greek foreign policy
The theoretical framework constructed for the purposes of this research project, 
the manner in which process-tracing was applied and the findings have 
implications for the study of aspects of the foreign policies of other EU member- 
states that the literature has identified as crucial, especially in those cases, where 
it is plausible to argue that the EU may have caused change in the foreign 
policies of its member-states. This study advanced the analysis of 
Europeanisation by addressing a series of problems, which have been pointed out 
in the literature. First, it addressed the issue of the precise meaning of the 
concept. In sharp contrast to Olsen’s understanding of Europeanisation, the 
definition adopted here refrains from considering Europeanisation as an all- 
encompassing concept. Europeanisation refers to a single set of empirically 
manageable phenomena, the process of incorporation of EU norms, practices and 
procedures into the domestic level. This definition of the concept does not pre­
618 Couloumbis, “Karamanlis and Papandreou...”, op. cit. p. 307
619 Ibid. p. 305; T. A. Couloumbis, The United States, Greece and Turkey: The Troubled 
Triangle, New York, Praeger, 1983, p. 140
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determine the causal mechanism through which Europeanisation produces 
foreign policy change. It was made explicit that while a discrepancy between 
national and EU foreign policy does not produce adaptational pressure because 
legally binding instruments are not available at the EU level in the field of 
foreign policy, Europeanisation should not be identified with processes of 
socialisation620. It is at least equally plausible to argue that national foreign policy 
makers incorporate EU foreign policy practices and procedures into their policies 
for instrumental reasons.
Second, both the theoretical framework and the findings showed why uploading 
per se should not be identified with Europeanisation. The two explanations of 
Europeanisation presented here clearly separated the process of Europeanisation 
from its outcomes. It was made explicit that uploading might be an outcome of 
the process of Europeanisation, in which case the process refers to the 
incorporation of the procedural EU foreign policy norm of collective decision­
making. It was thus made possible to move beyond mere descriptions of how 
member-states project their policy goals onto the EU’s agenda to an analysis of 
why they choose to do so. The evidence showed that Simitis had already selected 
the European Community as the default venue for Greek policy towards Turkey 
prior to the establishment of the relevant EU foreign policy practices 
(enlargement conditionality). Consequently, the decision to upload was not the 
outcome of an EU-generated process.
Third, the theoretical framework presented here clarifies the relationship between 
explanations of policy change informed by the logic of expected consequences 
and explanations of policy change informed by the logic appropriateness. It has 
been argued that the two logics are not mutually exclusive and that they may 
occur simultaneously621. It has been suggested that when the costs and benefits of
620 Tonra identifies Europeanisation with the internalisation of norms and Torreblanca argues that 
change at the domestic level originates from adaptational pressure generated at the EU level; see 
Tonra, “Denmark and Ireland”, op. cit. and Torreblanca, op. cit.
621 See J. G. March -  J. P. Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders”, 
International Organization, 52: 4, 1998, esp. pp. 952-4 for a discussion of the interactions 
between the two logics in general and Borzel -  Risse, op. cit. pp. 74-5 for a similar discussion in 
relation to processes of Europeanisation. It should be pointed out that the process of instrumental 
Europeanisation discussed by Borzel and Risse is different from the one presented here, as it 
refers to the redistribution of resources and the differential empowerment of domestic actors 
inside the state. The Europeanisation thesis implies no such redistribution. Instead, it refers to the
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alternative courses of action are clearer than the prescriptions of rules that define 
appropriate behaviour, the logic of expected consequences prevails and vice 
versa, that cost-benefit calculations inform major decisions and rules that define 
appropriate behaviour inform minor decisions or vice versa and finally that 
behaviour based on the logic of expected consequences evolves into behaviour 
based on the logic of appropriateness over time622. This is not to suggest that the 
two logics are not mutually exclusive. The clarity of prescriptions, the 
significance of decisions and the point in time when action is pursued are scope 
conditions that determine the range of applicability of the two logics. Finally, it 
might be argued that the pursuit of the utility-maximising course of action is 
considered appropriate behaviour within certain contexts or that the pursuit of the 
course of action that is considered appropriate is utility-maximising for certain 
actors’ utility function. March and Olsen argue that this approach is to be 
avoided because it denies the distinctiveness of the two logics623. The argument 
remains unconvincing. If one could subsume either logic to the other, one would 
have a single explanation of a greater class of events and thus one would have 
gained both in terms of parsimony and in terms of breadth.
The theoretical framework presented here establishes the distinctiveness of the 
two logics more convincingly. When they inform explanations of policy change, 
the two logics are mutually exclusive with regard to two dimensions of the policy 
making process: the definition of the policy problem and the assessment of 
alternative courses of action. While policy change driven by the logic of 
expected consequences aims at the attainment of fixed goals through a different 
course of action, policy change driven by the logic of appropriateness is the 
result of a change in goals. In the case of Europeanisation and foreign policy, EU 
level interactions may result in the internalisation of substantive EU foreign 
policy norms that define third actors’ violations of these norms as foreign policy 
problems. Once the internalisation of these norms has modified the 
understanding of the policy problem, goals will also change, as third actors’
establishment of EU practices that modify the range of alternatives available to national foreign 
policy makers and empower them to pursue aggregated interests.
622 March -  Olsen, “The Institutional...”, op. cit. pp. 952-3 and March -  Olsen, “The Logic...”, 
op. cit. pp. 20-3
623 March -  Olsen, “The Logic...”, op. cit. p. 20
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compliance with these norms becomes national foreign policy makers’ objective, 
which is pursued in accordance with the relevant established EU practices624. In 
contrast, when Europeanisation is driven by the logic of expected consequences, 
established EU practices are incorporated into national policy because it is 
expected that they will achieve fixed policy goals more effectively. Similarly, 
policy change driven by the logic of appropriateness is by definition policy 
change that is not driven by cost-benefit calculations625. As was shown above, 
this is a most instructive observable implication, which makes it possible to 
empirically distinguish between the two logics.
Fourth, the argument and the findings of this thesis have implications for the 
debate on whether actors’ preferences are endogenous to the process of 
integration. As was shown here, Simitis’ preference for communitisation was 
indeed “causally independent of the strategies of other actors” 626. Those who 
argue that EU level interactions do entail processes of socialisation that result in 
change in actors’ preferences have suggested that this is more likely when the 
actors involved do not hold beliefs that are inconsistent with the behavioural 
rules that they are being socialised into627. It might be argued that these beliefs as 
such are less significant than the actors’ responsiveness to the policy context, as 
theorised by the literature on foreign policy leadership styles. According to the 
latter, responsiveness to the policy context depends partly on actors’ willingness 
to challenge constraints. As rules that determine what constitutes appropriate 
behaviour for EU member-states constrain action, actors who are reluctant to 
challenge constraints are more likely to be susceptible to the internalisation of 
such rules.
624 See also P. A. Hall, “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic 
Policymaking in Britain”, Comparative Politics, 25: 3, 1993, where it is argued that third order 
change or a paradigm shift entails a redefinition of the policy problem and policy goals.
625 Indeed, March and Olsen’s claim that the two logics are not mutually exclusive contradicts 
their understanding of the logic of appropriateness as a negation of the logic of expected 
consequences; see March -  Olsen, “The Logic...”, op. cit. p. 3
626 A. Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics”, 
International Organization, 51:4, 1997, p. 519
627 J. T. Checkel -  A. Moravcsik, “Forum Section: A Constructivist Research Programme in EU 
Studies?”, European Union Politics, 2: 2, 2001, p. 222; A. I. Johnston, “Treating International 
Institutions as Social Environments”, International Studies Quarterly, 45: 4, 2001, p. 499
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Fifth, the explanations formulated here distinguished between those 
configurations of explanatory variables that could have led to policy change 
independently of one another -  and thus constitute the basis for alternative 
explanations -  and those that could have led to policy change in conjunction with 
one another -  and thus constitute the basis for multi-causal explanations of 
foreign policy change.
Sixth, the findings confirmed the view that testing explanations that 
conceptualise foreign policy change as the outcome of Europeanisation against 
alternative explanations is useful. Evidence that effectively refutes such 
explanations is perhaps the most compelling indication that Europeanisation can 
indeed be a useful concept for empirical research. It is after all possible to be 
“clear enough to be wrong”628. The set of explanations tested here comprised all 
the explanatory variables identified in the literature and clarified the implications 
of the interactions between them for Greek policy towards Turkey. 
Consequently, the relevant EU norms, procedures and practices were not 
privileged as the single most important explanatory variable.
Seventh, it was shown how it is possible to empirically distinguish between 
alternative explanations of foreign policy change. As has been pointed out, even 
though the use of “some form of process tracing” is fairly common, what 
constitutes “good process tracing” is yet to be determined629. If “determining the 
relative causal significance of the external and the domestic” and “disentangling 
the global from the European” is the problem630, clarifying the observable 
implications of alternative explanations for three basic dimensions of the policy 
making process -  the definition of the policy problem, the alternative courses of 
action considered and the assessment of the latter -  is the solution. Since 
“explanatory variables from all levels of analysis, from the most micro to the
628 Radaelli, “Europeanisation: Solution...”, op. cit. p. 15; P. Sabatier, “Clear Enough to be 
Wrong”, Journal o f European Public Policy, 7: 1, 2000
629 Haverland, op. cit. p. 66; J. T. Checkel, “Tracing Causal Mechanisms”, International Studies 
Review, 8: 2,2006, p. 369
630 Featherstone, ‘“Varieties of Capitalism’...”, op. cit. p. 32
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most macro, are of interest to”631 the foreign policy analyst, process tracing is 
ideally suited to foreign policy analysis632.
Establishing key foreign policy makers’ understanding of the policy problem is 
particularly relevant when explanations of foreign policy change that emphasise 
the causal significance of leadership are being tested. As the latter is inversely 
proportionate to a leader’s responsiveness to the policy context, it is useful to 
determine whether she is driven by a distinctive, internal, preconceived vision for 
foreign policy reform. Examining the framing of alternatives is particularly 
useful when explanations that conceptualise foreign policy change as the 
outcome of Europeanisation are being tested. Europeanisation implies a 
discrepancy between EU and national foreign policy. Determining whether 
national foreign policy makers identified the discrepancy and distinguished 
between the national policy previously pursued and the relevant EU practice is a 
key indicator of Europeanisation. Finally, examining the assessment of 
alternatives is particularly pertinent when explanations that attribute foreign 
policy change to international socialisation are being tested. Socialisation results 
in behaviour that is driven by a logic of appropriateness, which by definition is 
behaviour that is not preceded by cost-benefit calculations. Investigating whether 
national foreign policy makers made such calculations is a key indicator of 
socialisation. The above has implications for the direction theory development 
ought to take. As “one cannot offset theoretical imprecision with methodological 
sophistication”633, it would be useful if theoretical approaches to the study of 
foreign policy change made their within-case observable implications more 
explicit.
631 Hudson, op. cit. p. 2
632 This particular research strategy is also useful for the empirical investigation of the causal 
significance of the EU for processes of change in policy areas, where the Open Method of 
Coordination applies. As has been pointed out, actor-based analysis that focuses on policy 
makers’ considerations is necessary because legally binding instruments are not available at the 
EU level and the incorporation of EU practices -  or rather practices that have been identified as 
optimal at the EU level -  into national policy is voluntary; see K. Jacobsson, “Trying to Reform 
the ‘Best Pupils in the Class’? The Open Method of Coordination in Sweden and Denmark” in J. 
Zeitlin -  P. Pochet (eds) with L. Magnusson, The Open Method o f  Coordination in Action: The 
European Employment and Social Inclusion Strategies, Brussels, P.I.E. -  Peter Lang, 2005, pp. 
108-9
633 Checkel -  Moravcsik, op. cit. p. 228
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The theoretical framework presented here sheds new light on crucial aspects of 
several EU member-states’ foreign policies. As has been pointed out, all 
candidates for EU membership are involved in disputes, which are inhibiting 
their progress towards accession. As far as Turkey is concerned, in December 
2006 it was decided that eight chapters will not be opened and no chapter will be 
provisionally closed unless Turkey applies the Additional Protocol to the Ankara 
Agreement to Cyprus634. With regard to the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, even though the Commission has yet to recommend the opening of 
accession negotiations due to various shortcomings including violent incidents 
during the 2008 elections, government officials have argued that they suspect this 
might not be the only reason -  alluding to the name dispute with Greece -  and 
French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner has been quoted as saying “the 
problem of Macedonia, it’s the name”635. Finally, Slovenia has been blocking 
progress in Croatia’s accession negotiations due to a border dispute. While in 
November 2008 enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn suggested that the dispute 
was a bilateral issue and that in the Commission’s view “bilateral issues should 
be settled bilaterally”636, once Slovenia blocked the opening of nine chapters in 
Croatia’s accession negotiations in December 2008, the Commission proposed 
the formation of a group of experts that would mediate between the two 
countries, which is currently under negotiation637. The theoretical framework 
constructed for the purposes of this thesis can be used to explain variation in the 
usage of the offer of EU membership as a policy instrument across these cases by 
establishing national foreign policy makers’ considerations.
The theoretical framework presented here can also be useful for the study of 
aspects of EU member-states’ foreign policies that are not related to the use of 
this particular policy instrument. Consider the foreign policy of the United
634 The eight chapters are: Free Movement of Goods, Right o f Establishment and Freedom to 
Provide Services, Financial Services, Agriculture and Rural Development, Fisheries, Transport 
Policy, Customs Union and External Relations; see Conclusions of the 2770th General Affairs 
Council meeting, Brussels, 11 December 2006
635 E. Vucheva, “Macedonia Name Dispute ‘Holds Hostage’ EU Credibility”, EUobserver, 09 
December 2008, available at http://euobserver.com/?aid=27255
636 “As a Nordic”, Rehn added, “and Nordics don't understand the Balkans by definition, I have 
sometimes difficulty in seeing that this kind of historical dispute should be in the first place 
settled in courts, instead by political means”. See Olli Rehn interview with EurActiv, op. cit.
637 E. Vucheva, “EU Proposes Mediation Group for Croatia-Slovenia Dispute”, EUobserver, 23 
January 2009, available at http://euobserver.eom/9/27465
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Kingdom. While a recent review concluded that British foreign policy has been 
Europeanised638, according to the theoretical framework presented here there is 
not sufficient evidence to support this argument. First of all, the better part of the 
review discusses British preferences on cooperation in the field of foreign and 
security policy and the evolution of the latter. What is implicitly being argued 
under the heading of Europeanisation is that British preferences on cooperation 
in these policy areas have been endogenous to the integration process. It remains 
at best unclear why it is necessary to conceptualise this as the outcome of 
Europeanisation. Furthermore, it is argued that international pressures and 
domestic factors have brought about Europeanisation639. Clearly, if 
Europeanisation is not a process whereby the EU causes change in national 
(foreign) policy, the concept is indeed redundant.
Second, while it is asserted that thirty years of participation in cooperation in the 
field of foreign policy have entailed processes of socialisation and resulted in a 
coordination reflex, it is made explicit that Britain frequently refrains from 
coordinating within the context of the EU640. As has been pointed out, the US 
remains the UK’s “preferred partner” in the post-Cold War era and “the UK has 
routinely been willing and able to break free from EU level commitments.. .(and) 
act alone or in partnership with other countries when they deem it necessary”641. 
As was mentioned above, adherence to EU foreign policy norms and practices as 
a result of socialisation should be consistent across issues and over time. Indeed, 
the inconsistency of the Greek government’s approach to the Turkish and 
Cypriot candidatures was identified above as evidence that refutes the 
socialisation thesis. In this sense, if coordination does not occur consistently 
across issues and over time it is not a reflex, but the outcome of a calculation. 
Acknowledging that coordination is the result of a calculation and asking what 
that calculation is would be a useful step for further research.
638 T. Oliver -  D. Allen, “Foreign Policy” in I. Bache -  A. Jordan (eds), The Europeanisation o f  
British Politics, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006
639 Ibid. p. 199
640 Ibid. p. 197
641 A. Forster, “Britain” in I. Manners -  R. G. Whitman (eds), The Foreign Policies o f European 
Union Member States, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2000, pp. 47, 55-6; see also C. 
Hill, “United Kingdom: Sharpening Contradictions” in C. Hill (ed), The Actors in Europe’s 
Foreign Policy, London, Routledge, 1996, p. 84
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Finally, having argued that measuring Europeanisation is difficult, the authors 
conclude by arguing that Kissinger’s failure to distinguish between the UK and 
the EU in a speech entitled “Britain and the World” constitutes the most accurate 
measurement of the extent of the Europeanisation of British foreign policy642. 
Clearly, a badly prepared speech or at best third actors’ perceptions do not 
constitute relevant evidence. As was shown above, the process of 
Europeanisation of national foreign policy is voluntary and therefore establishing 
the causal significance of the EU requires evidence of national foreign policy 
makers’ considerations.
Consider French policy towards China. While it has been argued that change in 
French policy towards China in the early 1990s has been the outcome of a 
process of Europeanisation643, the theoretical framework presented here shows 
that the argument remains unconvincing. First, as far as the policy making 
process is concerned, it remains unclear what the variation is. France pursued 
collective decision-making both during the period when it preferred what has 
been referred to as a “confrontational” policy towards China and during the 
period when it preferred a policy of so-called “constructive engagement”. During 
the first period, France promoted the imposition of sanctions by the Community 
and during the second period France promoted the creation of the Asia-Europe 
Meeting644.
Second, adherence to procedural EU foreign policy norms was inconsistent in 
both periods. During the first period, France (and Germany) defected from the 
Community’s agreement to impose sanctions on China in response to the 
Tiananmen massacre and during the second period France (along with Germany, 
Italy and Spain) deviated from the established Community practice of 
cosponsoring a United Nations Commission on Human Rights resolution 
criticising China’s human rights record645. This constitutes further evidence that 
coordination is not a reflex, but the outcome of a calculation.
642 Ibid. p. 200
643 Wong, The Europeanisation o f French Foreign Policy.. op. cit.
644 Ibid. pp. 81-2, 84-5
645 Ibid. pp. 92, 94-5
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Third, it remains unclear why a policy that privileged French economic interests 
over respect for human rights is more consistent with substantive EU foreign 
policy norms than a policy based on sanctions in response to a massacre. At any 
rate, policy change was pursued when a new Prime Minister and a new President 
were elected. The motivations of French foreign policy makers that led to policy 
change cannot be attributed to EU dynamics. As was the case with Greek policy 
towards Turkey during the period covered by this thesis, policy change was the 
result of political turnover646. Finally, this particular case empirically 
demonstrates that the emergence of a discrepancy between national foreign 
policy and EU foreign policy is possible even after a national government has 
successfully uploaded its preferences onto the EU. The reason is simple; national 
preferences might change over time647.
Consider German foreign policy. As has been pointed out, the increased 
willingness to use military instruments constitutes the most “profound” change in 
German foreign policy since the end of the Cold War648. On the one hand, it has 
been argued that this change has been the outcome of Europeanisation649. It is 
indeed plausible to argue that German foreign policy makers have become 
convinced that it is appropriate to use military instruments in situations that fall 
within the scope of acceptable military action defined by the EU. The literature 
has also debated the room for maneuver that increasing post-Cold War US 
pressure on Germany to assume greater responsibilities within the context of 
NATO left German foreign policy makers650. On the other hand, it has been 
argued that “these changes were intended from early on”, that the government’ s 
efforts to pursue reform have been observable since 1987 and that they played a 
“key role” in overcoming the constraints imposed by public opinion651. The 
explanatory variables discussed in the literature on change in German foreign
646 Ibid. pp. 83-5, 93-5
647 As Pierson has pointed out, change in national preferences over time is on of the reason why 
gaps emerge between national preferences and EU institutions and policies; see Pierson, op. cit. 
pp. 139-40
648 R. Baumann -  G. Hellmann, “Germany and the Use of Military Force: ‘Total War’, the 
‘Culture of Restraint’ and the Quest for Normality” in D. Webber (ed), New Europe, New 
Germany, Old Foreign Policy? German Foreign Policy Since Unification, London, Frank Cass,
2001, p. 66
649 Miskimmon -  Paterson, “Foreign and Security Policy...”, op. cit. pp. 331-5; Miskimmon -  
Paterson, “Adapting to Europe...”, op. cit. pp. 31, 35-9
650 Ibid. pp. 69-77
651 Baumann -  Hellmann, op. cit. pp. 64, 68-9, 73, emphasis added
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policy are similar to those incorporated into the theoretical framework of this 
thesis. Process-tracing the observable implications of these explanations for the 
definition of the policy problems the use of military instruments was intended to 
address, the alternative courses of action German foreign policy makers 
considered and the manner in which the latter were assessed would allow 
researchers to establish which of the above variables were causally significant for 
change in German foreign policy. If one can show that German foreign policy 
makers’ intentions to pursue policy change had been crystallised prior to the end 
of the Cold War and the establishment of the relevant EU rules -  as was the case 
with Simitis’ preference for communitisation -  explanations that emphasise the 
causal significance of structural incentives and the role of the EU can be refuted.
Consider Finland’s policy towards Russia. It has been argued that Finland 
promoted the Northern Dimension Initiative in an attempt to multilateralise its 
policy towards and engage with Russia and that Finnish Prime Minister Paavo 
Lipponen -  assisted by Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari -  was the key policy 
entrepreneur652. Certain beliefs regarding the future of the integration process and 
Finland’s role within the EU that present similarities with Simitis’ views on the 
matter have been attributed to Lipponen. As has been pointed out, Lipponen “has 
often been seen as the personification” of a policy based on the idea that further 
integration and Finland’s active participation in the EU will increase Finland’s 
influence and security653. It might be suggested in this sense that the Northern 
Dimension Initiative was the outcome of the entrepreneurship of a key foreign 
policy maker, who was highly committed to his internal vision for Finnish 
foreign policy. At the same time, however, it has been pointed out that Finland’s 
Northern Dimension Initiative was not particularly coherent. In fact, it has been 
argued that the Commission viewed it as a “sublime piece of mysticism and 
nonsense”654. It might be suggested that Lipponen was not committed to an 
internal, well-formulated vision for Finnish foreign policy and that he was 
therefore quite responsive to the policy context. Indeed, Lipponen explicitly drew
652 D. Arter, “Small State Influence within the EU: The Case of Finland’s ‘Northern Dimension 
Initiative’”, Journal o f Common Market Studies, 38: 5, 2000, pp. 683-7; Rieker, 
Europeanisation. .., op. cit. pp. 104-5
653 Rieker, Europeanisation..., op. cit. p. 103
654 Arter, op. cit. p. 682
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parallels between the Northern Dimension Initiative and the EU’s Mediterranean 
policy655. It might be the case that Finnish foreign policy makers identified 
benefits in incorporating EU foreign policy practices established within the 
context of the EU’s Mediterranean policy into their policy towards Russia. 
Testing alternative explanations of the Finnish government’s initiative that 
emphasise Lipponen’s leadership and the role of established EU practices would 
make it possible to establish the origins of the initiative.
Finally, consider the policies of Poland and the Baltic states -  especially 
Lithuania -  towards Russia. It has been argued that Poland and Lithuania 
promoted the Eastern Dimension and generally the EU’s involvement in 
neighbouring states, such as Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus in an attempt to 
contain Russia656. While the pursuit of stability, democracy and prosperity in the 
region657 is consistent with the logic of EU foreign policy, EU support for its 
Eastern neighbours as a type of containment policy aimed at Russia is not. While 
historical experiences, geographical proximity, relative power positions vis-a-vis 
Russia and Russia’s assertiveness make these member-states concerned about 
Russia, they pursue quite different policies. Finland believes that the EU can 
provide security, while Poland and Lithuania reserve that role for the US and 
NATO658. The discussion of uploading in the literature would have led one to 
identify the efforts to promote both the Northern and the Eastern Dimension as 
Europeanisation. The theoretical framework presented here, however, sheds a 
different light on these policies and raises interesting research questions. Why 
does Finland prefer to engage Russia, while Poland and Lithuania prefer to 
contain it? Do national foreign policy makers understand the problem that their 
policies towards Russia are intended to address differently? Were the initiatives 
that national foreign policy makers pursued the outcome of an assessment of 
relevant EU foreign policy practices? It follows from the above that the
655 Ibid. p. 686
656 V. Kononenko, ‘“Normal Neighbours’ or ‘Trouble-Makers’? The Baltic States in the Context 
of Russia-EU Relations” in Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook 2006, Tallinn, Estonian Foreign 
Policy Institute, pp. 80-1; M. Leonard -  N. Popescu, “A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations”, 
European Council on Foreign Relations; M. Zaborowsky -  K. Longhurst, “America’s Protege in 
the East? The Emergence of Poland as a Regional Leader”, International Affairs, 79: 5,2003, p. 
1014
657 Kononenko, op. cit. p. 80
658 Zaborowsky -  Longhurst, op. cit.
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theoretical framework constructed for the purposes of this thesis can be fruitfully 
applied to the study of the foreign policies of numerous EU member-states, 
which present empirical puzzles that have considerable real-world implications, 
thus advancing the theoretically informed empirical study of foreign policy.
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